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ABSTRACT 
As typological category, criminal entrepreneurs have a different modus operandi from most 
traditional criminals. This study develops a theory of successful criminal entrepreneurs, 
operating in non-hierarchically structured organised crime. Successful criminal entrepreneurs 
cannot be described through classic criminological theories such as low self-control theory. 
The theory of successful criminal entrepreneurs provides an understanding of the leadership 
of criminal entrepreneurs which includes vision, leadership style and orientation, in addition 
to their identity. The theory also provides an understanding of the operational approaches 
used by successful criminal entrepreneurs in addition to the use of their social networks. The 
theory of successful criminal entrepreneurs argues that successful criminal entrepreneurs start 
their careers with a clearly defined vision. Criminal entrepreneurs then lead people towards 
their vision with a charismatic leadership style, employing social and personal orientation. 
The operational approaches adopted by criminal entrepreneurs for success in fulfilling their 
visions include filling a gap in the market, brokerage, bribery and blackmail. These 
operational approaches are associated with both the location of the criminal entrepreneur in 
the network and the embedded resources within their network. Among the various networks 
that criminal entrepreneurs are part of, they occupy both a brokerage position, and a central 
position within their network of speciality, such as an illegal gambling network. The 
embedded resources in the criminal entrepreneur networks include criminals, police, politics, 
money laundering and gang capital, in addition to mentors who can provide the necessary 
human capital for the success of the criminal entrepreneur’s career.       
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1. Chapter One: Introduction 
This study argues that successful criminal entrepreneurs as typological category, have a 
different modus operandi, compared to the classic criminals described in low self-control 
theory. The purpose of this study is to develop a theory of successful criminal entrepreneurs. 
The aim of the theory is to gain a better understanding of how criminal entrepreneurs succeed 
in founding and/or operating criminal organisations. 
Throughout time, organised crime has damaged economies and communities simultaneously. 
On an international level, organised crime groups make $US870 billion a year from illegal 
activities that damage communities and economies (Metherell 2013). The focus of this study 
is Australia, and at a national level, organised crime cost the Australian government $36 
billion in 2013-2014 (Dawson, 2015). 
Researchers and scholars have studied organised crime in order to gain a better understanding 
of how it is founded, operated and succeeds in crime (Bright, Hughes and Chalmers 2012; 
Bright et al. 2015; Kleemans and Van de Bunt 2008). Understanding organised crime has 
proved to be a challenge, starting with its definition. There are various definitions of 
organised crime, but they lack consistency. The inconsistency revolves around defining both 
‘crime’ and ‘organised’ (Finckenauer 2005; Maltz 1976; Paoli 2002). For instance, crimes 
committed by organised groups can also be carried out by non-organised groups (Finckenauer 
2005). Some definitions imply that organised crime groups have a hierarchical structure 
(Finckenauer 2005; Maltz 1976), however, recent studies have shown that some organised 
crime groups have a non-hierarchical structure (Lauchs and Staines 2012; Lauchs, Keast and 
Yousefpour 2011; Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain 2012). The inconsistency in the definitions 
of organised crime reflects the complexity of the phenomena. As a result of its complexity, 
researchers have studied various divisions and aspects. 
Bright et al. (2015) and Bright, Hughes and Chalmers (2012) focused on and outlined the 
structure of illicit drugs networks. Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain (2012) and  Lauchs, Keast 
and Yousefpour (2011) focused on corruption networks that facilitate organised crime. The 
work of Morselli (2003, 2001), Lauchs and Staines (2012) focused on criminal entrepreneurs 
involved in drugs and corruption, in particular outlining their networks and the roles they 
played in their success. These previous studies are all consistent in finding that criminal 
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entrepreneurs who operate in organised crime are skilled individuals who are able to attract 
followers and occupy influential positions within their criminal network.  
This study extends the efforts of the previous researchers by identifying the characteristics 
and skills of successful criminal entrepreneurs, and their successful operational approaches in 
crime, in addition to outlining their social and criminal networks in the different phases of 
their careers. The motive behind examining the careers of successful criminal entrepreneurs 
in different phases is to outline the differences and changes in their characteristics, 
operational approaches and social networks prior to, and at the peak of their success. By 
closely examining the careers of successful criminal entrepreneurs this study outlines the way 
that criminal entrepreneurs develop their skills, outlines their sophisticated operational 
approaches and the changes made to those approaches through their career, and examines 
how they use and create their social networks in creating a criminal organisation and 
succeeding in crime.     
In other words, this study combines the three main approaches to studying non-hierarchical 
organised crime: 1) focusing on a specific network, 2) location, and 3) the criminal 
entrepreneurs behind the criminal organisation. This study combines the three approaches by 
examining successful criminal entrepreneurs, and their social and criminal networks in 
Sydney, Australia. The criminal entrepreneurs featured in this study are Leonard McPherson, 
George Freeman, Abraham Saffron and Sir Robert Askin.  
Prior to providing a brief profile of the four Australian criminal entrepreneurs whom are the 
focus of this study, this section provides a brief historical background of the history of crime 
in Australia. In 1788, Great Britain started transporting its convicts to Australia for 
imprisonment (Robinson and Lincoln, 2010). Most of the convicts never left Australia and it 
became their homeland (Robinson and Lincoln, 2010). The first criminal group formed were 
not from native citizen, but escaped whom originally were from various European countries, 
including Great Britain (Robinson and Lincoln, 2010). The criminal groups was called 
bushrangers, whom were give the name as they hid in the bushes (forest) were they survived 
by hunting and fishing (Robinson and Lincoln, 2010). The bushrangers were skilled criminals 
who carried criminal activities and were able to form criminal groups (Robinson and Lincoln, 
2010). The first bushranger was John Caesar also known as Black Caesar who later was 
joined by five or six escaped convicts (Cunneen and Gillen, 2005). Martin Cash was also a 
bushranger who formed marauding gangs which carried out hold-ups, shooting robberies, 
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fights and brawls (Robson and Ward, 1966). Jack Donohoe ‘Bold’ also known as the Wild 
Colonial Boy, was one of the most famous bushrangers who joined forces with an Irish and 
English gangs and robbed from the rich and gave to the poor also known as the Robin Hood 
style (Ward, 1966). Later after the discovery of gold in 1851, Black Douglas and his gang 
operated in the bushes and robbed travellers carrying gold receipts and cheques, in addition to 
robbing the digger’s tents in daytime while they were away working and the shops at night 
(Robinson and Lincoln, 2010). In 1855, Daniel Morgan was another bushranger who was 
known as a violent, abusive and a murderer who often killed for no clear motive or reason 
(McQuilton, 2005). It is believed that bushranging came to an end with the Felon 
Apprehension Act of 1865, which authorised anyone to shoot and kill any bushranger without 
a warrant, arrest or trial (Campbell, 1986). The Felon Apprehension Act of 1865 was 
introduced mainly to limit the activities of Ben Hall and his gang in 1865 (Campbell, 1986; 
Penzig, 1972). Hall and his gang were known as one of the most efficient and organised 
bushranger gang who specialised in raids and holdups (Penzig, 1972). However, the era of 
bushranger is believed to have ended with the shooting of Edward ‘Ned’ Kelly, whose gang 
also carried holdups and bank robberies  (Barry, 1974). Although with the death of Ned Kelly 
the bushrangers gangs era ended, gangs and organised crime in Australia did not (Barry, 
1974; Robinson and Lincoln, 2010).  
Yet, in the late 1920s a new era of organised crime managed by the razor gangs started (Allen 
and Irving, 1981). The ‘razor’ name was given to them as their weapon of choice was the 
straight shaving razor blade (Allen and Irving, 1981; Allen, 1986). The razor gangs were 
formed and led by two female leaders, Matilda Mary ‘Tilly’ Devine also known as the 
‘Queen of Woolloomooloo’ and Kathleen Mary Josephine ‘Kate’ Leigh who was known as 
the ‘Queen of Surry Hills’ (Allen and Irving, 1981; Allen, 1986). Tilly and Kate were arch-
enemies, both leaders battled for control of Sydney underworld, and their activities included 
prostitution rackets, selling liquor after hours and illegal drugs (Allen and Irving, 1981; Allen, 
1986). 
Kate’s main enterprise was supplying ‘sly-grog’ which is selling liquor after legal trading 
hours in Sydney (Allen and Irving, 1981; Allen, 1986). Yet, Kate’s empire also supplied 
drinking venues, prostitutes, illegal betting, gambling and cocaine (Allen, 1986). Tilly’s main 
business on the other hand focused primarily on prostitution and brothels (Allen and Irving, 
1981). The rivalry produced gruesome deaths and injuries, it is estimated that by the end of 
the razor gangs war in the late 1930s, more than 500 individuals including prostitutes working 
  
Chapter 1: Introduction   4  
for both gang leaders were either murdered or injured by the razor blade (Allen and Irving, 
1981; Allen, 1986). 
Also in the 1920, Joseph Leslie Theodore ‘Squizzy’ Taylor, was a notorious criminal from 
the underworld, known for armed robbery, prostitution, the sale of illegal liquor and drugs, 
race fixing and protection rackets (McConville, 1990). Taylor also setup a jury-rigging 
service with the help of Paddy Boardman (McConville, 1990).  Early in his career, Taylor 
joined his first gang known as the ‘Push’ where he engaged in pickpocketing and other minor 
misdemeanors (McConville, 1990). Yet, later in his career, his crimes progressed and he was 
involved in various murders and the ‘Fitzroy Vendetta’ gang war (McConville, 1990). Taylor 
was also involved in orchestrating robberies with other criminals and criminal groups 
(McConville, 1990). In 1927, Taylor died from gunshot wounds during an altercation with 
rival gangster, John ‘Snowy’ Cutmore (McConville, 1990). Although, Taylor succeeded in a 
number of robberies in addition to escaping murder charges due to a lack of evidence, he was 
not well enough connected to police to gain higher level of immunity and avoid prosecution, 
and therefore went onto hiding between 1921 and 1922 (McConville, 1990). The next chapter 
of organised crime in Australia had various leaders with different modus operandi, and 
stronger ties with corrupt police and politicians. The four organised crime leaders this study 
focuses on are Leonard McPherson, George Freeman, Abe Saffron and Robert Askin.                
 
Leonard McPherson (1921 – 1996) was an organised crime leader in Sydney, Australia 
(Reeves 2007a; Morton and Lobez 2011; Coy 2010). McPherson was one of the most 
successful and influential criminal entrepreneurs. As a criminal entrepreneur, McPherson 
murdered, blackmailed, and bribed criminals and non-criminals in addition to protecting 
selected criminals and criminal groups (Reeves 2007a; Morton and Lobez 2011; Coy 2010). 
McPherson was able to escape prosecution for various crimes, including murder, at the peak 
of his criminal career (Reeves 2007a; Morton and Lobez 2011; Coy 2010). Although 
McPherson’s criminal records show a ruthless vicious criminal, his criminal operations were 
well thought-out and sophisticated (Reeves 2007a; Morton and Lobez 2011; Coy 2010).  
Freeman (1935 – 1990) was also an organised crime leader in Sydney Australia (Freeman 
1988; Reeves 2011; Morton and Lobez 2011). As a successful criminal entrepreneur, 
Freeman was the leader of an illegal SP bookmaking network (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; 
Morton and Lobez 2011). In addition to illegal gambling, Freeman robbed, murdered, bribed 
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and blackmailed at the peak of his criminal career (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Morton and 
Lobez 2011). Despite engaging in various criminal activities, Freeman was not prosecuted 
and/or charged for the vicious crimes he committed at the peak of his career (Freeman 1988; 
Reeves 2011; Morton and Lobez 2011). The only crime Freeman was charged with at the 
peak of his career was tax evasion (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Morton and Lobez 2011), as 
was Saffron.  
Saffron (1919 – 2006) was a successful criminal entrepreneur and an organised crime leader 
in Sydney, Australia (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010). Saffron was well-known for 
his illegal liquor trade and successful blackmail operations (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; 
Piper 2010). Unlike McPherson and Freeman, Saffron never carried out violent crimes 
personally (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010), however, Saffron framed those who 
challenged him with crimes that have not been solved and were not committed by them 
(Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010). Saffron is also believed to have been behind the 
disappearance of journalist Juanita Nielsen and the Luna Park Ghost Train fire that claimed 
the lives of seven people (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010).  
Askin, like Saffron, never committed a violent crime personally. Askin (1907 – 1981) was 
born in Sydney, Australia (Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989; Hickie 1985) and 
facilitated the commission of crime and supported organised crime and its leaders (Hancock 
2006; Goot 2007; Hickie 1985). Askin was a corrupt politician and a member of a criminal 
organisation, who accepted bribes and supported corruption within NSW government 
(Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989; Hickie 1985). Askin protected corrupt police, 
including police commissioners and illegal casino operators (Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; 
Reading 1989; Hickie 1985). Despite being involved in organised crime, Askin was never 
charged and prosecuted for the crimes he committed (Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 
1989; Hickie 1985). The rationale behind focusing on the four criminal entrepreneurs is that 
they lived in Sydney, New South Wales, in the same era. Thus they shared the same 
environment in addition to some of the same resources, particularly people. In effect, the 
author can compare the four criminal entrepreneurs operational approaches in addition to 
other factors discuss in further details in the upcoming chapters, which includes their personal 
characteristics and social networks.    
By examining the successful careers of the four criminal entrepreneurs featured in this study, 
the author aims to develop a theory of successful criminal entrepreneurs. The theory will 
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outline the characteristics, operational approaches and networks of successful criminal 
entrepreneurs and how these things contribute to their success in Australia.   
Chapter Two outlines and discusses the literature on organised crime and criminal 
entrepreneurship. The literature review starts by outlining the cost and damage that organised 
crime has had on Australian society and the economy. The motive behind developing a 
‘theory’ and then the definitions of organised crime and the controversies around them are 
outlined and discussed. The structures of organised crime are illustrated and discussed. The 
focus of this study is the non-hierarchical structure of organised crime found in Australia 
(Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain 2012). The theories and approaches adopted to have a better 
understanding of non-hierarchical organised crime and their limitations are discussed. This 
study focuses on the entrepreneurship approach and its role in founding and operating 
organised crime.  
Prior to discussing criminal entrepreneurship, the concept of entrepreneurship and its 
definitions are outlined and discussed, then the theories adopted to have a better 
understanding of entrepreneurial behaviours and their limitations are discussed. The concept 
of criminal entrepreneurship is presented. The early definition and study of criminal 
entrepreneurs and their role in organised crime are discussed. The only three studies that 
addressed successful criminal entrepreneurs in details are discussed. From the literature on 
criminal entrepreneurship three main conclusions are drawn: criminal entrepreneurs are 
leaders, who engage in brokerage and usually have a mentor. Further literature on leadership 
regarding vision, leadership style and orientation is examined. The literature on the 
operational approaches of criminal entrepreneurs, which include delegation, brokerage, 
bribery and blackmail, are discussed and outlined. The literature on mentorship and criminal 
achievement is discussed, and finally the literature on human capital and crime is discussed. 
The literature review chapter concludes by outlining the gaps in the literature, and the 
research questions of this study.    
Chapter Three outlines the methodological approach of this study. This study adapts a 
qualitative approach with a case study design. First, the framework of this study is outlined. 
This study is based on Smith’s (2009) three modi framework. The three modi framework is 
comprised of modus essendi, modus operandi and modus vivendi. In this study, modus 
essendi focuses on criminal entrepreneur leadership which is composed of vision, leadership 
style and orientation, in addition to identity. Modus operandi focuses on the operational 
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approaches of criminal entrepreneurs. Modus operandi outlines the crimes and activities of 
the four criminal entrepreneurs featured in this study in an effort to understand how they were 
able to carry out their crimes successfully, and outline any changes to their modus operandi 
during their life and the causes or reasons behind these changes. Modus vivendi involves the 
value of criminal entrepreneur social networks. The value of networks in modus vivendi is 
outlined through examination of the embedded resources in the criminal entrepreneur 
network, including their criminal, police, gang and political capital, and money launderers. 
The measure used for dividing the criminal entrepreneurs’ lives and careers into four phases 
is presented and the rationale behind it is outlined. Finally, the methodology chapter outlines 
the data extraction process and data resources, prior to introducing the data itself, and the 
results chapter.  
Chapter Four illustrates the data extracted from the data resources outlined in the 
methodology chapter. It starts by providing a brief biographical background of the four 
criminal entrepreneurs featured in this study, then the criminal entrepreneur modus essendi 
data are presented. The extracted modus essendi data describes the leadership of the four 
criminal entrepreneurs by demonstrating their vision, leadership style and orientation. The 
extracted modus essendi data outlines the identity and identity status of the criminal 
entrepreneurs. The modus operandi data of the criminal entrepreneurs is then outlined. The 
data extracted illustrates their operational approaches in advancing their criminal career. Data 
about the criminal entrepreneurs’ modus vivendi is presented. The data extracted illustrates 
the embedded resources in the criminal entrepreneur networks. Finally the data chapter 
concludes by outlining consistent patterns found in the four criminal entrepreneurs featured in 
this study.    
In the fifth chapter, the outcomes of the data and results chapter are discussed. It starts by 
examining the visions of the four criminal entrepreneurs, and their sources. The leadership 
styles of the criminal entrepreneurs, and their orientations regarding fulfilling their vision, are 
outlined and discussed. Next, the original contribution of this thesis to the literature regarding 
vision and leadership is outlined and presented. The identity and identity status of the 
criminal entrepreneurs are discussed. By outlining the vision, leadership style, orientation, 
their identity and identity status of the criminal entrepreneurs, the modus essendi discussion is 
concluded and its original contributions are outlined.  
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The modus operandi of criminal entrepreneurs is discussed. The modus operandi of the 
criminal entrepreneurs focused on in this study includes filling a gap in the criminal market, 
brokerage, bribery and blackmail. The original contribution of this thesis regarding the modus 
operandi of criminal entrepreneurs is then presented and discussed. Next, the modus vivendi 
of criminal entrepreneurs is discussed. This focuses on the embedded resources in their 
network which include criminals, police, politics, money laundering and gang capital, in 
addition to mentors and human capital. The original contribution of this thesis to research, as 
drawn from the modus vivendi of criminal entrepreneurs, is outlined. Chapter Five concludes 
by presenting the theory of successful criminal entrepreneurs, in addition to the limitations of 
the study and suggestions for future research. Finally Chapter Six provides an extensive 
conclusion regarding the current thesis and its outcomes.                 
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2. Chapter Two: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Criminologists and sociologists study organised crime to aid policymakers and law 
enforcement agencies in developing more efficient policies, crime prevention and early 
intervention programmes. There are various ways of studying and understanding organised 
crime. A promising approach is through understanding criminal entrepreneurs, who found 
and/or operate criminal organisations. This study aims to develop a theory that provides an 
understanding of successful criminal entrepreneurs who found and operate criminal 
organisations.   
This chapter starts by discussing the reasons for studying organised crime, particularly in 
Australia, and then the definitions of organised crime and the controversies around them are 
discussed. The two main structures of organised crime, hierarchical and non-hierarchical, are 
presented (Hagan 1983; McIllwain 1999; Spapens 2010). The hierarchical structure has a 
single defined leader and different ranking members (UNDOC 2002). The non-hierarchical 
structure is formed of loosely connected criminal entrepreneurs working collectively toward a 
collective goal (Hagan 1983; McIllwain 1999; Spapens 2010). The hierarchical structure is 
more evident in the United States, in groups like the Italian-American Mafia (Hess and Osers 
1973; Ruggiero 2015). In Australia, the focus of this study, organised crime, is spread 
through a non-hierarchical structure (Lauchs and Staines 2012; Lauchs, Keast and 
Yousefpour 2011; Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain 2012). After outlining the structure of 
organised crime, the various theories and approaches adopted to understand non-
hierarchically structured organised crime are outlined, and their limitations are discussed.   
Based on the literature, three main approaches have been adopted in order to understand non-
hierarchical organised crime: 1) by examining a specific crime network, 2) by studying 
criminal activities within a specific location, and 3) by studying the entrepreneurs who are 
part of organised criminal activities (Morselli 2003, 2001; Lauchs and Staines 2012; Lauchs, 
Keast and Chamberlain 2012; Bright and Delaney 2013; Bright, Hughes and Chalmers 2012; 
Bright et al. 2015). This study connects the three approaches by examining criminal 
entrepreneurs in a specific location, which is Sydney, Australia, and examining all their 
networks, their characteristics and operational approaches. To obtain a better understanding 
of criminal entrepreneurship, the origin and definition of ‘entrepreneurship’ is first outlined 
and discussed.  
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According to the various definitions and studies of entrepreneurship, leadership is outlined as 
one of the most significant skills that entrepreneurs have, and this is also found in organised 
crime leaders and founders (Morselli 2001; Lauchs and Staines 2012; Lauchs, Keast and 
Chamberlain 2012). The literature on leadership is outlined and discussed. Three main 
components of leadership are considered in this study; vision, leadership style and 
orientation. After defining entrepreneurship and leadership, the theories applied in order to 
have a better understanding of entrepreneur behaviours are presented, and their limitations are 
discussed. 
After outlining the concept of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial behaviour, the limited 
literature on criminal entrepreneurship is discussed, including the only three studies of 
successful criminal entrepreneurs. Finally this chapter concludes by outlining the gaps in the 
literature and the framework adopted in this study to address the gaps and the research 
questions of this study. This chapter proceeds by outlining the cost of organised crime.  
2.2 Why organised crime? 
In its simplest form, organised crime is coordinated criminal activities among connected 
criminals for their personal gain. The reason for studying organised crime is the damage it has 
done to the economy and community. 
On an international scale, organised crime groups make more than $US870 billion a year 
(Metherell 2013). On a national scale, organised crime cost the Australian government $36 
billion in 2013-2014 (Dawson, 2015). The cost of organised crime in terms of the damage it 
causes to communities, and for prevention precautions is the equivalent of 24% of Australia’s 
social security and welfare budget (Dawson, 2015).   
The cost of organised crime is reflected in the harm it causes to the individual, the community 
and the economy. For the individual, the harm resulting from organised crime could be 
physical, such as being raped or otherwise assaulted; property-related (e.g. destroyed or 
stolen); or psychological, such as being frightened, intimated or traumatised (Finckenauer 
2005). In the community, it triggers higher levels of fear of crime, which has a significant 
negative effect on the quality of life and trust levels in the community (Finckenauer 2005; 
Putnam 1995). The harm of organised crime also extends beyond individuals and 
communities into the national economy. According to Van Dijk (2007, p. 49):  
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… crime ... increases the cost of business, whether through direct loss of 
goods or the costs of taking precautions such as hiring security guards, 
building fences, or installing burglar alarm systems. In the extreme, foreign 
firms will decline to invest and domestic ones will flee the country for a more 
peaceful locale. 
Van Dijk (2007) also pointed out that on a universal scale, business executives rank 
organised crime and corruption as the second most important impediment when engaging in 
business with other countries. Organised crime deters tourists from visiting and foreign 
investors from investing in corrupt countries, based on the types of crimes carried by 
organised crime groups (Van Dijk 2007).  
The crimes carried out by organised crime groups are divided into three main categories 
based on their seriousness, low, medium and high, as shown in Figure 1 (Smith 2014). Low 
seriousness crimes carried out by organised crime groups include small-scale street crimes, 
family-based local crimes, small-scale business fraud and tax evasion (Smith 2014). 
Organised cybercrime and scams, organised environmental crimes, organised maritime piracy 
and serious financial crimes are considered medium serious crimes (Smith 2014). The most 
serious crimes carried out by organised crime groups include child exploitation, human 
trafficking, corporate fraud, running drug cartels and terrorist activities (Smith 2014). These 
criminal activities are behind the high cost of organised crime for governments and 
communities, and therefore, a greater understanding of organised crime in Australia is 
needed. This study aims to contribute to the literature and fight against organised crime by 
developing a theory about successful criminal entrepreneurs who are the founders and 
influential members of criminal organisations. The next section discusses the rationale behind 
focusing on developing a theory.  
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Figure 1 Ranked seriousness of organised criminal activities. 
Seriousness of crime  Criminal activities  
 
 
High  
            Terrorist activities  
           Drug cartels  
          Corporate fraud  
         Human trafficking  
        Child exploitation  
  
 
Medium  
       Serious financial crime  
      Organised maritime piracy  
     Organised environmental crime  
    Organised cybercrime and scams  
  
 
Low  
   Small-scale business fraud and tax evasion  
  Family-based local crime  
Small-scale street crime  
Seriousness → 
Smith (2014, 2) 
2.3 Why a theory? 
A theory is ‘a set of interrelated constructs (concepts), definitions, and propositions that 
present a systemic view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables, with the 
purpose of explaining and predicting the phenomena’ (Bull and Willard 1993, 187). In other 
words, a theory simplifies complex phenomenon.  
Recent studies adapted social network theory and decoded the structure of organised crime, 
and found that organised crime is driven by criminal entrepreneurs (Bright et al. 2015; Lauchs 
and Staines 2012). The study of Morselli (2001) in addition to recent studies focusing on 
criminal entrepreneurs by Lauchs and Staines (2012), Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain (2012) 
showed that criminal entrepreneurs have complex social and criminal networks in addition to 
operational approaches. A theory would simplify the complex structure and relationships 
between the operational approach of criminal entrepreneurs, including their behaviours, self-
concepts, and social and criminal networks. The theory would finally outline how the 
different elements complement one another in achieving the goals of the criminal 
entrepreneurs and their organisations. Although simplification is a theory’s greatest asset, 
however, it also has been seen as its main limitation (Romer 1996). According to Romer 
(1996), because a theory is able to simplify complex phenomena, it could also over simplify 
them. Richard Darwin (1987) has responded to the ‘over simplification’ criticism by arguing: 
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“If I ask an engineer how a steam engine works, I have a pretty fair 
idea of the general kind of answer that would satisfy me. Like Julian 
Huxley, I should definitely not be impressed if the engineer said that it 
was propelled by ‘force locomotif’. And if he started boring on about 
the whole being greater than the sum of its part, I would interrupt him: 
‘Never mind about that, tell me how it works.’ What I would want to 
hear is something about how the parts of an engine interact with each 
other to produce the behaviour of the whole engine. I would initially 
be prepared to accept an explanation in terms of quite large 
subcomponent, whose own internal structure and behaviour might be 
quite complicated and, as yet unexplained. The units of an initially 
satisfying explanation could have names like fire-box, boiler, cylinder, 
piston, steam governor. … Given that the units each do their particular 
thing, I can then understand how they interact to make the whole 
engine move.  
“Of course I am then at liberty to ask how each part works. Having 
previously accepted the fact that the steam governor regulates that 
flow of steam, and having used this fact in my understanding of the 
behaviour of the whole engine. I now turn my curiosity on the steam 
governor itself” (Romer 1996, 3-4).    
In other words, Darwin argues that explanations operate on many levels that must be 
consistent with one another (Romer 1996). The role of the theory is to collect complicated 
and disorganised information, and organise it in a hierarchical structure (Romer 1996). By 
doing so, a well-structured theory would be able to illustrate to the reader ‘how to carve a 
system at the joints’ (Romer 1996, 4), in other words, how the different components interact 
and work collectively together. A good theory will break a complex mechanism or a system 
down into sub-systems that work meaningfully together in creating a significant outcome 
(Romer 1996). This study develops a theory that describes, anticipates, and provide a better 
understanding of successful criminal entrepreneur behaviour in criminal organisations. A 
developed theory of criminal entrepreneurship will aid policymakers in developing policies 
targeting the influential members of organised crime, in addition to creating crime prevention 
and early intervention programmes to prevent the creation of criminal entrepreneurs. 
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The previous two sections have outlined the drive and rationale behind this study of 
developing a theory of successful criminal entrepreneurship. The literature review starts by 
defining the main problem, organised crime.  
2.4 Defining organised crime   
Organised crime in its simplest form involves connected individuals who carry out crimes 
collectively for personal gain. This section argues that many definitions of organised crime 
have attracted a number of criticisms: first, the vague definitions of the words ‘crime’ and 
‘organised’; and second, defining organised crime based on a list of specific crimes. This 
section concludes by assuming the Oyster Bay definition, which was adopted by Meagher 
(1983), to describe organised crime in Australia.     
There are various definitions of organised crime (Le and Lauchs 2013; Paoli 2002; Van Dijk 
2007; Maltz 1976). For instance, in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 
organised crime is defined as ‘the unlawful activities of the members of a highly organized, 
disciplined association engaged in supplying illegal goods and services, including but not 
limited to gambling, prostitution, loan sharking, narcotics, labour racketeering, and other 
unlawful activities of members of organizations.’(Finckenauer 2005, 69). Organised crime is 
also defined as ‘a structured association, established over a period of time, of more than two 
persons acting in concert …’ (Calderoni 2008, 271). Reuter (1983) adds ‘organized crime 
consists of organizations that have durability, hierarchy and involvement in a multicity of 
criminal activities … The Mafia provides the most enduring and significant form of organized 
crime’ (Cited by Paoli (2002, 55)).  
Defining organised crime has proved to be a challenge (Le and Lauchs 2013; Paoli 2002; Van 
Dijk 2007; Maltz 1976). The definitions lack consistency, revolving around the definition of 
the words ‘crime’ and ‘organised’. For instance, in the definition of organised crime, the word 
‘crime’ is usually used to refer to an aggregate of a specific set of ‘crimes’ (Maltz 1976, p. 
399), however, ‘crime’ can mean ‘a specific behaviour or act’ or ‘a set of behaviours 
encompassing all crimes’ (Maltz 1976, p. 399). ‘Crime’ is also used in the definition of 
organised crime to refer to an unspecified group of people, for example: ‘Organized crime 
controls the scavenger industry in Westchester’ (Maltz 1976, p. 399). Maltz (1976) argued 
that definitions of organised crime are inconsistent due to the vagueness of the definition of 
‘crime’ in organised crime. While Maltz (1976) found the challenge and inconsistency in 
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defining ‘organised crime’ in ‘crime’, Finckenauer (2005) argued that the definition of the 
word ‘organised’ is also inconsistent across the definitions of organised crime.  
Finckenauer (2005) argued that not all organised crime is organised in terms of having a 
defined structure, such as a hierarchy (e.g. the Italian Mafia) as shown in Paoli (2002, 55) 
definition. In a hierarchical structure, an organised criminal group has a defined leader and 
members with different rankings, and all the members define themselves as part of a specific 
group or gang (UNDOC 2002). Hierarchically structured organised groups often share mutual 
norms and follow specific codes and culture (UNDOC 2002), not all organised crime is part 
of a defined hierarchical structure.  
Some criminal groups and organised crime are formed of loosely connected criminal 
entrepreneurs who join the criminal organisation to carry out a specific job or play a specific 
role in an organised crime (Spapens 2010; Paoli 2002; Smith 1980; Haller 1990). These 
criminal groups are sometimes formed by members who did not know one another in the past, 
but all have been connected by the criminal entrepreneur who is organising the crime. Even 
though the members of the criminal group did not previously know each other, their trust in 
one another is based on their trust in the entrepreneur who brought them together to work 
towards a collective goal, which is usually to commit a crime and harvest the profits (Morselli 
2001, 2003, 2005; Lauchs and Staines 2012). Following the crime or the purpose of the 
entrepreneur’s creation of the criminal group, the members can leave the group and never 
return (UNDOC 2002).  
These types of criminal groups are known as decentralised and are not very organised or 
structured, and are also referred to as having a non-hierarchical structure (UNDOC 2002). 
These types of criminal groups do not have members with different rankings (UNDOC 2002; 
Lauchs and Staines 2012), although they could have a leader with less power and authority 
over the members (UNDOC 2002; Lauchs and Staines 2012), and therefore it is hard to 
describe these criminal groups as organised or having a hierarchical structure. The last 
criticism of the definitions of organised crime concerns the definition of organised crime 
according to a list of crimes carried out by organised groups.    
Some definitions of organised crime focus on defining a list of crimes committed by criminal 
groups (Finckenauer 2005), such as the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 
definition of organised crime, which includes but not limited to: 
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- Gambling 
- Loan sharking 
- Importation and exportation of 
narcotics 
- Prostitution 
- Bribery  
- Labour racketeering 
- Unlawful activities  
 
The argument against the definition of organised crime based on a list of crimes, stressed by 
Finckenauer (2005), is that offences that are committed by organised groups can also be 
carried out by individuals and/or groups who are neither organised nor engaged in these 
crimes on a continuous basis. Although there are some controversies around the definitions of 
organised crime, this study will adopt a definition of organised crime, despite the criticism. 
The definition will aid this study in choosing successful criminal entrepreneurs in Australia, 
who were part of organised crime. This study will adhere to the Oyster Bay definition of 
organised crime, which is: 
Organised crime is a product of a self-perpetuating criminal conspiracy to 
wring exorbitant profits from our society by any means – fair or foul, legal 
and illegal. It survives on fear and corruption. By one or another means it 
obtains a high degree of immunity from the law. It is totalitarian in 
organisation. A way of life, it imposes rigid discipline on underlings to do 
the dirty work while the top men of organised crime are generally 
insulated from the criminal acts and the consequent danger of prosecution. 
(Bersten 1990, P. 45) 
Bersten (1990) definition of organised crime in Australia is based on  Meagher (1983) 
definition of organised crime, who was a former Counsel assisting the Costigan Royal 
Commission. There are two main reasons for choosing the Oyster Bay definition for this 
study. First, the definition was introduced in 1965, which falls within the time frame of the 
life and death of the four criminal figures featured in this study, who lived between 1907 and 
2006. Second, this definition described organised crime in Australia in 1965, and Meagher 
(1983) gave the following justification of why this definition fits organised crime in Australia 
during that period: 
1) The criminal activities are ‘organised’ and not isolated. 
2) The criminal organisation is self-perpetuating, as it is continuous for a number of 
years. 
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3) The organisation is financially profit driven, whether through seeking power or 
corruption. 
4) It targets a particular business activity, as an objective. 
5) The top leaders of the organisation are distanced from the criminal activities and 
have immunity. 
6) It endorses fear and corruption.  
7) It is totalitarian in organisation. 
The four criminal entrepreneurs featured in this study have founded or operated a criminal 
organisation.  
It can be concluded that the definitions of organised crime have been criticised due to the 
vagueness of the definitions of ‘crime’ and ‘organised’. Some of the crimes chosen to 
describe organised crime can also be conducted by individuals or non-organised groups. This 
study will adopt the Oyster Bay definition of organised crime, however, as it was chosen by 
the Australian government to describe organised crime in Australia in 1965 (Bersten 1990).  
The following section discusses the structure of organised crime, which also contributed to 
the controversies and criticism of some definitions of organised crime, as some definitions, 
including that of Reuter (1983) as outlined in the work of Paoli (2002, 55), argued that 
organised crime has a hierarchy structure, whereas recent studies by Lauchs and Staines 
(2012), Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain (2012), and the Australian Crime Commission (2015) 
found that organised crime can also have a non-hierarchical structure which is discussed in 
greater detail in the next section. 
2.5 The structure of organised crime  
Organised crime has been studied by various scholars and researchers, who found two main 
structures of organised crime (Metherell 2013; Moffitt 1986; Bersten 1990; Gottschalk 2010; 
Le and Lauchs 2013; Albanese 2004; Johansen 1919; Kleemans and Van de Bunt 2008; 
Hickie 1985; Smith 2014; Frisby 1998; Wang 2013; Small and Gilling 2009; Standing 2003; 
Symeonidou-Kastanidou 2007). The two main structures are hierarchical and non-
hierarchical, as shown in Figure 2. The hierarchy structure involves a group that (UNDOC 
2002; Lauchs, Bain and Bell 2015): 
- Has a single leader 
- Has a strong system of internal discipline 
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- Is known by a specific name 
- Often shares a strong social and ethnic identity  
- Has a strong influence on, or control over, defined territory, such as the Italian Mafia 
and the biker gang Hells Angels  
Figure 2 The hierarchical and non-hierarchical structures      
               
Non-hierarchical structure                                          Hierarchical structure         
The non-hierarchy structure is defined by the activities of key individuals whose prominence 
is based on (UNDOC 2002; Skaperdas 2001; Le and Lauchs 2013): 
- Contacts or skills  
- Personal loyalties  
- Social and criminal ties, connections, skills and abilities that surpass social or ethnic 
identity when forming connections within the criminal group  
- Network connections that endure, coalescing around a series of criminal projects  
- Criminal groups having a low public profile   
- The network being able to re-form after the exit of key individuals.  
According to the Australian Crime Commission of 2015 (Dawson , 2015), organised crime in 
Australia is non-hierarchically structured, which is the focus of this project. The non-
hierarchical structure of organised crime could be the most challenging form of organised 
crime for law enforcement agencies to predict and prevent. The non-hierarchical structure 
tends to be decentralised (UNDOC 2002). In other words, there is no obvious leader, or even 
a palpable structure, in the organisation, but instead a number of loosely connected 
entrepreneurs (UNDOC 2002). They are not necessarily part of an organisation, nor do they 
fall under a specific individual command (Alvarez and Barney 2007; Gottschalk 2010). The 
Entrepreneur
Entrepreneur
EntrepreneurEntrepreneur
Entrepreneur
Leader
High-profile 
members of the 
organisation
Low-profile members of 
the organisation 
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connected entrepreneurs collaborate to achieve a collective goal (Alvarez and Barney 2007; 
Gottschalk 2010). Each entrepreneur has a specific quality, skill or resource (Alvarez and 
Barney 2007; Gottschalk 2010; Smith 2009). The entrepreneurs combine their resources and 
skills to harvest different opportunities in the illicit field or market (Alvarez and Barney 2007; 
Gottschalk 2010; Smith 2009). Despite the challenges of predicting and preventing non-
hierarchically structured organised crime, various theories have been adapted to understand 
organised crime and criminal entrepreneurship. The next section discusses the theories 
applied to understanding non-hierarchical organised crime and criminal entrepreneurship.                    
2.6 Understanding organised crime 
This section outlines the theories applied to non-hierarchically structured organised crime, 
starting with organisation theory. Organisation theory provides a general overview of the 
nature of non-hierarchal organised crime. The illicit enterprise approach considers how non-
hierarchical criminal organisations continue to exist and succeed. To obtain a better 
understanding of this, researchers adopted social network theory to decode the structure of 
non-hierarchical criminal organisation and identify its influential actors, also referred to as 
criminal entrepreneurs. As the influential members are outlined low self-control theory was 
applied to gain a better understanding of criminal entrepreneur behaviour. Routine activity 
theory is discussed in order to illustrate how criminal entrepreneurs have been able to conduct 
their crimes successfully. This section concludes by emphasising the importance of 
understanding the concept of entrepreneurship, in order to have a better understanding of 
criminal entrepreneurs.          
2.7 Organisation theory  
Organised crime is a form of organisation that follows an organisation or enterprise structure 
or mechanism to survive and compete in its environment or market (Raab and Milward 2003). 
Researchers such as Raab and Milward (2003) adopted organisation theory to have a better 
understanding of organised crime. Organisation theory asserts that all organisations, 
legitimate or illicit, aim to maximise their profit (Southerland and Potter 1993; Raab and 
Milward 2003). Organisations follow two main approaches to maximise their profits, 
collaboration and adapting to changes in the environment.   
The first tactic for maximising profit is to gather resources through collaboration (Raab and 
Milward 2003). Organised crime aims to harvest profits from market activities that include 
  
Chapter 2: Literature Review  20  
the distribution of illegal goods and services. The distribution of goods and services often 
demands collaboration with other criminals, criminal organisations or corrupt parties, 
including law enforcement agencies through corrupt personnel, for smooth execution 
(Southerland and Potter 1993; Raab and Milward 2003). In addition to collaboration with 
various parties, criminal organisations also adjust to changes in their environment 
(Southerland and Potter 1993).  
The adjustments come in the form of restructuring and altering the functionality of the group 
or organisation (Southerland and Potter 1993). Organisation theory assumes that in order to 
succeed in any particular environment, an organisational structural form has to be developed 
or adopted (Southerland and Potter 1993). Organisations that successfully adopt an effective 
structural form will be able to survive and conquer the opportunities in the market. In fact, 
some illegal organisations imitate the same effective structure as developed or followed by 
successful legal organisations to take advantage of prospects in their niches (Southerland and 
Potter 1993; Von Lampe 2006). For instances, the Italian mafia has a central structure which 
mimics an enterprise structure. In other environments, where there is no one leading criminal 
organisation, organised crime is formed of loosely connected entrepreneurs working 
collectively towards a collective goal. In other words, organisation theory argues that 
organised crime strives, through collaboration and adapting to the changes in environment, to 
reach its goal or a collective goal with its partners. The collective goal is to fulfil the demand 
for illegal goods and services by supplying them, which is stressed in the illicit enterprise 
approach.  
2.8 Illicit enterprise 
An illicit enterprise is defined as ‘the sale of illegal goods and services to customers who 
know that the goods and services are illegal’ (Haller 1990, p. 207; Finckenauer 2005). In 
other words, a criminal organisation can be view as an illicit enterprise that strives for the 
supply and demand of illicit goods and services. Non-hierarchal organised crime is thus 
conducted by loosely-connected criminal entrepreneurs, and it can be argued that criminal 
entrepreneurs rise to meet the demand for a certain product or service (Spapens 2010; Paoli 
2002; Smith 1980; Haller 1990).  
Understanding the dynamics of supply and demand in the illegal market is important in order 
to understand the behaviours of criminal entrepreneurs. Demand represents an opportunity in 
the market (Haller 1990; Kleemans and de Poot 2008). In crime the opportunity outcome 
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could be either financial gain, controlling a resource or creating a resource (Albanese 2008; 
Fiorentini 1999). For instance, financial gain can be attained by selling unregistered weapons, 
which could also fulfil a demand in the market. Controlling resources can be achieved 
through forming exclusive connections with corrupt police, who provide information on 
ongoing investigations of criminal groups and activities in a certain area (Kugler, Verdier and 
Zenou 2005). Creating resources may involve learning how to forge documents (Kleemans 
and de Poot 2008). All these resources can be demands in the criminal market, however 
criminal entrepreneurs also strive on supply, such as extortion (Lindgren 1993). For instance, 
criminal entrepreneurs can extort payments from business owners in exchange for not robbing 
their business or store (Albanese 2008). These activities are often carried out by groups of 
criminal entrepreneurs (Morselli 2003, 2005; Albanese 2008). Opportunities in the market are 
also created by various groups and individuals in a network (Morselli 2003, 2005). Recent 
studies have adopted social network theory to understand non-hierarchical organised crime 
and the behaviour of criminal entrepreneurs in a network (Bright and Delaney 2013; Bright, 
Hughes and Chalmers 2012; Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain 2012; Morselli 2003). 
2.9 Social network theory   
To date, more researchers have applied social network theory to understand organised crime 
and entrepreneurial behaviours than any other theory (Bright and Delaney 2013; Bright, 
Hughes and Chalmers 2012; Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain 2012; Morselli 2003). 
According to Spapens (2010, 185-186), organised crime can be seen as ‘social networks with 
specific characteristics, such as non-hierarchical, fluid and flexible internal relations, and are 
seen as collectives rather than as formal organisations’. This is consistent with the arguments 
of Meagher (1983) and McCoy (1980), and with the organisation theory and illicit enterprise 
approaches.  
The term ‘network’ in criminology is defined as ‘criminal groups with specific 
characteristics, such as non-hierarchical structures, flexible and regularly shifting coalitions 
revolving around different criminal projects’ (Spapens 2010, p. 193). The term ‘network’ can 
also be defined as an activity, and thus networking in illicit markets is essential to criminal 
entrepreneurs (Spapens 2010, p. 193; Podolny and Page 1998, p. 59). Illicit markets can be 
seen as a ‘network’ since they are made up of connected individuals and independent small 
groups (Spapens 2010, p. 193; Podolny and Page 1998). As a result, the definition of a 
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‘network’ is still vague and confusing, which is a weakness and a limitation of the social 
network theory in criminology and particularly organised crime (Spapens 2010, p. 193).  
The challenge when using social network theory in criminology is outlining the boundaries of 
the criminal network, as criminal networks include criminals and non-criminals such as 
family members, colleagues and friends (Spapens 2010, p. 193). In order to avoid the 
confusion of the ‘network’ definition, the focus should be shifted to a certain location or 
individual (Spapens 2010, p. 195; Smith 2009), which in this study is the criminal 
entrepreneur. By focusing on the entrepreneurs, their criminal network can be measured using 
Spapens (2010, p. 195) concept of the ‘three pillars’.  
The three pillars are the criminal macro network, criminal collective and criminal business 
process, as shown in Table 1 (Spapens 2010). The criminal macro network is ‘the set of 
individuals who have the motivation, the skills, and the access to the resources needed to 
engage successfully in organised criminal activity’ (Spapens 2010, p. 195). Those actors have 
‘criminal relationships’ directly or indirectly (Spapens 2010, p. 195). Criminal relationships 
are defined as ‘the social links that enable individual members of the network to freely 
exchange information about potential illegal activity’ (Spapens 2010, p. 195). Spapens (2010, 
p. 195) also introduced the concept of the criminal collective, which is ‘a subset of members 
of the criminal macro network who are, at a given point in time, actively executing a criminal 
business process’ (Spapens 2010, p. 195). Finally, Spapens (2010, p. 195) added the criminal 
business pillar, which is defined as ‘a collective of related and structured activities designed 
to produce a specific illegal product, service, or other output prohibited by law, such as theft 
or fraud’ to meet the demand for the illegal products or services (Spapens 2010, p. 195).  
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Table 1: Criminal pillars 
Pillars Definitions  
Criminal 
macro 
network 
The set of individuals who have the motivation, the skills and the access to 
resources needed to engage successfully in organised criminal activity. 
 
Criminal 
relations 
The social links that enable individual members of the network to freely 
exchange information about potential illegal activity. 
 
Criminal 
collective 
A subset of members of the criminal macro-network who are, at a given 
point in time, actively executing a criminal business process. 
 
Criminal 
business pillar 
 
A collective of related and structured activities designed to produce a 
specific illegal product, service or other output prohibited by law, such as 
theft or fraud, to meet demand for the illegal product or service. 
(Spapens 2010, p. 195) 
In the same way as Spapens (2010) simplified how social network theory can be applied to 
organised crime and criminal entrepreneurship, the social network theory on organised crime 
and criminal entrepreneurship shows that criminal entrepreneurs connect previously 
unconnected individuals or groups to those who can provide illegal products and services 
(Morselli and Roy 2008). Social network theory also found that criminal opportunities can be 
found in weak ties, which are the connections of the criminal entrepreneur direct ties as 
shown in Figure 3 (Morselli and Roy 2008; Kleemans and de Poot 2008, Granovetter 1973). 
Through social networks, criminal entrepreneurs can access various resources such as skilled 
individuals or illegal goods merchants to conduct their own crimes (Morselli and Roy 2008; 
Kleemans and de Poot 2008). Social networks can also provide mentors who would nurse the 
skills and abilities of the criminal entrepreneur (Morselli, Tremblay and McCarthy 2006). 
Social network analysis of organised crime has also showed that criminal entrepreneurs are 
able to develop their crime human capital which is their know-how about crime, through the 
knowledgeable criminals in their network (Mocan, Billups and Overland 2005; Lochner 
2004; Clark and Davis 2011; Savage and Kanazawa 2002). 
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Figure 3 Weak ties  
     
 
 
The social network approach to organised crime illustrates how criminals and criminal 
organisations connect and interact in harvesting opportunities in the criminal milieu, in 
addition to outlining the embedded resources such mentors and human capital (which are 
discussed in detail further in this chapter) (Mocan, Billups and Overland 2005; Lochner 2004; 
Clark and Davis 2011; Savage and Kanazawa 2002; Kleemans and Van de Bunt 2008). The 
social network approach does not provide a detailed structure of the way in which criminal 
entrepreneurs conduct and execute their crimes successfully, however routine activity theory 
does.  
2.10 Routine activity theory  
Routine activity theory synthesises the three main elements of committing a crime: 1) an 
offender, 2) a victim, and 3) surrounding circumstances (Sasse 2005). Routine activity theory 
asserts that ‘victimization occurs when there is a convergence in space and time of a 
motivated offender, a suitable target, and the absence of a capable guardian to prevent the 
commission of the crime’ (Sasse 2005, p. 547). In other words, a successful crime is made up 
of three main elements, 1) a motivated offender, 2) a victim, and 3) the absence of a guardian, 
as shown in Figure 4.  
Figure 4 Routine activity theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on routine activity theory, it can be argued that successful criminal entrepreneurs do 
not commit an offence or a crime prior to securing protection (the absence of a guardian) and 
Motivated offender  
Absence of a guardian  Victim 
Direct tie Weak tie 
Criminal entrepreneur  Individual 
Opportunity 
Individual 
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choosing the perfect timing. A perfect example would be Jack Herbert, who flourished in 
crime after securing a connection with the police commissioner, who ensured his protection 
(Lauchs and Staines 2012). This kind of behaviour indicates that successful criminal 
entrepreneurs have a higher sense of self-control than the average or unsuccessful criminal. 
According to Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), ‘people who lack self-control will tend to be 
impulsive, insensitive, physical (as opposed to mental), risk taking, short-sighted, and 
nonverbal, and they will tend therefore to engage in criminal and analogous acts’ (Simpson 
and Piquero 2002, p. 510). Crime is defined in the previous citation as ‘acts of force or fraud 
undertaken in pursuit of self-interest’ (Simpson and Piquero 2002, p. 510). Low self-control 
therefore plays a significant role in the success of criminal entrepreneurs, as it influences their 
social networks and behaviours.  
2.11 Low self-control theory 
Low self-control theory was examined by Evans et al. (1997) in relation to social bonds and 
social learning, using the following measures: 1) the need for immediate gratification, 2) a 
lack of diligence, 3) tenacity, 4) persistence, 5) a preference for excitement, 6) risk taking, 7) 
thrilling, 8) physical acts, 9) self-centredness, 10) indifference, 11) insensitivity to the pain of 
others, 12) low tolerance of frustration and 13) a tendency to settle disputes physically rather 
than verbally (Evans et al. 1997). Those who score highly on these measures have low self-
control. The findings of Evans et al. (1997) suggest that those individuals with low self-
control have poor social bonds (measured by: 1) the quality of friendship; 2) the quality of 
family relationships, 3) marital status; and 4) attachment to a church), however low self-
control is positively associated with social learning, (measured by: 1) criminal association, 
and 2) internalised criminal values). According to Morselli and Tremblay (2004):  
… [for] offenders involved primarily in market offenses, low self-
control’s limiting effect on criminal earnings is conditional to an 
offender’s network capacity and therefore opportunities for crime. While 
low self-control theories frame opportunistic offenders as individuals 
impulsively seizing the advent of an attractive target in an unprepared 
and minimally planned action scheme, opportunistic and ‘adventurous’ 
tendencies also result in benefits and encompass structured forms of 
‘recklessness’. What appears to be impulsive, risky and minimally 
thought-out action on the part of the effective/efficient opportunity is 
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more likely quick thinking and an application of established acumen. (p. 
795)       
According to the work of Evans et al. (1997), successful criminal entrepreneurs should have a 
high degree of self-control. In other words, they would score lowly on the self-control 
measure. As the findings of Evans et al. (1997) suggest, those with low self-control have poor 
social skills and relationships, which is inconsistent with the findings of Lauchs and Staines 
(2012) and Morselli (2001, 2003), who found that criminal entrepreneurs are able to attract 
new members and form trust relations that expand their network. Criminal entrepreneurs also 
operate with great caution and non-recklessness (Lauchs and Staines 2012, Morselli 2001, 
2003). Criminal entrepreneurs are very selective in their criminal ties, and often have a two-
degree relationship (an individual or connection between the entrepreneur and the criminal 
connection) with some of their criminal contacts (Morselli 2001). According to Morselli and 
Tremblay (2004), low self-control can affect and limit market offender (entrepreneur) 
earnings, through the disruptions (by affecting the reputation of the entrepreneurs and 
labelling them as inefficient and more likely to attract unwanted attention, such as the police) 
of their social network and in particular non-redundant ties where opportunities are found.  
2.12 Connecting the dots 
The previous sections have provided an overview of the literature and theories adopted to 
decode organised crime. It can be concluded from the literature that non-hierarchical 
organised crime and its members are flexible, and adaptable to change, which is consistent 
with the Oyster Bay definition of organised crime. Their adaptability is reflected in their 
response to the demands of the illicit market and an awareness of the nature of the 
environment where the supply of crime, such as extortion, can be efficient, as discussed in the 
illicit enterprise approach. The ability of non-hierarchical organised crime to adapt to the 
changes in the environment lies in its structure. As non-hierarchical organised crime is 
formed of loosely connected entrepreneurs, each entrepreneur provides certain skills and/or 
resources to execute certain crimes on demand, which shows their flexibility and adaptability 
to change. As certain entrepreneurs have skills and resources, opportunities can arise by 
connecting skilled and/or resourceful entrepreneurs. By connecting skilled and resourceful 
entrepreneurs, an organiser who is also a criminal entrepreneur can join the criminal 
operation and share its gains. These behaviours are consistent with organisation theory, which 
stresses the importance of collaboration, which is carried out by individuals with higher self-
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control. To successfully carry out and execute a crime, criminal entrepreneurs must secure the 
absence of a guardian, as shown in routine activity theory. Securing the absence of a guardian 
is often done through connections with corrupt law enforcement agents. These sophisticated 
behaviours show that criminal entrepreneurs have high levels of self-control, as discussed 
regarding low self-control theory.  
In other words, the success of non-hierarchical organised crime is heavily dependent on the 
criminal entrepreneur behind it. This study will therefore focus on criminal entrepreneurship. 
The next section starts by providing a brief historical background of the study of 
entrepreneurship, so as to gain a better understanding of the field.              
2.13 A brief historical background of the study of entrepreneurship 
Business and government segments have long acknowledged the ability of entrepreneurs to 
strengthen the economy and push the boundaries of innovation (Hisrich 1990; Low and 
MacMillan 1988; Carland, Carland and Hoy 2002; McKenzie, Ugbah and Smothers 2007). 
As a result, Arthur H. Cole (Cole 1942) called for definitive research on entrepreneurship. In 
1948, Cole established the Research Center of Entrepreneurial History at Harvard University 
(Hornaday and Bunker 1970). Although the research centre conducted various studies of 
entrepreneurship, it was closed in 1958, and the published literature does not provide the 
reason for the closure (Hornaday and Bunker 1970). Despite closing the centre, Harvard and 
Michigan State University remained ahead in entrepreneurial research (Hornaday and Bunker 
1970). In the mid-1950s, it was widely believed that the qualities of an entrepreneur were 
stamina, ambition, willingness to make sacrifices and an interest in risk taking versus an 
interest in security (Hornaday and Bunker 1970); however, these characteristics have not been 
linked to criminal entrepreneurs and have yet to be determined. Before further discussing the 
qualities and skills of entrepreneurs, the origin of the term ‘entrepreneur’ will be outlined.    
2.14 The origin of the word ‘entrepreneur’ 
It is believed that the term ‘entrepreneur’ was first found in French economics literature in the 
early seventeenth century (Dees 1998, p. 1). ‘Entrepreneur’ in French means ‘undertake’, as 
in undertaking a significant project or activity (Dees 1998, p. 1). The meaning of the term 
‘entrepreneur’ was provided by Jean Baptisa Say (Dees 1998, p. 1). Say argued that ‘The 
entrepreneur shifts economic resources out of an area of lower and into an area of higher 
productivity and greater yield’ (Dees 1998, p. 2). The term ‘entrepreneur’ was therefore used 
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to describe those who find new and better ways of doing things, which in effect stimulates the 
economy (Dees 1998, p. 2). In the twentieth century, however, the term ‘entrepreneur’ 
became strongly associated with Joseph Schumpeter (Dees 1998, p. 2). Schumpeter described 
entrepreneurs as those who were creative and innovative and able to create or destroy the 
process of capitalism (Dees 1998, p. 2; Schumpeter 1934). Schumpeter argued that the role of 
the entrepreneur is to ‘reform or revolutionize the pattern of production’ (Dees 1998, p. 2). 
The early definitions of entrepreneurs emphasised the role of an entrepreneur in moving and 
creating resources to improve the economy, in addition to the characteristics and qualities 
they possess. Later studies paid greater attention to the characteristics, skills and qualities of 
entrepreneurs in efforts to obtain a more precise definition of entrepreneurship (Miller 2015; 
Renko et al. 2015; Ramoglou and Zyglidopoulos 2015; Peneder 2009; McKenzie, Ugbah and 
Smothers 2007).       
2.15 Entrepreneurship 
This section outlines the different definitions of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship. Most of 
the definitions of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship revolve around managerial ability and 
innovation, however none of the definitions describe a criminal entrepreneur. This section 
concludes by outlining the characteristics often found in an entrepreneur, based on the 
definitions provided, which will be used in the coding of the characteristics of a criminal 
entrepreneur in order to determine which definition describes such a criminal entrepreneur.  
There has been widespread debate about defining entrepreneurs, and the skills and qualities 
they possess. The early definitions of entrepreneurs outlined some of the skills and qualities 
of entrepreneurs. For instance, Richard Catillon (1680-1734), Jean-Baptiste Say (1767-1832) 
and Alfred Marshall (1842-1924) defined an entrepreneur as a risk bearer, visionary and 
coordinator: in addition to someone who has theoretical knowledge and holds a key position 
in a network, possesses leadership skills, is innovative, is an opportunity seeker, is a decision 
maker, has high self-esteem, is venturesome, has a foresightful nature and has moral merits 
(Van Praag 1999). 
Six schools of thought have defined entrepreneurship more recently (Koh 1996). The great 
person school defined entrepreneurs as those who are born with intuition, vigour, energy, 
persistence and self-esteem (Koh 1996, p. 13). The classical school saw entrepreneurship as 
innovation, creativity and discovery (Koh 1996; Cunningham and Lischeron 1991). The 
management school believed that entrepreneurs own, and manage resources and risks (Koh 
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1996, p. 13). The leadership school defined someone who is motivated, with direction and 
leadership as an entrepreneur (Koh 1996; Cunningham and Lischeron 1991; Klapper 2004). 
The intrapreneurship school defined entrepreneurs as skilful managers within complex 
organisations (Koh 1996; Cunningham and Lischeron 1991; Hisrich 1990; Gibb 1996). 
Finally, the psychological characteristics school of entrepreneurship defined entrepreneurs as 
‘individuals with unique values, attitudes, and needs which drive them and differentiate them 
from non-entrepreneurs’ (Koh 1996, p. 13; Littunen 2000).  
McClelland (1961) defined entrepreneurs as those who share a greater need for achievement, 
favour moderately difficult tasks over easier ones, prefer to perform tasks personally, assume 
personal responsibility for their performance and seek its evaluation. Timmons (1989) 
defined entrepreneurship as: 
“… the ability to create and build something from practically nothing. It is 
initiating, doing, achieving, and building an enterprise or organization ... It is 
the knack for sensing an opportunity where others see chaos, contradiction 
and confusion. It is the ability to build a funding team to complement your 
own skills and talents. It is the know-how to find, marshal and control 
resources (often owned by others) and make sure you do not run out of 
money when you need it most. Finally, it is a willingness to take calculating 
risks, both personal and financial, and then do everything possible to get the 
odds in your favour” (Cited by Ranasinghe (1996, p. 2)).  
Knight (1921) believed that entrepreneurship is the ability to predict the future successfully. 
Leibenstein (1978) defined entrepreneurship as ‘the ability to work smarter and harder than 
your competitor’ (cited by Low and MacMillan (1988, p. 140)). Cole (1968) defined 
entrepreneurship as ‘purposeful activity to initiate, maintain, and develop a profit-oriented 
business’ (cited by Low and MacMillan (1988, p. 140)). Stevenson, Roberts and Grousbeck 
(1985) argued that entrepreneurship is ‘being driven by perception of opportunity, rather than 
resources currently controlled’ (cited by Low and MacMillan (1988, p. 140)). Gartner (1985) 
defined entrepreneurship as ‘the creation of a new organization’ (cited by Low and 
MacMillan (1988, p. 140)). Finally, Gottschalk (2010, p. 299) defined an entrepreneur as ‘a 
person who operates a new venture and assumes some accountability of inherent risks’. 
Gottschalk (2010, p. 299) added that the talent of an entrepreneur is in taking risks by 
opening and/or operating a business venture (Gottschalk 2010, p. 299). In other words, 
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business entrepreneurs form organisations and ventures to seize an opportunity. Table 2 
summarises the characteristics, qualities and skills of entrepreneurs, mostly in the business 
field.  
Table 2: A summary of entrepreneurial characteristics, skills and qualities  
Scholar/ School   Characteristics/Skills/Quality  
 
Jean Baptisa Say (1767-1832) 
 
Joseph Schumpeter (1934) 
 
 
Richard Catillon (1680-1734) and 
Alfred Marshall (1842-1924) 
 
 
 
 
 
Great Person school 
 
 
Classical school 
 
Leadership school 
 
Intrapreneurship school 
 
Psychological Characteristics school 
 
McClelland (1961) 
 
 
 
Timmons (1989) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Knight (1921) 
 
Leibenstein (1978) 
 
 
Cole (1968) 
 
 
Shifting economic resources 
 
Creative and innovative, revolutionary pattern of 
production 
 
A risk bearer, visionary and coordinator, 
knowledgeable, a key position in a network, 
leadership skills, innovative, an opportunity 
seeker, a decision maker,  high self-esteem, 
venturesome, foresightful nature and moral 
merits  
 
Born with intuition, vigour, energy, persistence 
and self-esteem 
 
Innovation, creativity and discovery 
 
Motivated, direction and leadership 
 
Skilful managers within complex organisations 
 
Unique values, attitudes and needs 
 
High need for achievement, prefers to work on 
moderately difficult tasks, takes personal 
responsibility 
 
Ability to create and build something from 
practically nothing, initiating, doing, achieving 
and building an enterprise or organisation, knack 
for sensing an opportunity where others see 
chaos, controlling resources (often owned by 
others), taking calculating risks 
 
Ability to predict the future successfully 
 
Ability to work smarter and harder than your 
competitor 
 
Purposeful activity to initiate, maintain and 
develop a profit-oriented business 
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Stevenson, Roberts and Grousbeck 
(1985) 
 
Gartner (1985) 
 
Kirzner (1997) 
 
 
Gottschalk (2010, p. 299) 
 
Being driven by the perception of opportunity, 
rather than the resources currently controlled 
 
The creation of a new organisation 
 
An alert individual who discover and exploit 
profits opportunities 
 
A person who operates a new venture and takes 
accountability for the risks taken 
Based on the definitions of an entrepreneur as shown in Table 2, this study defines an 
entrepreneur as a motivated individual who has a vision to accomplish, and takes calculated 
risks to achieve, their mission. Although the definitions of an entrepreneur provide an insight 
into the merits, skills and qualities, they do not provide a deep understanding of how they 
develop and operate. The next section outlines some of the theories adopted in order to 
understand entrepreneurship.  
2.16 Adopted theories used to understand entrepreneurship  
Various researchers and studies have adopted different theories to understand 
entrepreneurship. This section outlines the most common theories applied to entrepreneurship 
in the literature and its ability to address criminal entrepreneurship, as per the focus of this 
study. The theories included in this section are explanatory theory, predictive theory, 
normative theory, social/cultural theory, personality based theory, network theory, population 
ecology theory, finance theory and economic theory (Van Praag 1999; Amit, Glosten and 
Muller 1993; Morgenstern 1972; Wilkinson and Young 2005; Haller 1990; Zimmer 1986). 
Explanatory theory is the outcome of the examination of certain behaviours that contribute to 
the success of entrepreneurs (Amit, Glosten and Muller 1993). In order to develop an 
explanatory theory of successful criminal entrepreneurship, the behaviours that contributed to 
the success of criminal entrepreneurs have to be outlined. The literature on successful 
criminal entrepreneurship describes flexibility and adaptability to change as the only trait that 
contributes to the success of criminal entrepreneurs, as mentioned earlier (Morselli 2001; 
Lauchs and Staines 2012; Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain 2012). Due to the limited insight 
into the behaviour that drives successful criminal entrepreneurs, this study cannot solely 
apply explanatory theory in order to understand successful criminal entrepreneurs.      
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In addition to explanatory theory, predictive theory has been applied to understand 
entrepreneurship (Morgenstern 1972). Predict theory focuses on the conditions and situations 
that create entrepreneurial opportunities (Morgenstern 1972). The literature outlines one 
major condition and situation where successful criminal entrepreneurs strive and harvest 
opportunities: a corrupt environment (Lauchs and Staines 2012; Lauchs, Keast and 
Chamberlain 2012; Morselli and Roy 2008). The limitation of the predictive theory is that it 
focuses on external factors, with limited attention paid to internal factors such as leadership, 
which contributes to the success of a criminal entrepreneur.  
In contrast, normative theory focuses on describing specific behaviour that would be effective 
in certain situations and circumstances (Wilkinson and Young 2005; Morgenstern 1972). In 
other words, normative theory provides guidelines about how to behave in certain situations 
to achieve a desirable outcome (Wilkinson and Young 2005; Morgenstern 1972). It is 
difficult to generalise a normative theory of successful criminal entrepreneurs, however, as 
they are known to be flexible and adoptable to change (Lauchs and Staines 2012; Lauchs, 
Keast and Chamberlain 2012; Morselli and Roy 2008). In organised crime and corrupt 
environments where criminal entrepreneurs operate, circumstances change constantly, as 
criminals and corrupt individuals are arrested, prosecuted or even murdered, which changes 
the circumstances and the social structure of the criminal milieu.      
Social and cultural theories suggest that for entrepreneurship to flourish there must be 
congruence between ideological constructs and economic behaviours (Amit, Glosten and 
Muller 1993). In other words, social and cultural theories argue that entrepreneurs challenge 
social and cultural norms, such as gender roles and social status, which can also act as 
motivation for achieving their goals (Amit, Glosten and Muller 1993). Social and cultural 
theories suggest that individuals who are likely to lose their social status are more likely to 
become entrepreneurs (Amit, Glosten and Muller 1993), but the criminological literature on 
criminal entrepreneurship does not provide any insights into social and/or cultural factors that 
produce criminal entrepreneurs or contribute to the success of a criminal entrepreneur.  
Personality theory, unlike social and culture theory, focuses on personality traits as factors in 
the success of an entrepreneur (Zimmer 1986). Personality theory is based on personality 
traits and characteristics that enable an individual to be a successful entrepreneur (Zimmer 
1986), however there are various traits that contribute to the success of an entrepreneur, in 
addition to external circumstances that are out of the control of the entrepreneur, and would 
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enhance or reduce their chances of becoming successful. Apart from flexibility, the 
personality traits that contribute to the success of a criminal entrepreneur are yet to be 
determined.   
Unlike the work on personality traits and successful criminal entrepreneurship, the work on 
social network theory and successful criminal entrepreneurs is well established in the 
literature (Morselli and Roy 2008; Morselli 2003, 2005; Morselli and Tremblay 2004; 
Morselli 2009; Lauchs and Staines 2012; Lauchs, Keast and Yousefpour 2011; Lauchs, Keast 
and Chamberlain 2012). Social network theory focuses on the role of social networks, and 
ties in the success of a criminal entrepreneur (Morselli and Roy 2008; Morselli 2003, 2005; 
Morselli and Tremblay 2004; Morselli 2009; Lauchs and Staines 2012; Lauchs, Keast and 
Yousefpour 2011; Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain 2012), however social networks and ties 
cannot alone predict or explain the success of an entrepreneur. Social network theory neither 
explains how criminal entrepreneurs are able to occupy their social structure nor considers 
any internal factors such the skills and qualities the entrepreneur has that contribute to the 
success of the criminal entrepreneur.    
Another theory that focuses on external factors is population ecology theory. Population 
ecology theory stresses environmental circumstances in the success of entrepreneurs (Amit, 
Glosten and Muller 1993). In other words, entrepreneurs must be able to adapt to the 
environment in order to succeed as entrepreneurs, such as being in a corrupt environment. 
Population ecology theory emphasises this as a significant factor to succeed as a criminal 
entrepreneurs, and this was proven effective in the works of, Morselli (2001, 2003), Lauchs 
and Staines (2012). 
Another approach adopted to understanding entrepreneurship is finance theory. Finance 
theory focuses on the supply of capital in enabling an entrepreneur to start a new venture 
(Amit, Glosten and Muller 1993). Although finance theory outlines a significantly important 
factor in the success of the entrepreneur venture, it is very limited in its contribution. Finance 
theory focuses solely on the role of financial capital and ignores related non-financial 
elements that contribute to the success of a criminal entrepreneur.  
Economic theory extends finance theory, as it focuses on supply and demand in driving 
entrepreneurs in creating new ventures (Haller 1990; Amit, Glosten and Muller 1993). The 
limitation of economic theory is its inability to outline how supply and demand are created in 
the criminal milieu, and how certain criminal entrepreneurs are able to address supply and 
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demand, while other criminal entrepreneurs fail to successfully fulfil the supply and demand 
of a criminal market.  
The previous theories addressed criminal entrepreneurs from different perspectives, such as 
social, cultural, economical, financial, environmental and psychological. The shared 
limitation of the previous studies is their focus on one element, such as social, cultural or 
psychological issues, and also a lack of interactivity. Despite the limitation of the previous 
theories, research into how criminal entrepreneurs emerge, found and operate criminal 
organisations continued. According to the literature, entrepreneurs have significant 
advantages that would aid them in succeeding in legal ventures - but why would 
entrepreneurs turn to crime and become criminal entrepreneurs?      
2.17 Criminal entrepreneurship  
This section discusses entrepreneurs’ rationales behind choosing to found a criminal 
organisation over a legitimate organisation. This section also outlines how criminal 
entrepreneurs are able to identify and seize opportunities ahead of existing, larger 
organisations.     
Criminal entrepreneurship is defined as ‘the imaginative pursuit of position, with limited 
concern about the means used to achieve the purpose’ (Smith 2015, 203). Criminal 
entrepreneurs play an essential role in organised crime; in fact, Symeonidou-Kastanidou 
(2007) called for a new definition of organised crime that includes the entrepreneurial 
structure as a main element due to the critical role entrepreneurs play in organised crime 
(Gottschalk 2010). But why do entrepreneurs choose to found a criminal organisation or 
enterprise over a legitimate enterprise? 
The answer to the previous question is found in the work of Alvarez and Barney (2007), 
Volkov (1999), Smith (2015), Baumol (1990) and Ellis and Shaw (2015), who argued that 
entrepreneurial opportunities can be seized in a variety of ways, including the choice of 
enterprise or organisation, and that whether it will be illegal/criminal or legal depends on the 
opportunity provided and the best type of organisation to harvest the opportunity (Gottschalk 
2010; Alvarez and Barney 2007; Volkov 1999; Ellis and Shaw 2015). Opportunities that 
attract illegal enterprises often emerge from legal and illegal markets, in terms of the need for 
goods and services (Gottschalk 2010; Ellis and Shaw 2015; Smith 2015; Volkov 1999).  
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Entrepreneurs who enter the illegal market can be driven by the assumption of not having a 
fair opportunity to compete in a specific market, which is referred to as ‘competitive 
imperfection’, and can be due to changes in technology, demand or other factors, including 
low wages for law enforcement agency personnel (Gottschalk 2010; Kugler, Verdier and 
Zenou 2005). Regardless of the source of ‘competitive imperfection’, its outcome is often 
financial gain for those who are able to capitalise on it, and take advantage of the 
imperfection of the market, who in organised crime are corrupt police and criminal 
entrepreneurs (Gottschalk 2010). According to Alvarez and Barney (2007), ‘The realization 
of this potential often requires additional economic activities, activities that sometimes 
require the organization of a firm and sometimes can be organized through other governance 
mechanisms, such as arbitrage and alliances’ (Gottschalk 2010, p. 299). In other words, 
criminal entrepreneurs form criminal organisations to harvest opportunities in the illicit 
market, as these opportunities could not be seized alone, but can be grasped with the help of 
an organisation (Gottschalk 2010; Alvarez and Barney 2007; Volkov 1999; Ellis and Shaw 
2015). If so, how do entrepreneurs see an opportunity ahead of big existing organisations? 
Gottschalk (2010), Ruggiero (2015), Kupatadze (2015), Alvarez and Barney (2007) suggested 
that if someone holds all the necessary resources, whether they are tangible or intangible, they 
can exploit the market opportunity and develop financial gain, in some cases without the need 
for additional economic organisations. For instance, if a criminal entrepreneur knows how to 
carry out cyber-attacks, they may not need a criminal organisation to seize certain online 
criminal opportunities. The same explanation applies to those who engage in arbitrage, if one 
has the commodities and capital to trade, they may not need an organisation to fund or 
support them in their trade (Gottschalk 2010; Nielsen 2015).  
Where the individual does not possess all the resources needed to exploit an opportunity, 
however, the opportunity will be seized (Gottschalk 2010) or created by an entrepreneur 
(Ramoglou and Zyglidopoulos 2015). The entrepreneur is able to exploit and create 
opportunities in the market in a variety of ways, or to use Smith’s (2009) term, modus 
operandi (Gottschalk 2010; Volkov 1999). For instance, the entrepreneur can connect those 
who possess resources in order to create new market opportunities (Gottschalk 2010). The 
entrepreneur can connect a skilled individual to a financier and create a new venture of which 
the entrepreneur is part. In other words, by connecting resource holders and forming new 
collaborations which provide a new supply of products and services, changes in the market 
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structure are created and therefore new opportunities for entrepreneurs arise, as some 
suppliers could be eliminated (Gottschalk 2010).  
Another approach adopted by entrepreneurs is forming alliances with those who possess 
resources (Gottschalk 2010). The rationale behind forming an alliance with possessors of 
resources is to access their resources to harvest opportunities in the market (Gottschalk 2010). 
The partners with whom entrepreneurs form alliances tend to share the same characteristics as 
the entrepreneur (Gottschalk 2010; Sergi 2015).  
Changing the business model is another approach to seizing certain opportunities or 
overcoming external challenges such as honest police or larger and rival criminal organisation 
(Ramírez, Gómez and Muñiz 2015). For instances, criminal entrepreneurs often avoid the 
police in fear of being arrested and incarcerated. A change in business model in that case 
would be starting a partnership with corrupt police and sharing the outcome of the criminal 
operations or organisation with them (Lauchs and Staines 2012; Blackburn, Neanidis and 
Rana 2015; Solar 2015). An alternative approach, common among criminal entrepreneurs, is 
violence (Ramírez, Gómez and Muñiz 2015; Volkov 1999). Some criminal entrepreneurs use 
violence to create opportunities, such as extortion (Pinotti 2015; Volkov 1999; Ramírez, 
Gómez and Muñiz 2015). Violence can also be used in eliminating the competition and 
control of territories, a common approach among criminal entrepreneurs who form drug 
gangs and syndicates (Pinotti 2015; Volkov 1999; Ramírez, Gómez and Muñiz 2015). 
Furthermore, violence is also a tradable social capital in the criminal circles and milieu 
(Volkov, 1999). 
It can be concluded that the motives that drive criminal entrepreneurs and their criminal 
organisations are financial gain and open opportunities. The way in which criminal 
entrepreneurs operate is by controlling or creating resources. When entrepreneurs are unable 
to obtain resources, they aim to control and “manage the possessors of resources” through 
partnerships. Some criminal entrepreneurs resort to violence to control or obtain resources 
and opportunities in the market.  
It can be argued that criminal entrepreneurs adapt to the type of opportunities provided in the 
market (Alvarez and Barney 2007, Gottschalk 2010). Criminal entrepreneurs can be the 
product of unfair opportunities in the market (Gottschalk 2010; Kugler, Verdier and Zenou 
2005). They seek partnerships to exploit opportunities in the market (Gottschalk 2010). The 
partners of the criminal entrepreneurs are likely to share the same characteristics of the 
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entrepreneurs, but the characteristics of a criminal entrepreneur are not described in the work 
of Gottschalk (2010) and Sergi (2015), which is a limitation of their work. The work of 
Gottschalk (2010) and Sergi (2015) also does not outline the operational approach of criminal 
entrepreneurs. The next section examines the only three studies that looked at the careers of 
criminal entrepreneurs, outlined their social network structure and how it contributed to their 
success, and the operational approach adopted to conduct crime successfully.   
2.18 Successful criminal entrepreneurs  
Based on the three studies, hypotheses concerning successful criminal entrepreneur 
characteristics, operational approaches and social networks will be developed. A definition of 
success in entrepreneurship will be outlined. This section will conclude by creating a 
definition of a successful criminal entrepreneur to be used in this study. This section starts by 
defining success in criminal entrepreneurship.  
Success in entrepreneurship is based on the definition of success as:  
“… an individual who had started a business, building it where no 
previous business had been functioning, and continuing for a period of 
at least five years to the present profit-making structure” (Hornaday 
and Bunker 1970, p. 50). 
Smith’s (2015) definition of criminal entrepreneurship is broad and does not necessarily 
include ‘successful’ criminal entrepreneurs. This study will develop a definition of what 
makes a successful criminal entrepreneur by combining the Oyster Bay definition of 
organised crime in Australia and Hornaday and Bunker’s (1970) definition of success, under 
the condition of a minimum of one million Australian dollars in revenue annually. The 
rationale behind having a minimum of one million Australian dollars is that those who are 
able to generate a million Australian dollars are more likely to be involved in serious criminal 
activity that requires a group of skilled individuals. Moreover, generating a million Australian 
dollars in revenue illegally requires laundering, which means engaging with organised crime 
groups who launder ill-gotten gains. In other words, those who made a million Australian 
dollars in ill-gotten gains are more likely to be part or connected to organised crime. 
A successful criminal entrepreneur is an individual who is the product of a self-perpetuating 
criminal conspiracy to wring exorbitant profits from society by any means – fair or foul, legal 
or illegal – who survives on fear and corruption. By one means or another, they obtain a high 
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degree of immunity from the law and are totalitarian in their organisation and crime, 
imposing rigid discipline on underlings to carry out the dirty work while they are generally 
insulated from the criminal acts and the consequent danger of prosecution. The individual or 
entrepreneur must have been successful in their criminal activity and organisation for at least 
five years, with an annual income of one million Australian dollars. This definition applies to 
the following successful criminal entrepreneurs, Howard Marks, Jack Herbert and Sammy 
Gravano.  
To date, only three studies have focused on successful criminal entrepreneurs (Lauchs and 
Staines 2012, Morselli 2003, 2001). Those studies were conducted on the successful careers 
of Howard Marks, Jack Herbert and Sammy Gravano (Lauchs and Staines 2012, Morselli 
2003, 2001). To gain a better understanding of the internal and external factors that 
contributed to the success of Marks, Herbert and Gravano, their behaviours are divided into 
three main sections, modus essendi, modus operandi and modus vivendi.  
Modus essendi focuses on how criminal entrepreneurs perceive and define their behaviour 
and characteristics (Smith 2009). The criminal entrepreneur’s modus essendi is used for 
identifying the behaviours of the criminal entrepreneur, such as risk taking, leadership, and 
their self-concept, such as identifying themselves as a gangster or a businessman. By 
connecting the self-concept and behaviours, the researcher is able to connect an 
understanding and interpretation of the criminal entrepreneur with their behaviour. 
By understanding the criminal entrepreneur’s self-concept and behaviour, a researcher can 
outline the motives behind the criminal entrepreneur behaviours. For instance, if a criminal 
entrepreneur’s self-concept of himself is as a businessman, it is arguable that the entrepreneur 
is more likely driven by market opportunity rather than crime. After describing the modus 
essendi of criminal entrepreneurs, their modus operandi is described. 
Modus operandi involves the way that criminal entrepreneurs operate. In other words the 
modus operandi unveils how ‘successful’ criminal entrepreneurs are in crime, and in 
overcoming the challenges in the criminal milieu, such as rival criminal organisations and 
honest police (Smith 2009). By linking modus essendi and modus operandi, a better 
understanding of the criminal entrepreneur’s self-concept and behaviour, and their influence 
on operational approaches, can be achieved. The resources embedded in their network must 
also be outlined in order to gain a better understanding of successful criminal operations, as 
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they contribute to the success of a modus operandi. The resources embedded in a criminal 
entrepreneur’s network are outlined in modus vivendi.   
Modus vivendi reveals the value of a criminal entrepreneur’s social network (Smith 2009). In 
other words, modus vivendi illustrates the embedded resources in the criminal entrepreneur’s 
network. By connecting modus vivendi and modus operandi, a better understanding of how 
criminal entrepreneurs access and use the resources in their network can be achieved.   
The rationale behind using the three modi framework in discussing the three studies of 
successful criminal entrepreneurs is to draw hypotheses to be tested in this study, as based on 
the three modi framework introduced by Smith (2009). The first study of a criminal 
entrepreneur concerned Howard Marks. The next section will examine the criminal careers of 
the Howard Marks, Sammy Gravano, and Jack Herbert. The rationale behind choosing 
Marks, Gravano and Herbert is they fit the definition of successful criminal entrepreneurs, 
and the availability of their social network data which can provide significant insights on how 
successful criminal entrepreneurs social and criminal network look and change throughout 
their criminal careers. Furthermore, they shares similar crimes modus operandi to the four 
criminal entrepreneurs featured in this study.     
2.19 Howard Marks 
Howard Marks, also known as ‘Mr Nice’, was an international cannabis smuggler (Marks 
1997), who was charged with conspiracy, money laundering and participating in racketeering-
influenced corrupt organisations (RICOs) (Morselli 2001). Marks was a principle member of 
the ‘Marks Cartel’, an international cannabis smuggling ring (Morselli 2001; Marks 1997). 
According to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) reports, Marks was responsible 
for 15% of the cannabis smuggled into the US in the 1970s and 1980s (Morselli 2001). 
Unlike other criminals involved in the cannabis trade, Marks did not succeed and become a 
pioneer in his field simply by joining an existing criminal group, but created his own 
(Morselli 2001; Marks 1997).  
Marks was described as a liberal-minded, free-willed and independent criminal entrepreneur 
(Morselli 2001; Marks 1997). Further analysis of Marks’ career conducted by Morselli (2001) 
revealed a structure behind his apparently disorganised cannabis smuggling activities. The 
structure of his activities reflected his personal work network, including its strengths and 
weaknesses (Morselli 2001). According to Morselli (2001), Marks did not have financial 
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capital at the beginning of his career, but had social capital, which enabled him to engage in 
the cannabis trade full-time, and the financial capital followed soon afterwards.    
Marks was a liaison officer in the cannabis trade (Morselli 2001; Marks 1997). His ability to 
fit between exporting and importing or importation representatives among exporters made 
him vital to other trade members (Morselli 2001; Marks 1997). Marks’ role, position and 
skills as a liaison officer gave him a brokerage position, which enabled him to simultaneously 
increase his own security and the efficiency of the working network (Morselli 2001; Marks 
1997). Marks’ social position and its privileges were the result of seizing and accessing a 
chain of entrepreneurial opportunities, which made Marks himself an entrepreneurial 
opportunity for others (Morselli 2001; Marks 1997). Marks placed and presented himself as a 
reliable and efficient specialist in a loose network of entrepreneurs (Morselli 2001; Marks 
1997). As a specialist, Marks (1997) claimed that the ingredients of a successful illegal 
business were durability, stability and consistent profit.    
An examination of Marks’ career from the mid-1970s to 1980 shows that while he was 
engaged in the cannabis trade, he simultaneously managed to reduce the number of 
individuals he needed to work and deal with (Morselli 2001). In other words, Marks did not 
need to make new contacts, but in the rare cases in which he did make new contacts, they 
were established based on the ensuring of trust through a careful search (Morselli 2001). 
Being a broker, Marks was exposed to few co-participants in each venture (Morselli 2001). 
Marks’s connecting behaviour reveals a network closure pattern (network closure is 
minimising the number of direct ties to the entrepreneur in their own network or the networks 
they are part of) that offenders use as a strategic move of formal control and sanctioning 
processing (Morselli 2001). Although Marks reduced his contacts in his network and reduced 
his exposure, he managed to do so in a context that would not negatively affect his 
entrepreneurial opportunities; in fact, they increased (Morselli 2001). In other words, the 
privilege of Marks’ social position was being away from the action, having few encounters 
with the participants, choosing among the opportunities offered and harvesting the profits of 
brokering, while simultaneously dabbling in other similarly designed ventures (Morselli 
2001). The fall of Marks’ legacy was due to over-ambitious venturing (Morselli 2001). 
In summary, Marks modus essendi was leadership, his modus operandi was brokerage and 
forming his own criminal group, his modus vivendi was through skilled criminals in the 
cannabis trade, and operating in a loose network of criminal entrepreneurs, forming short and 
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long-term criminal ties based on trust. Towards the end of Marks’ career, however, his modus 
vivendi was a closed network with limited ties and resources. Figure 5 outlines his modi.  
Figure 5: Howard Marks  
        Modus Essendi    +              Modus Operandi                +   Modus vivendi  
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2.20 Sammy Gravano 
Sammy Gravano, also known as ‘The Bull’, was a member of the Gambino crime family 
(Gravano 2012; Morselli 2003). Gravano expanded his network until he reached an elite 
status and position, then started to constrain it (Morselli 2003). Gravano was able to constrain 
and achieve network closure after the success of his criminal career (Morselli 2003). 
Gravano’s ability to achieve network closure was due to his competitive advantage in 
controlling violence and becoming a vital actor in his criminal network (Morselli 2003).  
Network closure is considered a privilege in organised crime and among criminal 
entrepreneurs, as it limit their exposure to other criminals and the public in addition to enable 
them to be selective in choosing opportunities (Morselli 2003). It limits the criminal’s 
exposure to law enforcement agencies (Morselli 2003). Network closure increases the 
autonomy of criminal entrepreneurs and their criminal operations (Morselli 2003). Gravano 
succeeded by forming trustworthy relationships with patrons, which enabled him to reach and 
access their networks (Morselli 2003). 
In summary as shown in Figure 6, Gravano’s modus essendi was leadership, his modus 
operandi was the capacity to control or promote violence and form trusted relationships, and 
his modus vivendi was an open network of criminals and, towards the end of his career, a 
closed network of high profile organised crime members (Morselli 2003). 
Figure 6: Sammy Gravano  
 Modus Essendi        +              Modus Operandi                       +     Modus Vivendi  
[leadership]      +     [
 Forming trusting relationships 
Capacity for violence
Controlling violence
]   +    [  
Open and
closed networks  
] 
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2.21 Jack Herbert 
More recently, in Australia, a study was conducted on the career of Jack Herbert, also known 
as 'Bagman' (Lauchs and Staines 2012). Herbert flourished within corruption and found a 
number of opportunities to make money within his network through his brokering skills and 
the value of his position within the network (Lauchs and Staines 2012; Herbert and Gilling 
2004).  
Herbert was also able to establish corruption networks based on his knowledge of how to run 
corruption operations, his reputation for attracting members into the corruption network and 
the organisation he created (Lauchs and Staines 2012; Herbert and Gilling 2004). Herbert’s 
knowledge, skills and connections gave him the ability to build a corruption network from the 
ground up (Lauchs and Staines 2012; Herbert and Gilling 2004). The opportunity to rebuild 
the corruption network was channelled to him through his trustworthy reputation among 
operators of illegal gambling and his link to the police commissioner (Lauchs and Staines 
2012, p. 112; Herbert and Gilling 2004).  
Due to Herbert’s connections, in particular with the police commissioner, he was not 
concerned about being caught or prosecuted (Lauchs and Staines 2012; Herbert and Gilling 
2004). Herbert was well known for his efficiency, silence and reliability in making payments, 
and attracting and involving new players, which gave him the position of an organiser in the 
network (Lauchs and Staines 2012; Herbert and Gilling 2004). Herbert’s brokerage skills 
enabled him to operate with multiple groups (Lauchs and Staines 2012), thus creating and 
providing, significant opportunities and advantages (Lauchs and Staines 2012; Herbert and 
Gilling 2004). 
In summary, as shown in Figure 7, Herbert’s modus essendi was leadership, his modus 
operandi was brokerage, and his modus vivendi was occupying a brokerage position in the 
criminal network and having connections with a corrupt police commissioner, which was part 
of the embedded resources in his network.  
Figure 7: Jack Herbert 
           Modus Essendi + Modus Operandi     +       Modus Vivendi 
[Leadership] +  [Brokerage] +  [
Open network
(multiple networks)
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Based on the studies of Marks, Gravano and Herberts, it can be argued that a criminal 
entrepreneur’s modus essendi is leadership, their modus operandi includes brokerage, the 
capacity to control and promote violence, and their modus vivendi is open networks with 
various skilled criminal entrepreneurs and a closed network of high-profile personnel which 
could include a police commissioner who is one of the embedded resources in their network. 
The next section discusses the criminal entrepreneur’s modi in greater detail, starting with 
modus essendi which is leadership. According to Strange and Mumford (2002), leadership is 
comprised of vision, leadership style and orientation. The next section discusses the first 
component of leadership, vision.  
2.22 Vision 
Recent studies suggest that vision is one of the first and most important steps towards 
becoming a successful entrepreneur (Hanks and McCarrey 2015; Song Lin and Chi-hsiang 
2015; Zaccaro and Banks 2004; Farrell 2015; Strange and Mumford 2002; Strange and 
Mumford 2005; Kaiser, Feldhusen and Fordinal 2013; Van der Helm 2009). The importance 
of vision lies in its ability to provide a blueprint for entrepreneurs to achieve their goals (Van 
der Helm 2009). The blueprint is drawn by setting a future self-image, such as social status 
and/or future goals, to be attained (Van der Helm 2009). Van der Helm (2009) adds that 
vision is the best planning strategy that successful entrepreneurs can have.  
There are various definitions of ‘vision’ in the literature, mostly revolving around setting a 
future target, which can be a mission or even the social status that an entrepreneur or 
company wants to achieve (Hanks and McCarrey 2015; Málovics, Farkas and Vajda 2015; 
Strange and Mumford 2002). There are thus various types of vision, including strategic, 
creative and entrepreneurial (Wilson 1992; Song Lin and Chi-hsiang 2015; Earl and Potts 
2015). Strategic vision is often adopted by corporations and large entities, while creative 
vision is associated with innovation (Wilson 1992; Song Lin and Chi-hsiang 2015; Earl and 
Potts 2015), which the criminal entrepreneurs in this study were not engaged in. This study 
thus follows the first definition towards understanding the vision and vision formation 
process of successful criminal entrepreneurs; it adopts entrepreneurial vision as associated 
with individual personal vision (Strange and Mumford 2002; Strange and Mumford 2005).  
This study focuses on entrepreneurial vision. A successful vision has to be 1) clear, 2) stable, 
3) supported by the members of the organisation, 4) communicative, 5) inspirational, 6) 
realistic, 7) flexible and 8) conservative and formalised (Song Lin and Chi-hsiang 2015). The 
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role of vision is to 1) set the direction of the organisation’s future, and 2) attract and inspire 
followers (Hanks and McCarrey 2015; Renko et al. 2015; Bojko 2014). Most literature on 
entrepreneurship and leadership thus references vision as an essential element in creating a 
successful company or a successful entrepreneurial career (Hanks and McCarrey 2015; Renko 
et al. 2015; Bojko 2014), but few researchers and scholars shed light on the roots and 
inspirations of a clear vision.  
To date, Kaiser, Feldhusen and Fordinal (2013); Hanks and McCarrey (2015); Filion (1991); 
Strange and Mumford (2002) have touched on the sources of a vision, which are 1) personal 
experience, 2) social network, 3) strength, and 4) available resources. Criminologists, on the 
other hand who have adopted the entrepreneurial approach in order to understand criminal 
organisations, used a reversed approach to understand the vision of criminal entrepreneurs, by 
arguing that the criminal enterprise reflects the criminal entrepreneur’s vision behind the 
enterprise (Gottschalk 2010). They have not provided a precise measurement, however, nor 
defined how these elements inspire a successful vision. Moreover, the elements provided in 
the vision formation process mostly address legitimate business and not successful criminal 
entrepreneurs. Due to the limited literature on the vision of successful criminal entrepreneurs, 
this study adopts the elements noted by Kaiser, Feldhusen and Fordinal (2013); Hanks and 
McCarrey (2015); Filion (1991); Strange and Mumford (2002) as inspiring a successful 
vision, to measure the visions and the vision formation processes of successful criminal 
entrepreneurs in this study. Once a clearly defined vision has been reached, leadership is 
required to execute the vision, and lead followers and associates to achieving it. Leaders use 
different leadership styles to do this, as discussed in the next section.     
2.23 Leadership style  
There are various types of leadership style, such as charismatic, ideological, transactional and 
heroic leaderships (Yukl 1999; O'Connor et al. 1996; Strange and Mumford 2002; House and 
Howell 1992). The leadership style adopted by the entrepreneur to reach their vision depends 
on the vision and the environment settings (Yukl 1999; O'Connor et al. 1996; Strange and 
Mumford 2002; House and Howell 1992; Oreg and Berson 2015). The criminal entrepreneurs 
in this study are visionary leaders, in terms of having, developing and reaching their own 
vision; they are classified as charismatic leaders, as charismatic leaders are also referred to as 
visionary leaders (Cohen et al. 2004). Charismatic leadership can be divided into three main 
sections, according to the characteristics of the leader, the motives of the followers in 
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following the charismatic leader and the charismatic leader’s motivational approach to their 
followers (Strange and Mumford 2002). This section outlines the essence of charismatic 
leadership, a leader’s approach to their followers, and the methods that charismatic leaders 
use to maintain and motivate their followers. Finally, this section will outline the limitations 
of the charismatic leadership literature regarding successful criminal entrepreneurs. This 
section starts with the origins of charismatic leadership. 
According to Yukl (1999) the original definition of charismatic leadership is, simply, 
followers describing and referring to their leaders as charismatic. According to Yukl (1999) 
charismatic leadership is measured by the influence of the leader over their followers, and the 
type of relationship between them. The literature on leadership provides different ideas of 
what makes a charismatic leader (Yukl 1999; Cohen et al. 2004; House and Howell 1992; 
Strange and Mumford 2002).  
Charismatic leadership has a number of elements, which include 1) strategic vision, 2) 
sensitivity towards member needs, 3) unorthodox behaviours, 4) taking personal risks, 5) 
showing sensitivity to their surroundings, and 6) having the ability to identify constraints, 
threats and opportunities (Yukl 1999). Cohen et al. (2004) adds that charismatic leaders are 
task and relationship oriented. In other words, a leader and their followers collaborate and 
share responsibility to reach the defined vision (Cohen et al. 2004). A charismatic leader also 
has the ability to inspire, use nonverbal communication, appeal to ideological values and 
stimulate the intellectuality of their followers (House and Howell 1992).  
House and Howell (1992) argued that charismatic leaders are 1) supportive, 2) sensitive, 3) 
nurturing, and 4) considerate, such as Mahatma Gandhi or Nelson Mandela. House and 
Howell (1992) also add that charismatic leaders are less likely to be 1) aggressive, 2) 
demanding, 3) domineering and critical leaders, such as Jim Jones or Field Marshall Bernard 
Montgomery. Charismatic leaders can lead and attract followers in different fields (House and 
Howell 1992; Wright 2013; Strange and Mumford 2005; Strange and Mumford 2002; 
Hofmann 2015). For instance, some politicians are considered charismatic leaders, such as 
Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, Fidel Castro, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, religious figures 
such as Jesus Christ and Jim Jones, some social movement leaders, such as Mahatma Gandhi, 
Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcom X,  some business leaders, such as Lee Iacocca, Steven 
Jobs, Ross Johnson, Mary Kay Ash (House and Howell 1992), and some terrorist group 
leaders, such as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Anwar Al-Awlaki (Hofmann 2015).  
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It is clear from the literature that charismatic leaders can be both moral and immoral (House 
and Howell 1992; Hofmann 2015; Woodiwiss and Telford 2015; Wright 2013). Although 
House and Howell (1992) argued that charismatic leaders are less likely to be aggressive, 
demanding and domineering, they did not provide measures or descriptions of leaders for 
whom this conclusion and argument could be drawn. Wright (2013) argued, in his study of 
organised crime in Britain, based on the Richardson gang (led by Charlie Richardson) and the 
Kray gang (led by the twin brothers Reggie and Ronnie Kray), that organised crime leaders 
are charismatic (Woodiwiss and Telford 2015). Although Wright (2013, 173) was wary of 
using the term ‘organised crime’ due to its various and inconsistent definitions, he argued that 
if the definition of organised crime included a ‘rudimentary strategy, of a structured hierarchy 
and of specific roles assumed by gang members’ then Richardson and the Kray brothers were 
charismatic organised crime leaders. Woodiwiss and Telford (2015); Wright (2013) neither 
provided a definition nor a measure of charismatic leadership in their study. A number of 
studies led by Strange and Mumford (2005); Strange and Mumford (2002); Cohen et al. 
(2004); Yukl (1999) examined charismatic leadership in greater detail and provided clear 
measurement, definition and circumstances for a charismatic leader.  
To their followers, charismatic leaders appear in distressful times in terms of hardship and 
crisis were challenges arise and leadership is required to come it (Cohen et al. 2004; Strange 
and Mumford 2002). The charismatic leader introduces a radical vision to solve a crisis the 
followers are often going through (Cohen et al. 2004). The dedication of the followers to the 
leader is thus drawn from 1) psychological distress, 2) the need to be part of a larger whole, 
and 3) seeking self-worth and meaning in life (Cohen et al. 2004). When followers are 
struggling to reach their full potential in stressful times, charismatic leaders take their needs, 
values, preferences, desires and aspirations, and transform them into a collective and shared 
goal (Cohen et al. 2004). Once the needs, values, preferences, desires and aspirations of the 
followers are shared, they become willing to make sacrifices in order for the charismatic 
leader to reach what has become a shared vision (House and Howell 1992; Strange and 
Mumford 2002). Yukl (1999); Strange and Mumford (2002) adds that charismatic leaders 
emphasise emotions, value and positive and negative reinforcement to attract followers and 
members.  
Charismatic leaders use two main approaches to keep followers motivated: positive 
reinforcement and negative reinforcement (House and Howell 1992; Strange and Mumford 
2002). Positive reinforcements are material incentives for dedicated followers (House and 
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Howell 1992; Strange and Mumford 2002). Conversely, negative reinforcement occurs when 
less motivated followers and members are punished for their lack of contribution and 
motivation for achieving the collective goal and mission (House and Howell 1992; Strange 
and Mumford 2002). 
Charismatic leadership has proved to be efficient in attracting followers and fulfilling a vision 
in various fields (Strange and Mumford 2002). As Wright (2013) argued that organised crime 
leaders in a hierarchical structure are charismatic, this study examines charismatic leadership 
in non-hierarchically structure organised crime leaders. Through examination of charismatic 
leadership, this study aims to understand how successful criminal entrepreneurs in non-
hierarchically structured organised crime are able to attract followers.   
2.24 Leadership orientation 
Leadership orientation is the direction of efforts in leadership (Strange and Mumford 2002). 
There are two main leadership orientations, personal and social (Strange and Mumford 2002). 
Personal orientation involves serving and benefiting the leader themselves, regardless of the 
damage it causes to society or those around them (Strange and Mumford 2002). Social 
orientation, on the other hand, is a selfless approach, focused on serving the community and 
those around the leader regardless of the benefits to the leader (Strange and Mumford 2002).  
In other words, the entrepreneur can approach leadership with two main mind-sets which are: 
1) servicing their own personal interests, which can include their own personal organisation 
or criminal organisation, or 2) leading with the mind-set of serving the public, community 
regardless of the personal benefit and gains the leader can harvest from the opportunities 
arises, but putting the public and those around him or her first.   
The next section connects the dots between all previous sections to draw a conclusion and 
hypothesis prior to discussing the operational approaches of the criminal entrepreneurs in 
greater detail.  
2.25 Connecting the dots  
The previous sections showed that non-hierarchical structured organised crime is driven by 
criminal entrepreneurs. Further analysis of non-hierarchically structured criminal 
organisations suggests that the criminal entrepreneurs behind them are a different breed of 
criminals, as they do not fit the classic description of criminals found in low self-control 
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theory (Morselli and Tremblay 2004). To gain a better understanding of criminal 
entrepreneurs, the concept and definition of ‘entrepreneur’ were outlined. The definitions of 
an entrepreneur are consistent in describing them as leaders in moving and creating economic 
resources, through creating and founding new ventures (Dees 1998, Gottschalk 2010). The 
characteristics of entrepreneurs are also consistent with the description of organised crime 
members in the Oyster Bay definition, organisation and social network theories (as criminal 
entrepreneurs collaborate), illicit enterprise approach (as criminal entrepreneurs respond to 
the demand and supply of the market), and have higher self-control based on low self-control 
theory. The definitions do not provide an insight into how entrepreneurs are made, however. 
To gain a better understanding of how entrepreneurs are made, various theories were adopted 
and applied. The theories, which include explanatory, predictive, normative, social/cultural, 
personal-based, network, Psychological Entrepreneurship Theory (PET), finance and 
economy theories are all limited in describing certain elements that contribute to the 
formation of an entrepreneur, and they lack interactivity. In criminological literature, it is 
argued that criminal entrepreneurs are products of the opportunity presented (Gottschalk 
2010) which extends the illicit enterprise approach which argues that criminal entrepreneurs 
respond to opportunities in the market (supply and demand of the market). In other words, 
based on the opportunity presented, whether it is in a legal or illegal, field entrepreneurs 
would respond and seize the opportunity.  
To extend the theoretical literature, three studies were conducted of criminal entrepreneurs: 
Marks, Gravano and Herbert (Morselli 2001, 2003; Lauchs and Staines 2012). The studies 
found that criminal entrepreneurs are ‘leaders’ in their field, which is consistent with the 
entrepreneurship literature, as entrepreneurs possess leadership skills (Van Praag 1999). The 
three studies conducted by Morselli (2003, 2001), Lauchs and Staines (2012) also found that 
the criminal entrepreneur modus operandi includes brokerage, which is consistent with social 
network and organisation theories, and controlling and promoting violence which is 
consistent with the illicit enterprise approach (Haller 1990). The three criminal entrepreneur 
studies also showed that their social networks change over time, from open to closed, that 
relationships are formed based on trust, and involve valuable resources that the entrepreneur 
can access, such as a connection to the police commissioner. These findings are consistent 
with routine activity theory, as criminals must ensure the absence of a guardian in order to be 
successful in crime, which means establishing a connection with a corrupt police 
commissioner. To be able to establish a connection with a corrupt police commissioner a 
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criminal must have strong self-control, which is consistent with Morselli and Tremblay 
(2004) findings, and with social network and organisation theories that stress the importance 
of collaboration for success (Lauchs and Staines 2012).  
The limitations of the previous studies include not providing greater details on the leadership 
of Mark, Gravano and Herbert, however the literature on leadership suggests that leaders who 
have leadership skills must have a vision and a leadership style and orientation (Strange and 
Mumford 2002). The literature suggests that organised crime leaders have a charismatic 
leadership style (Wright 2013). This study thus hypothesises that criminal entrepreneurs are 
leaders with a clear vision, a charismatic leadership style and a personal orientation as 
criminal entrepreneurs aiming to serve themselves and their criminal organisation. The next 
section discusses the operational approaches of criminal entrepreneurs in greater detail so as 
to gain a better understanding of how they are successful in crime.       
2.26 The operational approaches 
This section outlines the ways in which criminal entrepreneurs conduct their business and 
arrange their crimes. Two main goals of the operational approaches of criminal entrepreneurs 
are protecting themselves and making a profit. The operational approaches adopted by 
criminal entrepreneurs to protect themselves, as covered in this section, are avoiding conflict, 
having representatives and delegation. Brokerage, bribery and blackmail are three of the main 
approaches adopted by criminal entrepreneurs to gain power and income. The rationale 
behind focusing on these six operational approaches is their significant role in the success of a 
criminal entrepreneur career and criminal organisations, as outlined in the literature (Morselli 
and Roy 2008; Morselli 2003, 2001; Lauchs and Staines 2012; Lauchs, Keast and Yousefpour 
2011; Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain 2012; DeLong 1993; Block, Stephan Kinsella and 
Hoppe 2000; Westen 2012).     
2.27 Avoiding conflicts and having representatives 
Successful criminal entrepreneurs understand the nature of their field, as the legal system 
cannot protect them in their illegal activities and therefore, criminal entrepreneurs avoid 
conflicts with other criminals and criminal groups (Bailey and Taylor 2009). Engaging in 
conflicts with other criminal groups could lead to violence and/or murder (Bailey and Taylor 
2009). Violence and murder often lead to investigations by law enforcement agencies. In 
other words, conflict can result in attracting unwanted attention to the criminal groups or 
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individuals (Bailey and Taylor 2009). Criminal entrepreneurs therefore avoid conflicts in an 
effort to avoid attracting unwanted attention to their hidden criminal activities (Bailey and 
Taylor 2009). This sort of behaviour, reflects high levels of self-control, which support the 
argument by Morselli and Tremblay (2004) that criminal entrepreneurs have high levels of 
self-control which contribute to their success in crime. 
Criminal entrepreneurs also often appoint a representative to act on their behalf (Williams and 
Godson 2002; Morselli 2001; Hofmann and Gallupe 2015). Where conflict could occur and 
attract attention, a criminal entrepreneur would have a representative to act on their behalf 
(Williams and Godson 2002; Morselli 2001; Hofmann and Gallupe 2015). There are two 
main gaols behind having a trusted representative. The first is avoiding being arrested if the 
criminal operation fails, and/or if law enforcement interfered (Williams and Godson 2002; 
Morselli 2001; Hofmann and Gallupe 2015). The second goal is distancing themselves from 
the criminal activities in case the operations are being observed (Williams and Godson 2002; 
Morselli 2001; Hofmann and Gallupe 2015). One mean of distancing oneself from criminal 
activities is delegation.     
2.28 Delegation 
The delegation approach protects central and privileged players (including criminal 
entrepreneurs) and acts as a cushion of social contacts, protecting crime leaders and criminal 
entrepreneurs from activities under surveillance by law enforcement agencies, as shown in 
Figure 8 (Morselli 2001; Hofmann and Gallupe 2015). Delegation is also considered a form 
of power (Felli and Hortala-Vallve 2015). Central and privileged actors are more likely to 
keep their distance from the actual distribution of illegal goods and activities, in order to 
reduce their visibility and the risk of detection (Bright et al. 2015; Morselli 2001).  
Placing someone in a critical position such as at the centre and/or as the main contact point of 
a criminal operation or organisation could be a defence mechanism, and a misleading strategy 
to divert law enforcement agencies from tracking or targeting the real leaders of a group 
(Morselli 2001, 2003; Lauchs and Staines 2012; Bright et al. 2015). This strategy is adopted 
due to the fact that offenders cannot rely on the legal system to protect them in their illegal 
activities, nor do they have legal contracts to protect their rights (Morselli 2001; Lauchs and 
Staines 2012; Morselli 2003).  
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Although central and privileged players maintain a relative distance from the location of 
illegal activities, they consistently harvest a portion of the profit drawn from the circulation 
process (Morselli 2001, 2003; Lauchs and Staines 2012). This delegation behaviour is 
consistent with Spapens’s (2010) argument that criminal entrepreneurs are very cautious in 
conducting their crime. Keeping a distance from the criminal activities also reflects high 
levels of self-control, which is consistent with the argument by Morselli and Tremblay 
(2004). Being at the heart of the process and distribution points does not, therefore, 
necessarily reflect a central or privileged role or a position in the processing chain, which 
reflects the non-hierarchical structure of a criminal organisation (Morselli 2001; Bright et al. 
2015). Distancing oneself from criminal activities is also evident in brokerage which is 
discussed in the next section.  
Figure 8: Delegation 
 
 
 
                             Criminal groups/criminal operation 
              Member of a criminal network 
              The criminal entrepreneur 
 
2.29 Brokerage 
Brokerage is the act of connecting two parties (Morselli and Roy 2008). In crime, criminal 
entrepreneurs can act as brokers by connecting unconnected criminal groups to one another, 
as shown in Figure 9 (Morselli and Roy 2008). For instance, criminal entrepreneurs can 
connect criminal groups operating robberies to money laundering groups in order to 
legitimise the ill-gotten gains from the robberies. An entrepreneur can also connect criminal 
groups to corrupt police to arrange immunity or provide information about ongoing 
investigations of certain organised crime members or operations (Lauchs and Staines 2012). 
 
 
Criminal 
entrepreneurs 
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Figure 9: Brokering 
                                                    
                                                                       
                                                                 
 
As a broker who connects criminals and criminal groups, the criminal entrepreneur is able to 
control valuable information as it passes through them to the other party (Lauchs and Staines 
2012; Morselli and Roy 2008). The criminal entrepreneur is also aware of the services and 
products required in the criminal milieu (Lauchs and Staines 2012; Morselli and Roy 2008). 
With this information the criminal entrepreneur can provide such products and services 
(Lauchs and Staines 2012; Morselli and Roy 2008). As the entrepreneurs gather and control 
information in the criminal milieu, they can expose the limitations and weakness of certain 
criminal groups to rival criminal groups and law enforcement agencies (Lauchs and Staines 
2012; Morselli and Roy 2008). Criminal entrepreneurs who are brokers occupying a 
brokerage position in the criminal network are thus more likely to be successful in crime 
(Lauchs and Staines 2012; Morselli and Roy 2008). 
A brokerage position in a network is created through a structural hole (Morselli 2001). A 
structural hole is defined as ‘the separation between non-redundant contacts’ or ‘the void 
between unconnected players that are available for seizing’ (Morselli 2001, p. 205). The 
advantage of filling a structural hole is the ability to link or connect unconnected ties or 
individuals (Morselli 2001; Morselli and Roy 2008). In effect, structural holes in criminal 
networks are one of the most valuable locations and influential positions to occupy. In non-
hierarchical organised crime, criminal leaders are more likely to occupy a brokerage position 
in the network rather than a central position. Despite occupying a significant location in the 
network and playing a significant role in connecting and smoothing criminal operations, the 
criminal entrepreneur must reward the cooperative parties, particularly corrupt law 
enforcement personnel, for their collaboration, which is done through bribery.       
2.30 Bribery 
Bribery is the bloodline of corruption and organised crime and there are various definitions of 
bribery in the literature (James Jr 2002). This study will adopt Driscoll (1984, 14) definition 
of bribery which is:  
Entrepreneur 
Criminal group Criminal group 
Brokering 
  
Chapter 2: Literature Review  53  
‘Any valuable thing given or promised, or any preferment, advantage, 
privilege or emolument, given or promised corruptly and against law as an 
inducement to any person acting in an official or public capacity to violate 
or forbear from his duty, or to improperly influence his behaviour in the 
performance of his duty’ 
Criminal entrepreneurs pay bribes in different forms such as favours, cash or even 
information (Hickie 1985).  
Bribery is a form of corruption (Solar 2015; Lui 1985). In corruption, bribery occurs when, 1) 
an official uses their power and authority to take advantage of citizens, or 2) when payment 
(in different forms) influences and distorts official decisions and judgments in favour of the 
briber (Lindgren 1993, 1704). Those who engage in bribery vary, from citizens to 
government officials, individual criminals, and organised crime members (Banuri and Eckel 
2015; Solar 2015; James Jr 2002; Pritchard 1998; Driscoll 1984). Bribers generally seek: 1) a 
better service, 2) someone turning a blind eye, and/or 3) information (Lui 1985). Those who 
seek better service are not necessarily involved in crime (Solar 2015), however those who 
demand turning a blind eye or information are most likely to be involved in corruption, crime 
and/or organised crime (Solar 2015).  
The literature on bribery and organised crime describes bribery as an essential element in the 
success of organised crime and criminal entrepreneur careers (Frisby 1998; Lauchs, Bain and 
Bell 2015; Lauchs and Staines 2012; Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain 2012; Lauchs, Keast 
and Yousefpour 2011). Once a collaborative arrangement is settled between organised 
members and government officials (including the law enforcement agencies), bribes are what 
maintain the relationships and collaboration arrangements between the two parties (Wang 
2013; Richard 1999; Skaperdas 2001).  
Bribery can take place within the same jurisdictions or across the borders (Schloenhardt 1999; 
Albanese 2004). In organised crime, bribes are paid for human trafficking, drug smuggling, 
prostitution rackets, violation of alcohol laws, information about investigations being carried 
out on a specific criminal organisation, securing contracts, protection and many more crimes 
(Schloenhardt 1999; Albanese 2004; Solar 2015). The literature acknowledges the critical 
role of bribery in the success of organised crime (Solar 2015; Kumssa 2015), however the 
bribery literature is not without its limitations.  
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The literature on bribery does not describe the mechanism of bribery in low-trust organised 
crime settings. Bribery is closely linked to extortion, which is the ‘obtaining of property from 
another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or 
fear, or under color of official right’ (Lindgren 1987, 830). In other words, those who receive 
bribes can blackmail those who bribed them to turn a blind eye, and this is the weakness of 
the bribery approach. Criminal entrepreneurs can be both guilty of, and victims of, blackmail.     
2.31 Blackmail  
Blackmail is another approach used by individuals and criminals to extort payment in 
exchange for not releasing harmful information about the individual being blackmailed (Felli 
and Hortala-Vallve 2015; Westen 2012; Shaw 2012; Block, Stephan Kinsella and Hoppe 
2000; Posner 1993). The literature on blackmail is full of scenarios of what could be 
considered blackmail (Felli and Hortala-Vallve 2015; Westen 2012; Shaw 2012; Block, 
Stephan Kinsella and Hoppe 2000; Posner 1993; DeLong 1993; Lindgren 1984). Blackmail is 
an act that is considered a grey area in terms of drawing the line between being legal and 
illegal criminal acts (Felli and Hortala-Vallve 2015; Westen 2012; Shaw 2012; Block, 
Stephan Kinsella and Hoppe 2000; Posner 1993; DeLong 1993; Lindgren 1984). As a result 
there are various definitions of blackmail (Felli and Hortala-Vallve 2015; Westen 2012; Shaw 
2012; Block, Stephan Kinsella and Hoppe 2000; Berman 1998; Lindgren 1984). The 
definitions of blackmail centre around the extortion of payment in the form of cash or 
property in exchange of not releasing harmful or embarrassing information (Felli and Hortala-
Vallve 2015; Westen 2012; Shaw 2012; Block, Stephan Kinsella and Hoppe 2000; Berman 
1998; Lindgren 1984). This study uses Boyle (1992, 1428) definition of blackmail, which is 
the ‘[u]nlawful demand of money or property under threat to do bodily harm, to injure 
property, to accuse of crime, or to expose disgraceful defects’. Boyle (1992) definition of 
blackmail is best suited to this study because, members of criminal networks can be blackmail 
for the crime they have committed or exposing disgraceful acts.  
There are four types of blackmail, ‘opportunistic blackmail’ which is where ‘the blackmailer 
innocently stumbles upon information he subsequently realizes will serve as useful blackmail 
fodder’ (Berman 1998, 803); ‘participant blackmail’ is when the blackmailer is ‘a participant 
in the conduct about which he later blackmails the victim’ (Berman 1998, 803); ‘commercial 
research blackmail’ is when the blackmailer ‘consciously seeks information in order to 
blackmail their victim’ (Berman 1998, 803) and ‘entrepreneurial blackmail’ is when the 
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blackmailer ‘entices a victim into a compromising situation for the specific purpose of 
producing the material with which they can blackmail’ (Berman 1998, 803).  
In order to blackmail an individual, three main classic embarrassing acts are sought: 1) 
innocent and harmless social acts, such as engaging in conventional sexual intercourse with a 
spouse, or simply taking a shower together, 2) adultery, and 3) crime (Berman 1998). These 
acts can be used by criminal entrepreneurs to blackmail challengers, competitors, or even the 
innocent for personal gain. The literature, however, is limited on criminal entrepreneurship 
and blackmail.        
The literature on blackmail is rich in explaining the criminality and legal approaches in 
defining and dealing with blackmail, and its existing use in organised crime and corruption 
(Felli and Hortala-Vallve 2015; Westen 2012; Shaw 2012; Block, Stephan Kinsella and 
Hoppe 2000; Posner 1993; DeLong 1993; Lindgren 1984). Limited literature has focused on 
blackmail from a criminal entrepreneur perspective, in terms of how criminal entrepreneurs 
are introduced to blackmail; avoid being blackmailed in organised crime and corrupt 
environments by other organised crime groups; outlining the motives of blackmail for 
criminal entrepreneurs; and finally about how successful and efficient blackmail is in a 
corrupt, low-trust environment, heavily managed by organised crime. The next section 
connects the dots between criminal entrepreneur leadership and operational approaches.  
2.32 Connecting the dots 
According to the literature, criminal entrepreneurs who operate and found organised crime are 
charismatic leaders with a vision, who have high levels of self-control (Morselli 2003, 2001; 
Wright 2013; Strange and Mumford 2002; Strange and Mumford 2005). Criminal 
entrepreneur operational approaches include brokerage and controlling and promoting 
violence (Lauchs and Staines 2012, Morselli 2001, 2003). Promoting and controlling violence 
is a form of supply and demand, as discussed earlier regarding the illicit enterprise approach 
(see 2.8 Illicit Enterprise, p. 19). For instance, violent criminals can be controlled, which may 
be required by other businesses (especially illegal businesses that cannot seek the help of the 
police). Promoting violence can be a supply situation, as payments can be extorted from legal 
and illegal businesses in corrupt environments where police are bribed to turn a blind eye.  
The operational approach of criminal entrepreneurs as shown in the literature suggests their 
success in crime and founding and/or operating criminal organisation is due to their ability to 
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occupy structural holes in the criminal network, which made them brokers (Lauchs and 
Staines 2012; Morselli 2001, 2003). As brokers, criminal entrepreneurs can access and 
control information (Lauchs and Staines 2012; Morselli 2001, 2003). By accessing and 
controlling information, criminal entrepreneurs are able to expose the weaknesses of other 
criminal groups, and sell the information collected and/or controlled (Lauchs and Staines 
2012; Morselli 2001, 2003). To maintain the brokerage position, particularly with corrupt law 
enforcement agencies and personnel, criminal entrepreneurs pay them bribes to access 
information and secure immunity from prosecution (Solar 2015).  
Another operational approach used by entrepreneurs is blackmail, which is extorting payment 
in exchange for not releasing harmful or embarrassing information (Shaw 2012; Block, 
Stephan Kinsella and Hoppe 2000; Westen 2012). The advantage of using the various forms 
of blackmail is it that they could be legally grey area, meaning it may be debateable whether 
they were legal or illegal (Shaw 2012; Westen 2012).  
It can thus be argued that criminal entrepreneurs who occupy structural holes and brokerage 
positions, and engage in bribery and blackmail are charismatic leaders with personal 
orientation and a clear vision. The next section outlines the embedded resources in the social 
capital of criminal entrepreneurs that contributes to their success, and starts by defining social 
capital.               
2.33 Social capital 
In the field of social sciences, social capital has been defined by three leading scholars, Pierre 
Bourdieu (1986), James Coleman (1988) and Robert Putnam (1993, 1995a, 1995b), setting 
the benchmark for all other research on the topic. Bourdieu defined social capital as:  
‘The sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an 
individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of 
more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance 
and recognition.’(Kawachi and Berkman 2000, 176).  
 Coleman (1988) defined social capital as:  
‘Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a 
variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all 
consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain 
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actions of actors – whether persons or corporate actors – within the 
structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, 
making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence 
would not be possible’ (p.S98).   
More recently, social capital was redefined by Putnam (1995) as ‘features of social life-
networks, norms, and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue 
shared objectives’ (pp.664-665). The current study adapts Putnam (1995) and Coleman 
(1988) definitions of social capital, as they include collectives, individuals, norms, trust, 
closed and open networks, functions, and the effects and consequences of social capital, 
which are reflected in previous studies conducted by Bright et al. (2015); Morselli (2009); 
Morselli and Roy (2008); Morselli and Tremblay (2004); Morselli (2003); Lauchs, Bain and 
Bell (2015); Lauchs and Staines (2012); Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain (2012); Lauchs, 
Keast and Yousefpour (2011) on criminal entrepreneurship, and in alliance with Smith (2009) 
modus vivendi of criminal entrepreneurship.  
The importance of social capital and social networks in this study is in the resources they hold 
and can provide to criminal entrepreneurs. Mentors and human capital are two major 
resources that can be accessed through social capital and social networks; and that play a 
critical role in the success of a criminal entrepreneur’s career (Morselli, Tremblay and 
McCarthy 2006; Mocan, Billups and Overland 2005; Lochner 2004; Piquero et al. 2014; 
Clark and Davis 2011; Smith 2013). In effect, social capital and social networks aid the 
process of entrepreneurial capital which ‘generates an analysis of entrepreneurial activity 
through identifying all the resources that the entrepreneur may possess or acquire – that are 
themselves composed of many different facets – and which are then employed in the 
entrepreneurial process.’ (Firkin, 2003, 25) In other words, entrepreneurial capital is formed 
through various experiences, which can be gain through mentors. Furthermore, 
entrepreneurial capital can be gained through accessing resources found in the individual 
social capital and social networks which includes mentor whom provide their human capital 
(Morselli, Tremblay and McCarthy 2006; Smith 2013). 
This study outlines the roles of mentors and human capital, as part of social capital, due to 
their significant influence in the success of a criminal entrepreneur, to gain a better 
understanding of their contribution to the success of a criminal entrepreneur, starting with 
mentorship.     
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2.34 Mentorship, role models, literature, personal experience and strength 
The literature on criminal mentorship is limited, but suggests that mentors have a significant 
influence on criminal entrepreneurs (Morselli, Tremblay and McCarthy 2006; Smith 2013). 
The work of Smith (2013) and Morselli, Tremblay and McCarthy (2006) shows mentors and 
mentoring to have significant positive influence on the career of a potential criminal 
entrepreneur. Mentoring is a term used to describe the ‘process in which well-known and 
experienced people either developed new skills or were considered by the society around 
them to be ‘know-it-all’ advisors’ (Schechter and Firuz 2015, 367). A mentor is ‘a guide, 
tutor, facilitator, counsellor and a trusted advisor. He or she is someone who is willing to 
spend his or her time and expertise to guide the development of another person’ (McBurney 
2015, 257). 
In addition to teaching, advising and sponsoring (sponsoring in crime often include providing 
immunity from prosecution through the connections of the mentor), mentors provide human, 
cultural, and social capital to their protégés, nursing the protégé’s criminal talent, teaching the 
art of developing strong ties with influential actors in the criminal network, and possibly 
placing the protégé in a brokerage position to harvest criminal opportunities (Morselli, 
Tremblay and McCarthy 2006). Mentors for criminal entrepreneurs are not necessarily found 
in prison, nor in a criminal context (Morselli, Tremblay and McCarthy 2006). Criminal 
mentors can come from family and legal settings (Morselli, Tremblay and McCarthy 2006; 
Smith 2013). 
Not all mentors have a positive influence on their protégés, nor make a protégé a successful 
criminal (Morselli, Tremblay and McCarthy 2006; Taherian and Shekarchian 2008). Mentor 
and protégé relationships can detour due confidentiality breaches or poor implementation of 
mentorship (Taherian and Shekarchian 2008), which in crime could lead to attracting 
unwanted attention, damaging a criminal reputation for efficiency and therefore losing clients, 
and the loss of clients and connections could lead to the loss of a network location such as a 
brokerage position. In fact, bad implementation of mentorship could lead to the arrest of a 
protégé and possibly the mentor, or even death by other criminal groups (Morselli, Tremblay 
and McCarthy 2006).  
Due to the risks associated with having a protégé, criminal mentors therefore have a screening 
process when choosing a criminal protégé (Morselli, Tremblay and McCarthy 2006). The 
mentor screening process of choosing a criminal protégé involves selecting youth with low 
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self-control, who are less supervised and have a positive attitude towards risk (Morselli, 
Tremblay and McCarthy 2006). The limitations of Morselli, Tremblay and McCarthy (2006) 
study and findings involve their sample, which was taken from prisoners who by definition 
are not successful criminal entrepreneurs and therefore have lower levels of self-control. This 
study examines the role of mentors in aiding the success of a criminal entrepreneur by 
outlining the mentors who had the most influence and made the greatest contribution to the 
criminal entrepreneur’s success, how they met, and the human capital gained from the 
mentor.  
In addition to mentors, role models also have significant influence on entrepreneurs’ visions 
and operational approach (Gibson 2004). A role model can be defined as ‘a cognitive 
construction based on the attributes of people in social roles an individual perceives to be 
similar to him or herself to some extent and desires to increase perceived similarity by 
emulating those attributes’ (Gibson 2004, p. 136). Role models play different roles  to 
mentors, as role models are those who an individual or an entrepreneur inspires to become 
like, while mentors, on the other hand, are those who coach and teach an entrepreneur how to 
operate and carry or execute certain tasks in addition to developing certain skills (Gibson 
2004, Morselli, Tremblay and McCarthy 2006; Smith 2013).  
Furthermore, the absence of a biological father also contributed to the formation of an 
entrepreneur vision (Hanks and McCarrey 2015, Strange and Mumford 2005, 2002). The 
father often provided guidance, leadership, mentorship and in some cases become a role-
model to their offspring (Hanks and McCarrey 2015, Strange and Mumford 2005, 2002). 
Where the father is absent, the offspring often take to other individuals as role models, 
mentors and source of inspiration which contribute to the formation of their vision and goals 
(Hanks and McCarrey 2015, Strange and Mumford 2005, 2002). In other words, the father 
often shields his offspring from bad role models, mentors and in effect bad or criminal vision 
(Hanks and McCarrey 2015, Strange and Mumford 2005, 2002). Yet, in the absence of a 
father or father figure, the individual could be easily influenced by a bad or a criminal role 
model or mentor (Hanks and McCarrey 2015, Strange and Mumford 2005, 2002).  
Furthermore, literature defined as  ‘the body of serious, thoughtful writing on whatever 
subjects are of interest to the members of that community’ (Edgerlon 1967, 122), can also 
influence and shape one’s vision (Hanks and McCarrey 2015, Strange and Mumford 2005, 
2002) whether in creating legitimate and legal goal or criminal organisations. Moreover, the 
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individual personal life experiences can also contribute to his or her vision and goals in life 
(Hanks and McCarrey 2015, Strange and Mumford 2005, 2002). In addition, often later in 
life, individual can also build-up their vision and goals in life based on their personal strength, 
skills and qualities (Hanks and McCarrey 2015, Strange and Mumford 2005, 2002). All these 
forms of knowledge and education that contribute towards building a vision and goal in 
addition to how to operate, execute and reach the vision formed fall under the individual 
human capital. The next section discusses human capital and crime in greater detail.     
2.35 Human capital 
Human capital is formal education, such as a degree from a university, and non-formal 
education, such as specific training courses not within the formal education structure or 
system, which can include practical training on a job site or personal experiences in life 
(Davidsson and Honig 2003). According to Coleman (1988, S100) human capital is created 
by ‘changes in persons that bring about skills and capabilities that make them able to act in 
new ways’. In other words, gaining and developing human capital changes a person’s skills 
and abilities, which is controversial in crime and criminal entrepreneurship. The controversy 
lies in the use of such knowledge in crime. Some might use human capital in crime to develop 
their crimes modus operandi in order to extort the innocent, while others would use it to 
defeat crime, by creating early intervention and crime prevention programs.      
The literature on human capital and crime is divided into two main sections, human capital  
that would prevent crime (Jonck et al. 2015; Lochner 2004) and human capital that would 
enhance and enable the commission of crime (McCarthy and Hagan 2001, 1995; Bayer, 
Hjalmarsson and Pozen 2007; Mocan, Billups and Overland 2005), also known and referred 
to in this study as criminal human capital. This study focuses on criminal human capital and 
its ability to enhance the careers of criminal entrepreneurs. 
For criminal entrepreneurs, there are two main sources of criminal human capital, mentors 
and personal experiences (Mocan, Billups and Overland 2005). Through mentors, criminal 
entrepreneurs can learn how to conduct crimes successfully, such as breaking safes (Mocan, 
Billups and Overland 2005). Personal experiences also develop the human capital of criminal 
entrepreneurs through trial and error (Mocan, Billups and Overland 2005), however personal 
experiences can be costly for criminal entrepreneurs, as there are higher risks and the 
possibility of failure, which could lead to attracting unwanted attention and possibly arrest by 
law enforcement agencies. Despite acknowledgement of the role of criminal human capital in 
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crime, the literature does not describe the criminal human capital that criminal entrepreneurs 
share, nor how this human capital is developed or sourced. The next section connects the 
previous sections.   
2.36 Connecting the dots 
It can be argued that criminal entrepreneurs have vision, charismatic leadership and personal 
orientation. Criminal entrepreneurs delegate their duties, work as brokers in their network, 
engage in bribery and blackmail, and have the capacity to control and/or promote violence 
(Morselli 2001, 2003, Berman 1998). Based on the findings of Smith (2013) and Morselli, 
Tremblay and McCarthy (2006), this thesis argues that criminal entrepreneurs are likely to be 
mentored by others who could be criminals and/or non-criminals. Criminal entrepreneurs 
develop their criminal human capital from their social capital, which includes their mentors 
(Morselli, Tremblay and McCarthy 2006; Mocan Billups and Overland 2005). Figure 10 
summaries the criminal entrepreneur process. 
Figure 10 Criminal entrepreneur process  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The previous sections have described the three criminal entrepreneur modi, modus essendi, 
which is leadership, modus operandi, which is delegation, brokerage, bribery and blackmail, 
and avoiding conflict, and modus vivendi which involves structural holes, mentors and 
criminal human capital. This study is based on the three modi framework introduced by Smith 
(2009). The next section describes the modi framework and the rationale behind adapting it, 
prior to outlining its measurement in the methodology chapter. 
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2.37 Smith’s framework 
Smith (2009) developed a framework that promises researchers an understanding of criminal 
entrepreneur behaviour in organised crime. The framework is based on three behavioural 
concepts, the modus essendi, modus operandi and modus vivendi (Smith 2009).    
Modus essendi is ‘a philosophical term relating to modes of being’ (Gottschalk and Smith 
2011, p. 301; Smith 2009, 260). Modus essendi explores the psychological nature of the 
individual and is associated with the individual’s issues regarding identity, epistemology and 
ontology (Smith 2009). According to Smith (2009), criminal entrepreneurs view themselves 
as rebels, mavericks and likeable rogues, which reflects a shared knowledge referred to as an 
epistemology. Modus essendi also defines the behaviours of criminal entrepreneurs, such as 
their leadership based on behaviour. An entrepreneur’s shared epistemology and behaviours 
can be reflected in their operational approach or modus operandi.  
Modus operandi is a ‘criminological concept for classifying generic human actions from their 
visible and consequential manifestations’ (Gottschalk and Smith 2011, p. 301; Smith 2009, 
260). Smith (2009) argued that entrepreneurial behaviours could be seen as a method of 
operation that entails individual actions, observable traits and behaviours. A modus operandi 
is a person’s behaviours, as learned through the visual and narrative elements that they 
experience (Smith 2009). Smith (2009) argued that entrepreneurial behaviours can be 
illustrated through examination of the planning and organising of the crimes that criminal 
entrepreneurs commit. Additional behaviours and manners can be extracted from the 
aftermath of a crime in terms of hiding, covering up tracks, and the positioning of the 
outcome (benefits and proceeds) (Smith 2009). Studying the trading, arbitraging, wheeling 
and dealing of the proceeds of a crime can manifest criminal behaviour (Smith 2009). Modus 
operandi, or the operational approach, always involves other players; those players are 
usually part of the entrepreneur’s macro-criminal network. A better understanding of an 
entrepreneur’s social and criminal network can aid the understanding of how a criminal group 
is formed and operates. A better understanding of a criminal entrepreneur’s social and 
criminal network can be achieved through examination of their modus vivendi.  
Modus vivendi is ‘the shared symbiotic relationship between emerging entrepreneurial groups 
on the wrong side of the law’ (Gottschalk and Smith 2011, p. 301; Smith 2009, 261). Modus 
vivendi can be seen as the links in an individual’s social network, and is essential in 
understanding entrepreneurial behaviour (Smith 2009). However, modus vivendi does not 
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only apply to criminal behaviours and networks, but also legitimate entrepreneurs as well 
(Gottschalk and Smith 2011; Smith 2009). Yet this study will apply modus vivendi on 
criminal entrepreneurs’ behaviours and networks. Through the use of modus vivendi, the 
researcher is able to extract the value of the network (Smith 2009). Modus vivendi is crucial 
in understanding the social connections of criminal entrepreneurs, such as the relationships 
within their networks that are based within a framework of various power bases, patronage, 
mentors and resultant obligations (Smith 2009). These contacts (criminal relations) shape an 
entrepreneur’s modus vivendi and form their criminal macro-network (Smith 2009; Spapens 
2010).  
Criminals have different modus vivendi with different criminal associates and partners (Smith 
2009). This difference in modus vivendi is due to the fact that criminal entrepreneurs make 
connections with both criminals and non-criminals, which forms their social capital (Smith 
2009). Due to the sophistication of a criminal entrepreneur’s network and connections (Smith 
2009), their modus vivendi can be seen through their social capital and social interactions. 
Criminal entrepreneurs owe their success to their elevated contacts, which creates a high 
profile or source-full social capital (Smith 2009). Criminal entrepreneurs learn how to use 
social capital, including criminal and non-criminal connections, to attain their ends and goals 
(Smith 2009). Criminal entrepreneurs also use their social capital and connections as unpaid 
employees, and an extension to human capital (Smith 2009). Through social capital and social 
networks, criminal entrepreneurs learn to command and exclude leadership qualities and 
criminal human capital (Smith 2009). In order to illustrate the modus vivendi of the criminal 
entrepreneurs of this study, their social capital and social networks need to be measured (A 
detailed measurement of social capital and social networks is provided in the methodology 
section).  
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Figure 11: The research on organised crime and this study’s contribution to knowledge  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 11, summarises the literature structure with regards to criminal entrepreneurship 
research and organised crime. The purpose of figure is to simplify the patterns of research in 
criminal entrepreneurship and organised crime research. As shown in figure 11, the studies of 
organised crime are divided into two main sectors, hierarchy and non-hierarchy structure 
organised crime. Hence this paper focuses on non-hierarchy structured organised crime; it 
outlines the three main areas of research, which are crime network, entrepreneurs and 
studying crime network in a certain location which is referred to in figure 11 as location. As 
the paper focuses on entrepreneurs, figure 11 outlines how the author intends to extend the 
research on criminal entrepreneurship by examining the criminal entrepreneurs three modi. 
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The three modi approach would also link to the two main areas of study of organised crime 
and criminal entrepreneurship as it studies criminal entrepreneurs and their criminal 
organisations in Sydney which linked the study back to the location approach, in addition to 
social network which also links back to their operational approach, as criminal organisation 
operates through groups of connected individuals.       
Within the three modi approach, the author will examine each criminal entrepreneur modus 
operandi by examining the crimes they engaged in, identify who was involved, their role and 
motive. Then the author will examine each criminal entrepreneur modus essendi by outlining 
their characteristics and identity. Finally the researcher will examine the criminal 
entrepreneurs’ modus vivendi focusing on the embedded resources in their network, which 
will reach the edge of knowledge in the study of criminal entrepreneurship in Sydney, 
Australia and form the original contribution to the field. The next section will outline the gap 
in the literature and research questions. 
2.38 The gap in the literature and research questions 
Limited research has been conducted into criminal organisation and criminal entrepreneurs 
who are part of a non-hierarchical structure. This study builds on the work of Morselli (2003, 
2001) and Smith (2013, 2009), Lauchs and Staines (2012), and Bright, Hughes and Chalmers 
(2012). A limitation faced by Lauchs and Staines (2012) and Bright, Hughes and Chalmers 
(2012) was access and obtaining data. The work of Morselli (2001, 2003), Lauchs and Staines 
(2012), Bright, Hughes and Chalmers (2012) is based on five main sources of data: (1) 
offender databases, (2) transcripts of physical or electronic surveillance, (3) written 
summaries of police interrogations, (4) transcripts of court proceedings, and (5) online and 
print media. These resources have limitations, as they may not provide an in-depth insight to 
the lives and living condition of a criminal entrepreneur, or the external and internal factors 
that contributed to their success. The literature on criminal entrepreneurship is yet to answer 
and provide:    
(1) A theory that describes and provide an understanding of criminal entrepreneur 
behaviours. 
(2) Understanding of criminal entrepreneurship leadership in Australia, including their 
vision, leadership style and orientation. 
(3) Understanding of how criminal entrepreneurs behave in multiple criminal networks.  
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(4) Information about how criminal entrepreneurs overcome the challenges of operating 
in a corrupt environment 
(5) Information about how a change in one of the modi (e.g. modus essendi: leadership) 
affects the other modi (e.g. modus vivendi: social network).  
(6) Knowledge of which modi characteristics and epistemology successful criminal 
entrepreneurs share. 
(7) Information about how criminal entrepreneurs engage in bribery and avoid being 
extorted or blackmailed?  
(8) Reasons that mentors approach certain criminals (criminal entrepreneurs) instead of 
other criminals, despite sharing similar characteristics such as low self-control, early 
in their career?  
The author intends to fill in the gap in the literature by answering the following research 
questions. 
2.39 Research questions 
The theory of successful criminal entrepreneurs will be based on answering the following two 
questions: 
• What consistent patterns of modi do criminal entrepreneurs have and share? 
• What are the differences in the modi of the four criminal figures of this study who 
are Leonard McPherson, George Freeman, Abraham Saffron and Sir Robert Askin?  
To answer the two previous questions, the follow questions must be answered: 
• What is the criminal entrepreneur’s modus essendi? 
 What epistemology do criminal entrepreneurs share? 
 What is the self-concept and identity of criminal entrepreneurs? 
 What are the short-term and long-term goals of criminal entrepreneurs? 
 What level of self-acceptance do criminal entrepreneurs have? 
 What is criminal entrepreneur leadership, which includes: vision, leadership 
style and orientation?  
 How do criminal entrepreneurs develop their vision? 
• What is the modus operandi of criminal entrepreneurs? 
 Who forms the ‘criminal collective’ of the entrepreneurs? 
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 What is the motive behind their crimes? 
 Do criminal entrepreneurs have mentors? If so: 
 How many mentors do criminal entrepreneurs have? 
 Are the mentors successful criminal entrepreneurs as well? 
 How did the mentors influence the career of successful criminal 
entrepreneurs? 
 How do mentors choose and identify potential successful criminal 
entrepreneur protégés?  
• What is the criminal entrepreneur modus vivendi? 
 What social capital do successful criminal entrepreneurs have? 
 What embedded resources do criminal entrepreneurs have in their network? 
What is the relationship between the three modi in the different phases (prior success and 
peak of success) of a criminal entrepreneur’s career? The next section will summarises 
chapter two. 
2.40 Summary 
Organised crime costs the Australian Government $36 billion dollars in 2013-2014 (Dawson, 
2015). There are a number of definitions of organised crime. This study will use the Oyster 
Bay definition, as it was adopted to define organised crime in Australia within the relevant 
period (Bersten 1990). Organised crime has two main structures, hierarchical and non-
hierarchical (UNDOC 2002; Lauchs, Bain and Bell 2015). In Australia, the structure of 
organised crime is non-hierarchical (Dawson 2015). The non-hierarchical structure can be 
examined through a specific crime network, location or entrepreneurs. The non-hierarchical 
structure suggests that criminal organisations cooperate with one another in pursuit of a 
mutual interest, which is supported by a number of theories, such as illicit enterprise and 
organisation theory (Raab and Milward 2003; Haller 1990). 
Organisation theory suggests that in order for a criminal organisation to succeed, it must be 
able to adapt to changes in the market and the environment (Raab and Milward 2003). Illicit 
enterprise theory, on the other hand, argues that there is not a single organisation, but a 
number of organisations that cooperate for mutual interest (Haller 1990). Illicit enterprise 
theory emphasises the role of supply and demand, and asserts that as long as there is a 
demand (for illicit goods and services) criminal entrepreneurs will rise to satisfy the demand 
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(Haller 1990). To meet the demand of an illicit market, however, there must be connections to 
the illicit market that are channelled through criminal networks.  
Further study of criminal networks suggest that there are three main pillars that form a 
criminal network – the criminal macro-network, criminal relationships and criminal business 
pillars – which revolve around committing a crime (Spapens 2010). The process of 
committing a crime is described in greater detail by routine activity theory. Routine activity 
theory suggests that in order for successful victimisation, or a crime to occur, three main 
elements must be present: a motivated offender, a victim and the absence of a guardian (Sasse 
2005). 
The routine activity theory structure is consistent with the modus operandi of recent studies 
of criminal entrepreneurs (Lauchs and Staines 2012). These studies suggest that criminal 
entrepreneurs always secure protection prior to committing an offence and that there is a 
motive behind their crimes (Lauchs and Staines 2015). The motives that drive criminal 
entrepreneurs and their criminal organisations are financial gain, open opportunity and greed 
(Luachs and Staines 2012; Morselli 2001, 2003; Gottschalk 2010). The way in which criminal 
entrepreneurs operate is by controlling and channelling resources or administering 
information through brokering (Lauchs and Staines 2012; Morselli and Roy 2008).  
Those with low self-control often fail to find the intersection between the three previous 
elements of routine activity theory, as shown in the work by Evans et al. (1997), who 
examined low self-control theory. Evans et al. (1997) findings suggest that those with low 
self-control tend to have poor social relations and skills and favour aggressive behaviour (e.g. 
settling disputes physically over verbally), which according to Morselli (2001), Lauchs and 
Staines (2012) are not the characteristics or the operational approach of successful criminal 
entrepreneurs. The characteristics of criminal entrepreneurs found in the work of Lauchs and 
Staines (2012) and Morselli (2003, 2001) match some of the characteristics of legitimate 
entrepreneurs found in the definitions of Richard Catillon (1680-1734), Alfred Marshall 
(1842-1924), Timmons (1989) and Gartner (1985), which include adaptability to change and 
leadership. This literature suggests that criminal entrepreneurs have a vision, and lead with 
charismatic leadership styles and a personal orientation (Strange and Mumford 2002). In 
other words, criminal entrepreneurs attract their followers with their charismatic behaviours, 
but lead and operate mainly to benefit themselves.     
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The work of Lauchs and Staines (2012) and Morselli (2003, 2001) also shows that 
entrepreneurs operate by forming trusting relationships and occupying structural holes in a 
network, which is consistent with social network theory argument. Part of their modus 
operandi is arranging protection, which is consistent with routine activity theory, including 
organising and brokering, which is consistent with illicit enterprise theory (Lauchs and 
Staines 2012; Haller 1990). The modus operandi of criminal entrepreneurs also includes 
bribery to smooth the criminal operation and reward the collaborative parties (Lauchs and 
Staines 2012). Blackmail is also used to extort payment from the innocent (Berman 1998; 
Westen 2012). 
Finally, the modus vivendi suggests two patterns of social network; open networks and closed 
networks (Lauchs and Staines 2012; Morselli 2001, 2003). In other words, in their early 
careers, criminal entrepreneurs operate within an open network to access more individuals 
who hold or have access to resources, including mentors who can provide human capital 
(Lauchs and Staines 2012; Morselli 2001, 2003; Morselli, Tremblay and McCarthy 2006), 
however as they develop and improve, criminal entrepreneurs tend to trim their social 
networks and change them into closed networks (Lauchs and Staines 2012; Morselli 2001, 
2003). It can therefore be argued that entrepreneurs occupy a brokerage position in the middle 
of their career. Those who occupy a more distant position from their criminal activity and 
have a closed network are more likely to be at the end of their criminal career and have a 
more prestigious status (Lauchs and Staines 2012; Morselli 2001, 2003). The embedded 
resources of criminal entrepreneurs include connections with a protection that provides and 
represents the absence of a guardian, which is consistent with routine activity theory (Lauchs 
and Staines 2012; Sasse 2005). This study will assume that in their early stages criminal 
entrepreneurs seek patrons and mentors who are brokers, as they can provide instructions, 
new connections and criminal human capital that will enhance their criminal profile.  
This study hypothesises that criminal entrepreneurs are charismatic leaders with personal 
orientations, who have high levels of self-control. The modus operandi of charismatic 
entrepreneurs includes bribery and blackmail, and avoiding conflict. Their modus vivendi 
includes the use of structural holes, and the embedded resources in their network, including a 
protection provider such as a corrupt police commissioner. The embedded resources in a 
criminal entrepreneur’s modus vivendi include mentors who are not necessarily criminals and 
criminal human capital providers who could also be mentors (Morselli, Tremblay and 
McCarthy 2006). These findings and hypotheses will be tested and extended in this study. In 
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order to confirm these findings and hypotheses in Australia, this thesis will first describe the 
methodological approach.  
Figure 11 summarises the literature on organised crime and the direction of this study. The 
next section describes the methodological approach of this thesis.      
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3. Chapter Three: Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodological approach of this study. This project will take a 
deductive approach to a case study design based on secondary analysis of previously 
collected data from written biographies, published articles and documentaries. The deductive 
approach will test the hypotheses of criminal entrepreneur modi.  
This chapter starts by introducing the framework of this study. This study uses Smith’s (2009) 
modi framework of understanding criminal entrepreneur behaviours, which is composed of 
modus essendi, modus operandi and modus vivendi. Starting with modus essendi, this chapter 
provides detailed measurement of the leadership and identity which forms the criminal 
entrepreneur modus essendi in this study. This chapter will then describe the measurement of 
modus operandi, and provide a detailed measurement of the modus vivendi of criminal 
entrepreneurs in this study, which is based on social capital, focusing on embedded resources 
in the network. This chapter will then describe the method and approach of dividing the life 
and career of a criminal entrepreneur into four phases.  
After describing the measurement used in Smith’s (2009) framework, this chapter will 
introduce the case study design and idiographic approach of this study. The deductive 
approach and cross-case patterns of this study are described. The data and resources used in 
this study are introduced. The data and resources and the use of biographies as the main 
source of data are presented and discussed. Finally, this chapter will conclude by discussing 
the qualitative validity of this study; its methodological limitations and ethical considerations. 
This chapter starts by describing the framework of this study.       
3.2 Smith’s criminal entrepreneur framework 
This section describes Smith’s (2009) framework, which is based on three behavioural areas: 
modus essendi, modus operandi and modus vivendi. The three behavioural areas address the 
entrepreneurial skills, identity, operational behaviours and the values of their network. The 
rationale behind choosing Smith’s (2009) framework is its ability to extract data to fit the 
qualitative research approach of this study. Smith’s (2009) framework also enables the 
researcher to extend the work of Lauchs and Staines (2012), Morselli (2003, 2005, 2001), and 
Bright et al. (2015), who focused mainly on the social network aspect of criminal 
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entrepreneurs and organised crime. This section provides a detail measurement of each modus 
to guide the data extraction process, starting with modus essendi.  
3.3 Modus essendi 
Modus essendi is how we understand, define and perceive what is around us, including words 
and expressions (Zupko 2015). In other words, modus essendi is the basic form of defining 
and interpreting things, including words and expressions. Modus essendi defines and 
interprets words and expressions by outlining the triad relationship between things (modi 
essendi), concepts (modi intelligendi) and words (modi significandi) which form our 
understanding of what is around us (Zupko 2015; Smith 2009). By applying the concept of 
modus essendi to individuals, researchers can gain an insight into how things are seen and 
defined from their personal perspective, and therefore understand other points of view.      
The rationale behind adapting modus essendi to understand criminal entrepreneurs is that both 
criminals and entrepreneurs view themselves as rebels, mavericks and likable rouges, which 
reflects a shared epistemology and ontology (Smith 2009). Criminals and entrepreneurs 
generally share similar identities and interpretations of themselves. Modus essendi can be 
applied to various concepts; however in this study the researcher applies modus essendi to 
criminal entrepreneur leadership and identity.  
The researcher will extract modus essendi data through modi essendi, modi intelligendi and 
modi significandi. Modi essendi is the being of things, which include words and/or  
expressions, modi intelligendi is our understanding of beings, words or expressions and modi 
significandi is modi essendi and modi intelligendi combined, which is the complete 
understanding of a being, word and/or expression, as shown in Figure 12 (Smith 2009; Zupko 
2015).       
Since this study hypothesises about successful criminal entrepreneur modus essendi, it will be 
guided by definitions. For instance, the literature argues that successful entrepreneurs have a 
clearly defined vision (Strange and Mumford 2005). The modus essendi will then be guided 
by the definition and measurement of the vision. By describing the visions of criminal 
entrepreneurs and their behaviour towards accomplishing the vision, the researcher will be 
able to see how criminal entrepreneurs see and interpret their visions. For example, if a 
criminal entrepreneur’s vision was to become a businessman (modi essendi) and their 
business was killing others for a fee (modi intelligendi) as a hired killer, the researcher will be 
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able to provide a definition of business from the criminal entrepreneur’s perspective. By 
examining the sources of the vision, the researcher will be able to gain a deeper 
understanding of how and why the criminal entrepreneur defined crime or criminal 
behaviours as a business and describe the factors that contributed to forming this 
epistemology.   
Figure 12 Modus essendi structure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The contribution of examining modus essendi in this study is a structure to define criminal 
entrepreneur behaviour. Understanding the criminal entrepreneur’s definition of their 
behaviour, is a building block in understanding their identity, leadership and operational 
approaches, as they are composed of behaviours. Through modus essendi the researcher is 
able to extract the shared knowledge (also referred to as an epistemology) of the four criminal 
entrepreneurs in this study. In this study, modus essendi is adapted in order to understand the 
identity and leadership of criminal entrepreneurs.   
3.3.1 Identity 
The measurement of criminal entrepreneurs in this study identity is based on Erikson (1980) 
construct of ego identity, as it integrates sociological, historical and psychological factors 
within one social psychological perspective of the life-cycle of the individual. This study 
takes into consideration sociological, psychological and historical factors in the form of 
internal and external factors that could influence the criminal entrepreneur’s identity, 
operational approach and social network throughout their life-cycle. Erikson’s (1956, 1988) 
theory of ego identity is able to provide the required guidance for measuring  the identity of 
criminal entrepreneurs in this study (Cô and Levine 1988).  
Modi significandi 
Modi essendi 
 
Modi intelligendi 
 
Modus Essendi 
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To be able to adapt Erikson’s (1956, 1988) measurement of ego identity in a secondary 
analysis qualitative research method, this study will use Marcia’s (1966) simplified version of 
Erikson’s measurements, which created the ‘ego status’ questionnaire. Marcia (1966) started 
by measuring identity. The identity of an individual is based on their occupation and 
ideology, which in turn is based on religion and political views (Marcia 1966). The person 
whose identity is to be defined should be committed to a profession, a religious belief and a 
political view or party. Individuals who have not committed to an occupation, religious belief 
and political view or party are referred to as being in ‘crisis’ (Marcia 1966, 1967, p. 120). 
Hamachek (1988) also included additional questions in order to obtain a more precise 
measurement of identity (see Table 4). The identity of the entrepreneurs will be based on the 
answers to the questions in Table 4.  
The answers to the questions in Table 4 will be collected and extracted within a modus 
essendi framework. For instance, the self-concept (i.e. as a businessman) of the individual is 
their modi essendi. The data collected reflecting the self-concept (i.e. referring to oneself as a 
businessman and/or engaging in arbitrage) is modi intelligendi. The existence of sufficient 
data on the individual modi essendi and modi intelligendi forms the modi significandi. 
Sufficient data in this study refers to the availability of confirmed information found in three 
different data sources where that data is being collection (see section 3.12 for a list of all the 
data collection resources). Once the identity has been measured, the status of identity will be 
described.   
Table 3: Modus essendi – Identity questions  
Characteristic behaviours of people who have a sense of identity 
 The criminal entrepreneur: 
1. What is the entrepreneur’s self-concept? 
2. What are the entrepreneur’s long- and short-terms goals? 
3. What is the entrepreneur’s level of resilience towards peer pressure? 
4. What is the entrepreneur’s level of self-acceptance? 
5. What is the entrepreneur’s ability to make decisions? 
6. What is the entrepreneur’s level of optimism about themselves, others and life 
generally? 
7. Does the entrepreneur take personal responsibility for what happens to themselves or 
others, good or bad? 
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8. What level of independence does the entrepreneur have? 
9. Does the entrepreneur have a religion? 
10. Does the entrepreneur have political views? 
 
Measuring the level, in questions (3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) 
Low 
The entrepreneurs show 
low levels of 
commitment, either 
through clear statement or 
behaviour through not 
taking action towards it. 
Medium 
The entrepreneurs show medium 
levels of commitment, either 
through clear statement or 
behaviour through not taking action 
towards it. 
High 
The entrepreneurs show 
high levels of 
commitment, either 
through clear statement or 
behaviour through not 
taking action towards it. 
Example of applying modus essendi to identity 
Modi essendi 
(The identity) 
Modi intelligendi 
(The measurement of the identity) 
Modi significandi 
A businessman (self-
concept)  
- Referring to oneself as a 
businessman. 
- Engaging in arbitrage  
- Setting a short term goal of 
establishing a profitable 
business and long term goal 
to become a successful 
businessman who owns 
multiple businesses.  
The existence of sufficient 
data on modi essendi and 
modi intellegendi    
Jewish (religion) - Referring to oneself as 
Jewish 
- Practicing Judaism   
The existence of sufficient 
data on modi essendi and 
modi intellegendi    
This identity would be a Jewish businessman 
(Hamachek 1988, p. 359) 
Prior to discussing the four different ego statuses, some of the terminology used for ego 
identity measures will be defined, to gain a deeper understanding of the measurements. Five 
terms (self, self-concept, ego, crisis and commitment) are essential in understanding the 
measurement of identity. Self is defined as ‘one’s sense of personal existence’ or a 
‘phenomenological feeling or sense of personal identity’ (Hamachek 1988, p. 354). Self-
concept refers to ‘the cognitive awareness people have about the self at any given instance in 
time: “It ... is our own private mental images of ourselves, a collection of beliefs about the 
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kind of person we are”’ (Hamachek 1988, p. 354). The third term, ‘ego’, is a component of 
one’s self, and it is associated with one’s contact with the outside world (Hamachek 1988, p. 
354). The ego process of the outside world is channelled through a person’s cognitive 
processes, such as thinking, perceiving, remembering, reasoning and attending – all modes of 
thought used by a person to obtain personal ends and defend their self-concepts (Hamachek 
1988, p. 354). The term ‘crisis’ refers to the act of selecting between meaningful alternatives 
(Waterman and Waterman 1974, p. 1), while ‘commitment’ in this context is defined as ‘a 
relatively unswerving investment in a course of action’ (Waterman and Waterman 1974, p. 
1). Table 5 summarises the terms used in identity measurement.   
Table 4: Terms of identity measurement 
Term Definition  
Self “one’s sense of personal existence” or “phenomenological feeling or sense of personal 
identity” (Hamachek 1988, p. 354) 
Self-concept “the cognitive awareness people have about the self at any given instance in time: “It 
... is our own private mental images of ourselves, a collection of beliefs about the kind 
of person we are”” (Hamachek 1988, p. 354) 
Ego A component of one’s self, associated with one’s contact with the outside world 
(Hamachek 1988, p. 354) 
Crisis The act of selecting between meaningful alternatives (Waterman and Waterman 1974, 
p. 1) 
Commitment A relatively unswerving investment in a course of action (Waterman and Waterman 
1974, p. 1) 
 
Based on the answers to the questions in Tables 4 and 5, the identity and identify status of the 
entrepreneurs will be declared as either achieved, or in moratorium, foreclosure or diffusion. 
Identity achieved is used for those who have encountered a crisis and emerged with a stable 
commitment (Waterman and Waterman 1974). Someone in moratorium is someone who is 
currently in crisis (Waterman and Waterman 1974). Someone in foreclosure is an individual 
who is committed, but has never been through a phase of questioning and selecting 
(Waterman and Waterman 1974). Identity diffusion is defined when someone is not 
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committed nor attempting to reach a commitment (Waterman and Waterman 1974). The next 
section describes the calculation mechanism used to determine the identity status of the 
criminal entrepreneurs featured in this study.  
3.3.2 Calculation mechanism 
The determination of the identity status will be based on the overall answers to the 10 
questions in Table 4. If 70% or more of the answers to the questions are ‘commitment’ 
(commitment is a relatively unswerving investment in a course of action, such declaring 
oneself a Liberal by becoming a member of the Liberal Party), then the identity status of the 
entrepreneurs is achieved (7 questions with the clear committed/confirmed answers). If 50% 
of the answers are ‘commitment’, then the identity status of the entrepreneur is foreclosure (5 
questions with the clear committed/confirmed answers). If 25% of the answers to the 
questions are commitment, then the identity status of the entrepreneur is moratorium (3 
questions with the clear committed/confirmed answers). If less than 25% of the answers to the 
questions are commitment, then the identity status of the entrepreneur is diffusion (1 or 2 
questions with the clear committed/confirmed answers). Figure 13 shows the percentages and 
the identity they reflect. 
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Figure 13: Identity status 
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By determining the identity and identity status of the criminal entrepreneurs featured in this 
study, the researcher is able to illustrate how the criminal entrepreneurs saw them themselves. 
By outlining how the criminal entrepreneur sees themselves the researcher is able to gain an 
abstract understanding of how they defined their behaviours. For instances, if a criminal 
entrepreneur sees himself as a businessman (which is the modi essendi) because he sees 
trading on the black-market as the behaviour of a businessman (which is modi intelligendi), it 
would confirm the argument of Gottschalk (2010), Alvarez and Barney (2007), Volkov 
(1999), Ellis and Shaw (2015) that criminal entrepreneurs are the products of opportunities 
presented. 
Once the identity of the entrepreneur has been determined, the leadership skills of the 
criminal entrepreneurs featured in this study will be examined. The rationale behind focusing 
on leadership is discussed in the next section.  
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3.3.3 Leadership 
Leadership is comprised of three main elements, vision, leadership style and orientation, as 
shown in Figure 14 (Strange and Mumford 2002). The three components of leadership 
provide greater insight into the criminal entrepreneur’s mental and personal approach towards 
accomplishing their mission (Strange and Mumford 2002). The first component is vision, 
which is the mental image of a social status or the criminal entrepreneur’s goal in their life 
(Strange and Mumford 2002). The second component is leadership style, which illustrates the 
criminal entrepreneur’s approach towards attracting and interacting with their followers 
(Strange and Mumford 2002). The third component is leadership orientation which reflects 
the entrepreneur’s intentions, and the direction of their effort, whether it is aimed at serving 
themselves or their community (including criminal organisation) and their followers (Strange 
and Mumford 2002).        
Figure 14 Leadership components  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
By understanding the criminal entrepreneurs of this study through vision, leadership style and 
orientation, the researcher is able to understand their intentions and the direction of their 
behaviour, which provides the modi intelligendi (understanding and explanation) of their 
modi essendi (act or behaviour). The next section describes the measurements of the three 
components of leadership, starting with vision. 
3.3.4 Vision 
Vision is ‘an idealized future goal state, as a plan for the future goal attainment, and as an 
image of the future that articulates the values, purposes and identify of followers’ (Strange 
and Mumford 2005, 122). There are three primary sources of vision, which explain the 
formation of the entrepreneur vision: personal experience, social networks and available 
resources (Kaiser, Feldhusen and Fordinal 2013; Hanks and McCarrey 2015; Filion 1991; 
Strange and Mumford 2005).  
Vision Leadership Style  Leadership 
Orientation   
 
Leadership  
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Figure 15 Sources of vision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Personal experience is the personal daily activity of the criminal entrepreneurs in this study, 
and their feelings and thoughts (Csikszentmihalyi 2014). The research will extract from the 
data collected any activities, reported feelings and thoughts that the criminal entrepreneurs 
linked, or that can be linked, to their vision. For example, a thought may be expressed in a 
statement made by a criminal entrepreneur, such as ‘I want to be a criminal’, and this can be 
linked to their activities and vision as defined above. An activity that would inspire a vision, 
for example, might be engagement in arbitrage (buying and selling commodities), which can 
be linked to a vision of becoming a businessman through personal experience, which is the 
first source of the vision.     
The second source of vision is social networks, which in its basic form are the individuals 
connected directly and indirectly to the criminal entrepreneur. Social networks can inspire a 
criminal entrepreneur’s vision by providing an idea or an individual with desirable qualities, 
skills, authority or social status who they would consider an idol, and strive to imitate (Hanks 
and McCarrey 2015). A classic example of social networks being the source of a vision is 
where someone idolises their father, aiming to becoming just like him in the future. The 
researcher will extract from the data collected any idols or role models that the criminal 
entrepreneurs featured in this study identified as sources of inspiration, or as goals to reach 
their status. Social networks also provide various resources which are also able to inspire 
visions. 
Available resources for the entrepreneur can include social, human and financial capital, 
however in relation to vision, this study will focus on human capital, as social capital has 
already been above, and financial capital is outside the focus of this study. Human capital is 
the knowledge, ‘know-how’, or formal and informal education that an individual has or has 
access to (Coleman 1988). Human capital can influence vision by transforming known ideas 
and concepts into new concepts or applying them in a different and unique way. For instance, 
Social networks  Personal experiences Available resources  
Vision  
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the concept of brokerage is well-known in financial sectors, and criminal entrepreneurs 
applied the concept in organised crime by buying and selling information to unconnected 
criminal groups, and charging a commission (Morselli and Roy 2008; Morselli 2001; Lauchs 
and Staines 2012; Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain 2012). The researcher will identify any 
specific ‘know-how’, or formal or non-formal education in the data that is directly linked to 
the entrepreneur’s vision, such as ‘I knew how to make cocaine’ which is ‘know-how’, and 
therefore ‘I want to be a drug kingpin’ which is a vision. Table 6 provides an example of how 
vision is extracted within a modus essendi framework.  
Table 5 Example of applying modus essendi to vision.  
Modi essendi Modi intelligendi Modi significandi 
The vision The evidence and  behaviours 
reflecting the vision 
Sufficient data for modi 
essendi and modi intelligendi 
I want to be a drug kingpin - Direct quotation and a 
clear statement of the 
vision.  
  
- Engaging in the drug 
trade such as making, 
selling and distributing 
illegal drugs.  
The existence of sufficient data 
regarding modi essendi and 
modi intelligendi. 
 
Vision and sources of visions will provide an understanding of the criminal entrepreneur’s 
mental image and goals in life, how these mental images and goals were formed and the 
rationale behind them, which in effect can explain their behaviours. Once a vision is formed, 
the entrepreneur has to lead their followers towards accomplishing the vision. The next 
section describes the measurement of a criminal entrepreneur’s leadership style, which 
explains how criminal entrepreneurs were able to attract and lead followers towards their 
vision.   
3.3.5 Leadership style  
There are various leadership styles, however this study will focus on the charismatic 
leadership style, as Wright (2013) argued that the leaders of organised crime are charismatic 
leaders. Wright (2013) did not provide a measurement of charismatic leadership, so this study 
adapts Strange and Mumford (2002) measurement of charismatic leadership. Charismatic 
leaders are those who lead people towards addressing social needs and changes that can lead 
to a better future, based on their consideration of what is needed and best for their community 
or organisation (Strange and Mumford 2002). According to Strange and Mumford (2002), 
  
Chapter 3: Methodology 82  
charismatic leadership can be measured by outlining the leader’s vision (including goals and 
self-concept), and the relationship between the leader and their followers. The next section 
describes the coding of charismatic leadership.  
3.3.6 Coding Leadership Styles 
The coding of leadership styles will be based on the measures developed by Strange and 
Mumford (2002) in the form of questions, as showed in Table 7. The behaviours used to 
described the type of leadership in the work of  Strange and Mumford (2002) were described 
by a psychologist. The definition of behaviour used was ‘an action, or a communication, by 
the leader, and/or followers with respect to the leader’ (Strange and Mumford 2002, 350).  
Table 6 Charismatic behaviours 
List of charismatic behaviours 
1. The leader will act according to a certain ‘vision’ that specifies a better future state. 
2. The leader will strive toward distant rather than short-term goals. 
3. The leader will communicate messages that contain references to their overall vision. 
4. The leader will behaviourally role model the values implied by the vision by personal 
example 
5. The leader will express high performance expectations of followers. 
6. The leader will communicate a high degree of confidence in their follower’s abilities 
to meet expectations. 
7. The leader will demonstrate behaviours that selectively arouse unconscious 
achievement, power, and affiliative motives in followers when these motives are 
specifically relevant to the attainment of the vision. 
8. Leadership occurs through articulation of the vision and accomplishments that pertain 
to vision attainment. 
9. Followers are attracted to the leader him or herself 
10. People will have an extreme reaction to the leader 
11. Followers will sacrifice themselves for the leader and/or the leader’s vision 
12. In order for the leader to be effective, there must be some catalyst to make the 
followers open to the leader and their vision 
13. The leader will allow followers the autonomy to make their own decisions, but will 
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influence them to make decisions in line with the leader’s own vision 
14. The leader will back up orders with justifications based on the goodness of their 
vision 
15. Followers are directly influenced by the leader and their personal relationship with 
them 
16. The leader cares about their image and plays to the desires of followers 
17. The leader will take an interest in all current and potential followers 
18. The leader will excel in persuading people to agree with them 
19. The leader is motivated by the accomplishment of their vision 
20. The leader will negotiate their ideas when it benefits their image or vision 
21. The leader will take into account the needs of the organisation in their decision 
making 
22. The leader will use positive rewards and reinforcement with their followers 
23. The leader will try to persuade those who disagree with their vision to agree with it 
24. The leader will delegate authority for the attainment of their vision 
25. The leader may change their vision to meet the needs and wants of the followers and 
the organisation 
26. The leader will exude confidence, dominance, and a sense of purpose 
27. Followers will be devoted to and unquestioning of the leader 
28. The leader will motivate the followers to act upon ideas already in place in society 
29. The leader will be narcissistic and wish to bring power and attention to themselves 
30. The leader will interact with followers—social distance is low 
(Strange and Mumford 2002, 351) 
This study has defined and measured vision and identity, and the answers to Questions 1, 2,6, 
8 and 19 in Table 7 are drawn from the results about vision and identity. The outcome of the 
modus operandi (discussed and measured below) which describes the operational approach of 
the criminal entrepreneur in this study, provides answers to Questions 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 in Table 7. Finally, the 
outcome of modus vivendi (discussed and measured blow) which describes the social 
networks of the criminal entrepreneurs in this study, answer questions 15, 27, and 30.  
The researcher will address Questions 3, 9 and 10 in Table 7 as none of the modi addresses 
these questions. Once, the criminal entrepreneur of this study vision has been defined; the 
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researcher will describe any event in the data collected, where the criminal entrepreneurs 
referred to their vision when communicating with their followers. In addressing Question 9, 
the researcher will describe followers (through modus vivendi) from the data collected who 
have argued or claimed that their fellowship with the criminal entrepreneur was derived from 
the criminal entrepreneur themselves, and not the merits and advantages of being members of 
their organisation, such as access to resources (including new business opportunities, 
protection from prosecution or accessing valuable information). In addressing Question 10, 
the researcher will describe the follower reactions and their implementation of the leader’s 
orders and instructions. By following the leader instructions and implementing their orders 
with precision, the followers show an extreme reaction to the leader. Any behaviour that 
reflects fear of the leader (such as fleeing a city when threatened by the leader) also reflects 
an extreme reaction to the leader.  
The modus essendi framework will be applied to charismatic leadership. The 30 questions 
measuring charismatic leadership are modi intelligendi. Sufficient data answering the 
questions of charismatic leadership demonstrate modi significandi, as shown in Table 8.   
Table 7 Example of applying modus essendi to leadership style 
Modi essendi Modi intelligendi Modi significandi 
Leadership Style The evidence and  behaviours 
reflecting charismatic 
leadership  
Sufficient data for modi 
essendi and modi intelligendi 
Charismatic leadership - The answers to the 30 
questions in Table 7. 
The existence of sufficient data 
for modi essendi and modi 
intelligendi. 
 
Once the leadership style is described, the researcher will examine the leadership orientations 
of the leaders, which is discussed in the next section. 
3.3.7 Leadership orientation 
Leadership orientation is the direction of the leader’s vision (Strange and Mumford 2002). 
There are two main orientations of leadership, social and personal (Strange and Mumford 
2002). Social orientation is a selfless approach where the leaders lead toward a vision that 
does not necessarily provide personal advantages to the leaders themselves (Strange and 
Mumford 2002). Personal orientation is when the leaders places greater weight on personal 
benefits and advantages when leading towards their vision (Strange and Mumford 2002). 
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Leadership orientation can be drawn from the criminal entrepreneur’s vision and modus 
operandi, by outlining the outcome of their modus operandi in relation to their community 
and/or organisation and themselves.  
Applying the framework of modus essendi in extracting leadership orientation is as follows, 
the leadership orientation (e.g. personal) will be the modi essendi. The evidence and 
behaviours reflecting personal and/or social orientation will be modi intelligendi. The 
existence of sufficient data on modi essendi and modi intelligendi forms modi significandi, as 
shown in Table 9.     
Table 8 Example of applying modus essendi to leadership orientation 
Modi essendi Modi intelligendi Modi significandi 
Leadership orientation The evidence and  behaviours 
reflecting leadership 
orientation 
Sufficient data for modi 
essendi and modi intelligendi 
Personal orientation - Evidence of leading in 
order to benefit oneself 
with little regard to the 
benefits to the 
community.   
The existence of sufficient data 
for modi essendi and modi 
intelligendi. 
 
By outlining the criminal entrepreneur’s leadership orientations, style, vision, identity and 
identity status, the criminal entrepreneur’s modus essendi is described in this study. The next 
section describes the measurement of the criminal entrepreneur’s operational approach, also 
referred to as modus operandi. 
3.4 Modus operandi  
The modus operandi is the operating method (Smith 2009). Within a criminological concept, 
modus operandi refers to classifying collective human actions from their visible and 
consequential standpoints (Smith 2009). Modus operandi is the product of experiential 
learned behaviour that contains a visual and narrative element (Smith 2009). Smith (2009) 
argued that a businessman with criminal intentions has a different modus operandi from a 
common thief or gangster who has entrepreneurial tendencies.  
In other words, entrepreneurship differs across different fields (Smith 2009). In fact, criminal 
entrepreneurs are known to be adaptable to change and to seek opportunities in the market 
(Smith 2009; Spapens 2010; Smith 1980). According to Smith (2009), approaching criminal 
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entrepreneurs with a modus operandi scope would enable us to construct a generic profile of 
criminal entrepreneurial behaviours. An entrepreneur can be identified through their 
operational methods (Smith 2009). The operational method is composed of entrepreneurial 
behaviours (Smith 2009; Dees 1998; Luczkiw 1998; Schumpeter 1947; Ranasinghe 1996). 
There is no framework or methodology to apply in order to extract a criminal entrepreneur’s 
modus operandi, especially when criminals operate within a disorganised process or what 
looks like a disorganised process, however Smith (2009) argued that criminal entrepreneurial 
behaviours can be illustrated by examining the aftermath of their crimes, such as tracking the 
disposition of the proceeds reflected in trading, arbitrage and dealings (Smith 2009). The 
modus operandi is thus extracted by answering the following questions:  
• What is the modus operandi of criminal entrepreneurs? 
 Who formed the ‘criminal collective’ of the entrepreneurs? 
 What was the event? 
 Where was the event? 
 When was the event? 
 Who was involved? 
 What was the role of each member involved? 
 What was the motive behind their crime and the outcome of it? 
An ‘event’ in the questions of modus operandi is defined as any occasion that had a 
significant influence on the career and/or life of the criminal entrepreneurs featured in this 
study. Table 10 provides an example of how modus operandi is extracted.  
Table 9: Coding the modus operandi 
The event  Timeline  Code  
e.g. Crime  e.g. Early career  Who was involved? 
Who did what? 
When? 
Why? 
Motive? 
Benefit? 
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The modus operandi will include all the major events (including criminal activities) that 
could have a major effect on the criminal entrepreneur’s personality, identity and skills, 
causing or creating a turning point in their life or criminal career. The modus operandi can 
explain any events that caused a change in the entrepreneur’s social and criminal network. In 
other words, modus operandi will describe the legal and illegal activities of criminal 
entrepreneurs, the motives behind the acts or crimes, how the acts or crimes were committed, 
and who participated in the acts.  
Activities in organised crime require the collaboration of different partners; modus vivendi 
provides a deeper understanding of a criminal entrepreneur’s social and criminal network, the 
structure of their network and the embedded resources within their network, including co-
offenders.     
3.5 Modus vivendi  
Examining the modus vivendi aims to extract the value of the entrepreneur’s network. In order 
to extract the value of an entrepreneur’s criminal network, the network has to be measured. 
The author applies social capital measurements in order to measure the criminal 
entrepreneur’s network. The measurements will be based on embedded resources. The 
embedded resources will be measured based on networker sources and contact status. This 
section will conclude by illustrating the four different phases of a criminal entrepreneur’s 
career.   
The term modus vivendi has a Latin origin, and translates into ‘way of living’. The word 
modus means mode or way, and the word vivendi means life or living (Zupko 2015). The 
term modus vivendi has been used widely in English literature to refer to an agreement 
between conflicting parties to co-exist peacefully regardless of whether an agreement has 
been reached or not (Pearsall and Hanks 1998).  
Smith (2009) argued that modus vivendi is embedded in networking, which is critical to 
understanding entrepreneurship. Smith (2009, 261) differentiated networks from networking 
by arguing that a network is a ‘physical and mental structure’, whereas networking is ‘the 
activity through which it is operationalized’. Modus vivendi was described by Smith (2009, 
261) as a ‘relational quality enabling one to extract value from the network’. In other words, 
entrepreneurs use modus vivendi as a shared or a common practice which individuals follow 
and adapt when working or operating in a given community of practice (Smith 2009).  
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From a social network perspective, modus vivendi can be seen as the norms and rules, 
because relationships and ties within a network are found across different powerbases, 
patronage and the resultant obligations (Smith 2009), which can be extracted through social 
capital measurements. A more precise measurement of social capital can be provided based 
on the definitions of social capital mentioned earlier in the literature review.  
3.5.1 Measuring social capital 
The measurement of social capital is based on embedded resources and network location (Lin 
1999). When approaching social capital as embedded resources, it can be measured based on 
‘network resources’ and ‘contact status’ (Lin 1999). The indicators or units of analysis of 
network resources are the range of resources, best resources, variety of resources, 
composition (average resources) and contact resources (Lin 1999). When measuring social 
capital based on the ‘contact status’, however, the units of analysis are contacts, the 
occupations of the contacts, authority and sector (Lin 1999). Table 11 summarises the 
measurements and their indicators.  
Table 10: Social capital as assets in a network   
Focus Measurements  Indicators (Code) 
 
 
 
 
Embedded resources  
 
 
Network resources  
- Range of resources  
- Best resources  
- Variety of resources 
- Composition (average 
resources)  
- Contact resources 
 
Contact status  
- Occupation  
- Authority  
- Sector  
Lin (1999, p. 37) 
3.5.2 Embedded resources 
The embedded resources in a criminal entrepreneur’s networks are the capital and/or 
resources that the members of their networks have. Embedded resources are divided into two 
main sections, network resources and contact status. Network resources focus on the range of 
sources available in the network, such as financial capital, human capital and skilled social 
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capital. Contact status describes the actors in the network: occupation, authority (such as a 
high ranking members of law enforcement agencies) and the sector which the members of the 
network can access or have authority in.  
The network resource measurement in this study is focused on mentors and human capital. 
The mentors are identified based on individuals who taught the criminal entrepreneurs how to 
act, behave or carry out crimes. Any clear statements provided by the criminal entrepreneurs 
featured in this study about a specific individual as a mentor will also be included in the 
study.    
Since this study focuses on the criminal life and career of criminal entrepreneurs, the author 
will extract any sources of human capital, which is the ‘know-how’, or formal and non-formal 
education, as described in the data. This includes criminal human capital that the entrepreneur 
developed or received from their social capital, including their mentors. The experiences and 
events (as described in modus operandi) that resulted in learning and developing human 
capital, including criminal human capital, are included. The next section is describes the 
embedded resources in the criminal entrepreneur network based on their contact status.    
As this study focuses on criminal entrepreneurship in organised crime the coding of contact 
status will be based on criminal capital, political capital, police capital, money laundering 
capital, gang capital and others. Criminal capital is those who engaged in activities that 
violate the Australian law and are considered crimes. Political capital is those who worked for 
the government and those who were members of political parties both in and outside 
Australia. Police capital is those who worked in the police force in Australia. Money 
laundering capital is those who worked in the legal and illegal gambling industry, and were 
able to launder money through gambling. Gang capital is those who identified themselves as 
members of a gang. Others is capital that is not criminal, political, police, money launderer or 
gang capital.  
The rationale behind coding embedded resources based on criminal, police, political, money 
launderers and gangs is the importance of their role in the success of crime and enhancing the 
criminal entrepreneur’s career (Pinto and Wilson 1992; Lauchs and Staines 2012; Lauchs, 
Keast and Yousefpour 2011; Lauchs, Bain and Bell 2015; Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain 
2012). For instance, politicians provide protection for corrupt police and corrupt police 
provide protection to criminals - these are embedded resources. Figure 17 illustrate the 
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rationale behind coding the contact status of the embedded resources of the modus vivendi of 
criminal entrepreneurs. 
Figure 16 Embedded resources in the modus vivendi of criminal entrepreneurs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
The previous measurements will enable the author to understand the social capital of criminal 
entrepreneurs, and the embedded resources in their network. The researcher is also able to 
describe the influential actors who contributed to the criminal entrepreneur modus essendi 
and operandi. In other words, the researcher is able to identify the factors that contributed to 
the success of the successful criminal entrepreneurs featured in the study.  
Once the entrepreneurial social network has been measured and described, the author will be 
able to extract the value of the network. The modi measurements and analysis will be 
conducted in each phase of the criminal entrepreneur’s life. The next section illustrates how 
the four phases of the criminal entrepreneur’s life are determined in this study and the 
rationale behind them.  
Politicians 
Police 
Criminals (including 
criminal entrepreneurs) 
Money 
launderers  
Gangs 
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3.6 Determining the phases of an entrepreneur’s life 
This study divides a criminal entrepreneur’s life into four phases. As described in the 
literature, criminal entrepreneurs in non-hierarchically structure organised crime adapt to 
changes in the environment (Morselli 2001, 2003, Lauchs and Staines 2012). The rationale 
behind dividing a criminal entrepreneur’s career into phases is that it will isolate the 
conditions, circumstances, and internal and external factors that could had an influence on 
their behaviour during that period or phase. By dividing the life of the criminal entrepreneurs 
in this study into four phases and measuring their modi in each phase separately, the 
researcher is able to describe the changes in their modi throughout their life.     
The four phases are determined by the turning points or catalysts described in the data. The 
turning points are identified by their connection with an individual or as events that changed 
the course of the criminal entrepreneur’s life and/or career by having, for example, immunity 
from prosecution and/or the ability to control resources or access resources.    
Phase One involves prior engagement in criminal activities. Phase One aims to understand the 
criminal entrepreneur’s background and describe any internal or external factors that directed 
the entrepreneur towards crime. Phase Two is the official debut of their career, criminal or 
non-criminal. Phases One and Two are considered prior successes in crime. Phases One and 
Two aim to examine the criminal entrepreneur’s modi prior success in order to compare it to 
their peak and post successes. Phases One and Two will provide an understanding and outline 
any internal or external forces or factors that may have contributed to the failure of the 
criminal entrepreneur’s career, and the changes or measures that were taken to become 
successful.  
Phase Three is the peak of success, and involves the criminal entrepreneur’s modi and 
considers the measures that were taken to be successful. Phase Three will also describe the 
internal factors (such as leadership) and external factors (such as corrupt law enforcement 
agency personnel) that contributed to the success of the criminal entrepreneur’s career. 
Finally Phase Four will be post-success, and after the changes in the criminal entrepreneur 
modi. 
By applying these measurements, the researcher will be able to conduct intensive analysis of 
the criminal entrepreneurs in this study using a case study design, which is described next.   
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3.7 The case study 
This project entails an intensive analysis of the careers of four criminal figures, and it will 
follow a case study design and an idiographic approach in which the researcher aims to 
elucidate the unique skills, qualities and features of each entrepreneur (Bryman 2012). The 
advantages of developing a theory from case studies are: 1) the ability to generate a novel 
theory; 2) having clear measures and a framework, (3) the theory generated is testable, and 4) 
based on the data used, the theory created is empirically valid (Eisenhardt 1989).   
According to Eisenhardt (1989, p. 534), a case study is ‘a research strategy which focuses on 
understanding the dynamics present within a single setting’. Eisenhardt (1989) added that 
case studies can include one or multiple cases, with different levels of analysis. Case study 
data collection methods can vary or be a combination of examining archives, interviews, 
questionnaires and observations (Eisenhardt 1989). Case studies can provide a description, 
test a theory or create a theory (Eisenhardt 1989). This study will adopt a case study approach 
and use archives and written biographies to collect data, to generate a theory of successful 
criminal entrepreneurship.    
The selection of cases is information-oriented (Flyvbjerg 2006). The information-oriented 
selection approach enables the researcher to maximise the utility of information from the 
limited number of successful criminal entrepreneur cases in this study. The cases (the four 
criminal figures) are chosen to fit the definition of successful criminal entrepreneurs given 
earlier in the literature review. The study will rely on written biographies as the main source 
of data for a number of reasons: 
(1) Information about successful criminal entrepreneurs cannot be collected from law 
enforcement agencies, as most of it is considered classified.  
(2) Where data can be purchased from law enforcement agencies, it is very expensive 
(Bright, Hughes and Chalmers 2012).  
(3) The inability to conduct in-depth interviews with successful criminal entrepreneurs 
who are part of active organised crime groups, due to safety concerns, and the 
ethics committee constraints.  
(4) The documents on successful criminal entrepreneurs in many law enforcement 
agencies do not contain data that could aid this study in terms of defining the 
criminal entrepreneur’s modi. 
  
Chapter 3: Methodology 93  
(5) Written biographies usually provide a description of the environment in which the 
entrepreneurs lived and operated, which will help in understanding some of the 
circumstances and challenges the criminal entrepreneurs had to face or deal with, 
which were out of their control. Biographies also provide data best suited to an 
idiographic approach.  
3.8 The idiographic approach 
The idiographic approach will lead to a more complex understanding of an individual’s 
personality, which is shaped by interactions with other individual schemas, goals and specific 
contextual knowledge and situations.  
The idiographic approach can be applied to a set of related matters, not only a single matter 
(Runyan 1983). The idiographic approach is associated with: 1) individualised traits or 
personal dispositions, 2) the identification of central themes within an individual life, 3) the 
ipsative ordering of responses within the individual, 4) the pattern or organisation of variables 
within a single case, 5) the correlations within the single case, 5) the causal relationships of 
variables within a single case, 6) descriptive generalisation about a single case, 7) the 
particular subject meaning of events and circumstances to the individual, and 8) idiographic 
predictions based on trends or patterns in the data about a single case (Runyan 1983). The 
idiographic approach is not without limitations and criticism, however.  
The most common criticism of idiographic research is the difficulty in generalising its 
outcome, as it studies an individual person in a certain situation or environment (Runyan 
1983). Allport (1962: 406) responded to criticism of the generalisation by asserting ‘that if a 
relation is found within a single case, “we’d have to generalise to other people or else we’d 
have nothing of any scientific value”’ (cited by Runyan (1983, p. 420)). The author intends to 
avoid the generalisation conflict by conducting the idiographic approach with all four 
criminal entrepreneurs and finding consistency through cross-case patterns.     
By using the idiographic approach, the author aims to be able: 
(1) To determine the traits and skills of the entrepreneur. 
(2) To understand the circumstances the entrepreneur had to consider or live with. 
(3) To identify a theme in the entrepreneur’s life or career. 
(4) To find a relationship between the criminal entrepreneur’s traits, skills, operational 
approach and social network (including the criminal network). 
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(5) To find consistent patterns in the entrepreneur’s traits, skills, operational approach and 
social network (including the criminal network).   
3.9 The deductive approach 
The deductive approach is guided by a hypothesis or a theory derived from previous studies 
(Blaikie 2000). The aim of the deductive approach is to prove or reject a hypothesis or a 
theory (Blaikie 2000). This study will use the deductive approach to prove or reject 
hypotheses of successful criminal entrepreneur modus essendi, operandi and vivendi. The 
hypotheses are derived from the work of Lauchs and Staines (2012); Morselli (2003, 2001) on 
criminal entrepreneurs. The hypotheses will be tested within Smith’s (2009) framework of 
modi. The hypotheses are tested against the lives and careers of Leonard McPherson, George 
Freeman, Abraham (Abe) Saffron and Sir Robert (Bob) Askin.  
If the hypotheses match the finding of this study, they will be generalised and be part of the 
theory under development in this study, however if the hypotheses do not match the findings 
of this study, they will be rejected and not generalised and applied to successful criminal 
entrepreneurs in Sydney, Australia. This section will illustrate the abstraction process of the 
three modi and the creation of a theory of successful criminal entrepreneurs. This section 
starts by describing the extraction process of modus essendi. 
As shown in Figure 18 the extraction process of modus essendi starts by identifying the time 
in question. Time in this study refers to a year in the criminal entrepreneur’s life. For 
instance, Phase One of the criminal entrepreneur’s career and/or life may be from 1920, their 
date of birth, to 1940, their first incarceration. Any data collected between the years 1920 and 
1940 are categorised as Phase One. After determining the time and phases, the identity data of 
the criminal entrepreneur will be extracted. Based on the identity data collected, the identity 
status of the criminal entrepreneurs will be determined. Once the identity and identity status 
of the criminal entrepreneurs have been described, their leadership will be measured within 
the same phase, which will form their modus essendi.  
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Figure 17: The modus essendi abstraction process 
Main Category                                                   Theme                              Sub-Category  
 
Once the modus essendi of the criminal entrepreneurs has been determined, the hypotheses 
drawn from the work of Lauchs and Staines (2012); Morselli (2003, 2001), and based on the 
modus essendi of Howard Marks, Sammy Gravano and Jack Herbert, will be tested. The 
outcome of the tested hypothesis will either prove or reject the hypothesis. If the hypothesis is 
proven then it will be generalised as the modus essendi of successful criminal entrepreneurs. 
If the hypothesis is rejected then further research is needed to generalise a successful criminal 
entrepreneur’s modus essendi. The modus essendi hypotheses to be tested are:  
- Criminal entrepreneurs have a clear defined vision  
- Criminal entrepreneurs are charismatic leaders with personal and social orientations  
Modus essendi will be concluded by providing the precise identity and identity status of the 
entrepreneur and the leadership associated with that identity. The paper will provide detailed 
measurements, definitions and abstraction processes regarding how the identity was 
determined and the skills, qualities and any circumstances that could aid in developing it 
throughout the entrepreneur’s life and career. Once modus essendi has been established, the 
researcher will determine the criminal entrepreneur’s modus operandi.  
The modus operandi abstraction process will be controlled by the time (as measured in modus 
essendi earlier) of the event (e.g. crime). The event will then be defined as ‘what happened’. 
Once the event has been identified, the actors involved will be described. Afterwards, the role 
of each actor in the event will be stated and the motive behind the event will be indicated. 
Finally, the outcome and benefits of the events or actions taken by the members, including the 
Modus Essendi Time Identity
Identity 
Achieved 
Moratoriums Skill 
(Leadership)
Foreclosure 
Identity
Diffusion
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entrepreneur, will be illustrated. Figure 19 illustrates the abstraction process of modus 
operandi.  
Figure 18: The modus operandi abstraction process 
Main Category                                    Theme Category                               Sub-category  
 
 
 
The outcome of the modus operandi will provide an understanding of criminal entrepreneur 
behaviours, motives, efficiency and connections. Based on the outcome, the following 
hypothesis of modus operandi, drawn from the literature review, will be tested: 
 
- Avoiding conflicts  
- Having representatives  
- Delegation 
- Brokerage 
- Bribery  
- Blackmail 
- Forming new contacts based on trust  
 
- Creating their own group 
- Establishing protection relations 
- Capacity for violence 
- Controlling violence 
- Joining an existing criminal groups 
Once Modus operandi has been extracted for testing, the criminal entrepreneur modus vivendi 
will be extracted. The abstraction process for the modus vivendi will start by identifying a 
time. Then, the author will describe the embedded resources in the network which include 
criminal, police, political, gang and money laundering capital. Figure 20 illustrates the modus 
vivendi extraction process. 
Modus Operandi Time Event (e.g. a Crime)
What was the 
Crime?
What was the 
Motive?
Who was 
Involved?
Who Did 
What?
What was the 
Outcome?
Protection 
Provider?
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Figure 19: The modus vivendi abstraction process 
 
Main Category                                          Theme                       Sub-category  
 
Once the entrepreneur’s social capital has been described, the author will identify and define 
the actors in the networks based on their occupation, authority and sector, which will form the 
contact status. The author will then identify the different resources and the variety of 
resources in the network. The resources will be identified based on the members of the 
network occupation, authority and sectors. In doing so, the author will determine the 
embedded resources in the network and its value.  
Finally, the hypotheses of the entrepreneur modus vivendi and social network will be tested, 
which are: 
- Operating in multiple networks 
- Early in their career, the entrepreneur 
has an open network 
- The entrepreneur’s network is formed 
of loosely connected entrepreneurs 
- The embedded resources in the 
criminal entrepreneur network include 
mentors who provide human capital, 
including criminal human capital. 
- At the end of their career, the 
entrepreneur operates in a closed 
network 
- The entrepreneur’s social network and 
social structure changes throughout 
their career 
- The criminal entrepreneur network 
includes a protection provider such as 
corrupt law enforcement agency 
personnel who accept bribes and 
provide immunity to the criminal 
entrepreneur from being arrested and 
prosecuted.  
        
Modus 
Vivendi
Time
Social 
Network
Criminal 
capital 
Police capital
Political 
capital
Money laundering 
capital
Gang capital
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Modus vivendi will be concluded by providing a detailed outline of the embedded resources 
in the criminal entrepreneurs’ network. The modus vivendi will also describe the changes to 
the network and the network structure throughout the entrepreneur’s life and career. The 
challenges in the entrepreneur’s network will be illustrated and described. How the challenges 
embedded in the network were overcome can be seen and understood by looking at the modus 
operandi and modus vivendi at the time of the challenge or obligation, and how the 
entrepreneur dealt with it. Finally, the author will combine the three modi of the entrepreneur 
to find any relationship between them, and obtain a complete, defined and measured picture 
of the successful criminal entrepreneur modi and life, as shown in Figure 21. The study will 
then conduct a cross-case pattern to determine consistent patterns in the three modi across the 
four criminal entrepreneurs featured in this study. The consistent patterns will define the 
theory of successful criminal entrepreneurs. The next section describes the cross-case patterns 
found in this study.  
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Figure 20: Life cycle 
Modus Essendi                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               Timeline  
 
 
 
Modus Operandi                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Timeline 
  
 
 
 
Modus Vivendi                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               Timeline 
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3.10 Cross-case patterns 
The author intend to conduct a cross-case comparison, as humans are poor processers of 
information and can reach conclusions based on limited data or can be misled by the 
vividness of some findings, and some researchers tend to avoid or drop disconfirming 
evidence (Eisenhardt 1989). To avoid omissions, the researcher will examine the data in 
various ways, through cross-case comparison and the triangulation of resources (Eisenhardt 
1989; Cope 2005). The author will look for similarities and differences in the modi patterns 
across the four criminal entrepreneurs in this study (Eisenhardt 1989; Cope 2005). This tactic 
will force the author to look for and find similarities and differences that he might have 
missed in some cases, and will result in a more sophisticated understanding (Eisenhardt 1989; 
Cope 2005), finally defining a theory of criminal entrepreneurship.      
3.11 The sampling and data collection method 
The data and sampling collection technique will be purposive. The selection process of the 
successful criminal entrepreneurs featured in this study is outlined in detail in the next 
chapter (under the heading 4.2 How were the criminal entrepreneurs featured in this study). 
However, the next section present the data sources of this study.    
3.12 The data and resources 
Data will be drawn from: 
• Official state documents:  
o The New South Wales government (Lawlink) 
o The New South Wales Crime Commission 
o New South Wales state records  
• Written biographies, e.g.  
 Mr. Big: The True Story of Lennie McPherson and his Life of Crime by 
Tony Reeves (2007a) 
 Without Fear or Favour by Bob Bottom (1984)  
 Gangland Sydney by James Morton and Susanna Lobez (2011)  
 Mr. Sin: The Abe Saffron Dossier by Tony Reeves (2007b) 
 Gentle Satan: My Father, Abe Saffron by Alan Saffron (2009) 
 The Usual Suspect: The Life of Abe Saffron by Duncan McNab (2005) 
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 Smack Express: How Organised Crime Got Hooked on Drugs by Clive 
Samll and Tom Gilling (2009)  
 The Prince and the Premier: The Story of Perce Galea, Bob Askin and 
the Others Who Gave Organised Crime its Start in Australia by David 
Hickie (1985) 
 The Godfather in Australia by Bob Bottom (1979) 
 Drug Traffic: Narcotic and Organised Crime in Australia by Alfred 
McCoy (1980)  
 The Light on the Hill: The Australian Labour Party 1891-1991 by  
Ross McMullin (1991)   
 The Real George Freeman by Tony Reeves (2011) 
 George Freeman: An Autobiography by George Freeman (1988) 
• Mass media output: 
o Newspapers 
o Magazines 
o Television programmes 
 Australian Families of Crime (8 episodes) directed by Gary 
Deans (2010) 
 Tough Nuts: Australia’s Hardest Criminals directed by Laurence 
Coy (2010) 
o Films   
 Mr. Sin: The Abe Saffron Story directed by Hugh Piper (2010) 
This project uses written biographies as the main sources of data. The rationale behind 
choosing biographies is that they fit the nature of the study and the limited data found in other 
resources, such as police interrogation transcripts, and because there is difficulty obtaining 
law enforcement agencies documents. The researcher will transcribe the documentary films 
and follow the same abstraction process of data used for the written biographies. The author 
will use triangulation of resources to confirm the accuracy of the data (including the events 
that occurred, identity indicators and embedded resources) as shown in Figure 22. The next 
section describes the use of biographies in research in greater detail. 
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Figure 21: Triangulation 
 
 
 
 
 
  
     
3.13 Biographies 
Biographical research in the field of entrepreneurship is still in a stage of infancy (Smith 
2013). In criminological research, the biographical approach has been adopted by Firestone 
(1993), Lauchs and Staines (2012), Morselli (2001) and Smith (2013), who analysed the 
successful careers of American, English and Australian criminal entrepreneurs and gangsters. 
Biographies enable researchers to develop theories in criminology, sociology and 
entrepreneurship, by interpreting the life of a person (Smith 2013). Written biographies as a 
source of data can contribute to an understanding of entrepreneurship, crime and deviance 
(Smith 2013), however the use of autobiographies is not without limitations and criticism. 
They could be unreliable for academic research as they are self-justifying, exaggerated, 
glamorised stories, garnished for commercial purposes such as sales (Smith 2013). Using 
autobiographies alone as raw data is therefore problematic (McAdams, 2008). Furthermore, 
McAdams (2008) has argued that autobiographies could be misleading, therefore the author 
will extract data from various resources to confirm its accuracy. Although, McAdams (2008) 
criticises autobiographies, he still believes and argues that biographies are a rich sources of 
data and information that enable researchers to understand and construct how events evolved 
and developed in addition to how the individual felt, reacted and was influenced by such 
event. 
To overcome this criticism of the use of autobiographies as raw data, the author will draw 
data from four different resources (written biographies, autobiographies, mass media output 
and documentary films) about each criminal entrepreneur. The author will rely on 
sociological and criminological theories to make sense of the data from an academic 
perspective (Smith 2013). The use of scientific measures and theories to drive the research 
will lead to a theory that can be tested by law enforcement agencies and researchers in the 
Written biographies 
Documentary films  Media output 
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field. The structure of the defined theory of successful criminal entrepreneurs is illustrated in 
Figure 23. The author will use qualitative validity measures to assure the validity of the 
findings; and triangulation of data resources (see Figure 22).   
Figure 22: Defining the theory 
           Phase One                       Phase Two                          Phase Three                    Phase Four 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
3.14 Qualitative validity 
There are two main approaches to evaluating qualitative research: examining trustworthiness 
and authenticity (Bryman 2001b). Trustworthiness is comprised of four criteria on which the 
researcher will rely: credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability (Bryman 
2001b). Credibility ensures that the researcher has applied the ‘canons of good practice and 
submitting research findings to members of the social world who were studied for 
confirmation that the investigator has correctly understood that social world’ (Bryman 2001b, 
p. 272). Since the findings of the study cannot be submitted to the subjects being studied, the 
author will rely on triangulation to achieve credibility. Triangulation is based on ‘the idea of 
coverage of multiple perspectives for mutual confirmation of data to ensure that all aspect of 
a phenomenon has been investigated’, by cross-referencing the data from multiple sources 
(e.g. confirming an event in the entrepreneur’s career from different biographical books) 
(Krefting 1991, p. 219) as mentioned earlier. Transferability refers to the ability to apply the 
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findings of the current study in a different society or milieu (Bryman 2001b; Krefting 1991). 
Although transferability is an obligation of the researcher who is trying to apply the current 
study findings to their project (Krefting 1991), the author will provide a ‘thick description’, 
which is ‘a database for making judgments about the possible transferability of findings to 
other milieux’ (Bryman 2001a, p. 273) in this project. Confirmability is ensuring ‘as far as 
possible that the work findings are the results of the experiences and ideas of the informants, 
rather than the characteristics and preferences of the researcher’ (Shenton 2004, p. 72). The 
author aims to ensure confirmability by coding the behaviours of the actors and analysing 
them within a modus essendi, modus operandi and modus vivendi framework, however 
qualitative methods are not without limitations, which are discussed next.  
3.15 Combining the biographical approach and the modi approach 
Hence this study is taking a qualitative approach and the four criminal entrepreneurs will not 
be interviewed as they all have passed away. The author aimed to extract all relevant 
information through written biographies, autobiographies and any other relevant resources to 
collect data on the four criminal entrepreneurs. The purpose of the taking a biographical 
approach is to collect in-depth information and data of the criminal entrepreneurs’ lifecycles 
and all the information and factor which had a direct and indirect effect on their decisions and 
development as criminal entrepreneurs throughout their life.  
The modi approach will be used as a template to guide the extraction of the data and analysis 
in order to link it back to the literature and relevant studies, in order to be able to compare the 
results with other studies that applied similar approach.  
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Figure 23: Modi and Biographical approach combined 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Modi significandi 
 
Identity 
Modi essendi 
Modus Essendi 
Modi intelligendi 
Identity Status 
Leadership 
Leadership Style Vision 
Leadership 
Orientation 
Personal 
Experiences 
Foreclosure 
Identity 
Achieved 
Moratorium 
Identity 
diffusion 
Social Networks 
Available 
Resources 
Modus Operandi 
Event Timeline 
Who was involved 
Their role 
When 
Why 
Motive 
Benefit 
Modus vivendi 
Embedded 
Resources 
Network 
Resources 
Contact Status 
Rang of 
Resources 
Best Resources 
Variety of 
resources 
Composition 
(Average 
resources) 
Contact 
Resources 
Occupation  
Authority   
Sector   
Data Source 2 Data Source 1 Data Source 3 
Data Source = e.g. biographies 
  
Chapter 3: Methodology 106  
3.15 Methodological limitations 
There are three main limitations to this study. The first limitation is generalisation. The 
findings and theory developed from the study can only be applied to individuals who come 
from the same cultural background and environment. This limitation is due to the fact that 
organised crime is an enterprise governed by mutual social norms drawn from the cultural 
backgrounds and beliefs of the actors forming the organisation and network (Von Lampe and 
Ole Johansen 2004; Portes 2000; Putnam 1993). The second limitation is the use of a 
framework (modus essendi, modus operandi and modus vivendi) as the researcher could miss 
or ignore other patterns that do not fit the framework. The third limitation of the study is the 
data collection method. As the study is based on secondary analysis, the researcher has no 
control over the nature of the method of gathering the data; this could raise concerns about 
reliability and trustworthiness, which are overcome in this study through triangulation, as 
mentioned earlier (Bryman 2012). The data provided may not address the research questions 
directly (Bryman 2012). The next section will describe the ethical considerations of this 
study.  
3.16 Ethical considerations  
As they all have passed away, there are no ethical implications associated with the four 
criminal entrepreneurs being studied. The author does not intend to contact the relatives or 
associates of the four individuals.   
3.17 Conclusion  
This study is based on Smith’s (2009) framework of modus essendi, modus operandi and 
modus vivendi. Modus essendi measurement is based on the criminal entrepreneur identity 
and leadership which includes vision, leadership style and orientation. Modus operandi is 
based on the criminal entrepreneur operational approach. Modus operandi is measured by 
outlining the event (the operation), the location, those who were involved and their role, and 
the motives behind the operation and outcome. Modus vivendi is measured based on the 
criminal entrepreneur’s social capital. The measurement of social capital focuses on outlining 
the embedded resources in the network.  
This chapter has described the method of dividing a criminal entrepreneur’s life into four 
phases, and the rationale behind this, which involves comparing the outcome of the modi 
throughout the life of the criminal entrepreneurs. This chapter has described the case study 
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approach of this study, and also described the data sources, which are mainly written 
biographies, and discussed the use of written biographies in qualitative research. The validity 
of the research method is tested using triangulation of data from three different sources to 
confirm the validity of the data collected. Finally the limitations of this study were described. 
In the next chapter, the methodological approach will be applied to sources to extract the data 
within the modi framework, in order to analyse and discuss it.  
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4. Chapter Four: Data and Results 
4.1 Introduction 
This section describes the data extracted regarding the four criminal entrepreneurs featured in 
this study, using Smith’s (2009) framework. The data extracted was used to describe the 
criminal entrepreneurs in this study, with regard to vision, leadership style and orientation, 
and their identity and identity status. The criminal entrepreneur modus operandi is also 
extracted. The value of their social network is described, based on the embedded resources in 
the network, which include criminal, police and political capital, money launderers and gang 
capital, through modus vivendi. Finally this chapter concludes by illustrating the shared 
consistent modi patterns across the four criminal entrepreneurs in this study, throughout the 
four phases of their life and career. Furthermore, the data extracted will also illustrate the role 
of role models, absence of biological father, literature, personal experiences and strengths on 
forming the criminal entrepreneurs vision and modus operandi. Prior outlining the criminal 
entrepreneurs modi, this chapter starts by outlining the selection process resulting in the four 
criminal entrepreneurs featured in this study, then provides a brief biographical background 
on each of the criminal entrepreneurs, starting with McPherson.  
4.2 How were the criminal entrepreneurs featured in this study? 
The four criminal entrepreneurs featured in this study were chosen based on the following 
criteria: 
- All four criminal entrepreneurs featured in this study engaged in organised crime as 
defined by the Oyster Bay definition.  
- All four criminal entrepreneurs engaged in organised criminal activities in Australia, 
which is the focused location of this study.  
- All four criminal entrepreneurs were ‘successful’ entrepreneurs, according to the 
definition of success in entrepreneurship described earlier (under the heading 2.18 
successful criminal entrepreneurs). 
- There was sufficient reliable data for analysis of the four criminal entrepreneurs 
featured in this study.  
- The four criminal entrepreneurs featured in this study are all dead and therefore there 
were no ethical, legal or safety concerns in researching and analysis their published 
and documented crimes and behaviours. 
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- This study also acknowledges the existence of other successful criminal entrepreneurs 
in Australia (in different states), but they were not sufficient data for analysis. 
- This study cannot include successful criminal entrepreneurs operating in different 
states as it would violate the methodological approach and therefore skew the 
outcomes and findings of this study.    
The next section provides a brief biographical background of the four criminal entrepreneurs 
featured in this study, starting with McPherson.          
4.3 Leonard McPherson’s biographical background 
Leonard Arthur McPherson is one of Australia’s most successful criminal entrepreneurs and 
an underground legend (Reeves 2007a; Hickie 1985; Morton and Lobez 2011; Deans 2010). 
Leonard was born on the 19th of May 1921 in the suburb of Harbourside in Balmain, Sydney, 
Australia (Reeves 2007a; Hickie 1985; Morton and Lobez 2011; Deans 2010). Leonard was 
the youngest of ten siblings (Reeves 2007a; Morton and Lobez 2011; Deans 2010). Born in 
tough times between the Great Depression and World War II, McPherson grew up in tough 
conditions that shaped his personality (Reeves 2007a; Hickie 1985; Morton and Lobez 2011; 
Deans 2010). During these times, not only the McPhersons, but many Australian families 
were living on or under the poverty line, and would beg, borrow or steal to feed themselves 
(Reeves 2007a; Hickie 1985; Morton and Lobez 2011; Deans 2010). McPherson started his 
criminal career by stealing just before the end of his brief schooling at Birchgrove State 
Primary School (Reeves 2007a; Hickie 1985; Morton and Lobez 2011; Deans 2010). 
In his criminal career, McPherson idolised his role model, the American gangster Al Capone, 
and his vision was to become a crime boss just like him (Reeves 2007a; Hickie 1985; Morton 
and Lobez 2011; Deans 2010). McPherson used a different approach to succeed in his aims, 
however. The 7th of December 1932 was the official debut of McPherson’s criminal career, 
when, at the age of eleven and a half years old, he was charged with stealing and put on 
probation in the Children’s Court (Reeves 2007a; Hickie 1985; Morton and Lobez 2011; 
Deans 2010).  
When growing up, McPherson had a few trips to prison, mostly on charges of theft (Reeves 
2007a; Hickie 1985; Morton and Lobez 2011; Deans 2010). Early in his criminal career 
McPherson realised that stealing was causing him more damage than good, that it was an 
inefficient way of making a living, and that therefore a new operational approach was in 
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order (Reeves 2007a; Hickie 1985; Morton and Lobez 2011; Deans 2010). McPherson 
acknowledged the need for protection to avoid prosecution in case he was caught.  
Protection came with a price, and in Sydney the price was either money or information 
(Reeves 2007a; Hickie 1985; Morton and Lobez 2011; Deans 2010). Low on cash, 
McPherson turned to fizzing (which is providing information) against other criminals and 
cooperating with corrupt police to put other criminals behind bars in exchange for turning a 
blind eye to his criminal activities (Reeves 2007a; Hickie 1985; Morton and Lobez 2011; 
Deans 2010). Although the fizzing approach turned out to be successful, McPherson was 
labelled as ‘untrustworthy’ in the criminal milieu, and created more enemies than allies, nor 
did it glorify him as a crime boss, like Al Capone (Reeves 2007a; Hickie 1985; Morton and 
Lobez 2011; Deans 2010).  
With the help of his nephew, McPherson built a safe haven for “hot on the run” criminals 
(Reeves 2007a). At this stage of his career McPherson had his finger on the pulse of crime in 
Sydney, and through his connections with the police, he was able to grant favours to other 
criminals and became an influential leader in the underworld (Reeves 2007a). With his new 
status, McPherson turned into various criminal activities, including murder, extortion, 
protection, operating prostitution rackets, money laundering and illegal gambling (Reeves 
2007a; Hickie 1985; Morton and Lobez 2011; Deans 2010). McPherson’s success reached the 
international level, with prostitution rackets in the Philippines and connections to the US 
Italian Mafia, and possible involvement in an international illegal drug syndicate (Reeves 
2007a; Hickie 1985; Morton and Lobez 2011; Deans 2010). 
Despite his successful career, McPherson died in prison on the 28th of August 1996 (Reeves 
2007a; Hickie 1985; Morton and Lobez 2011; Deans 2010). McPherson was sent to prison 
for arranging an assault against Darron Burt, who was working with McPherson’s son 
(Reeves 2007a; Hickie 1985; Morton and Lobez 2011; Deans 2010). McPherson left an estate 
worth $10 million dollars and the NCA also reported an additional estate valued at $20 
million in Queensland and an unknown amount of cash in different bank accounts (Reeves 
2007a; Hickie 1985; Morton and Lobez 2011; Deans 2010). The next section provides a brief 
biographical summary of McPherson’s partner in crime George Freeman.  
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4.4 George Freeman’s biographical background  
George David Freeman was born in Annandale, Sydney, Australia, on the 22nd of January 
1935, into a broken home, and grew up without a father (Reeves 2011; Freeman 1988; Hickie 
1985; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). Freeman chose Darcy Dugan, a local criminal, as an idol 
(Reeves 2011; Freeman 1988; Hickie 1985; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). Dugan was tough 
criminal who had money, cars, popular with women and had respect among other tough men 
and criminals (Reeves 2011; Freeman 1988; Hickie 1985; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). Freeman 
loved his perceived image of Dugan and his life style, and decided to become just like him, a 
successful criminal (Reeves 2011; Freeman 1988; Hickie 1985; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). At a 
young age Freeman knew that he wanted to be an extraordinarily successful crook (Reeves 
2011; Freeman 1988; Hickie 1985; Coy 2010; Deans 2010).  
Growing up in the streets of Sydney, Freeman learned to be tough physically and mentally, 
and met like-minded people (Reeves 2011; Freeman 1988; Hickie 1985; Coy 2010; Deans 
2010). Freeman started his criminal career as a thief as a teenager (Reeves 2011; Freeman 
1988; Hickie 1985; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). After, few trips to juvenile prisons, Freeman got 
a job working with a horse trainer (Reeves 2011; Freeman 1988; Hickie 1985; Coy 2010; 
Deans 2010). Freeman learned about horse racing, which would set him up as an adult to 
become the biggest illegal SP (starting price) bookie in Sydney (Reeves 2011; Freeman 1988; 
Hickie 1985; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). SP bookmaking involves the starting price of fixed-
odds betting on various sports (Pinto and Wilson 1992).  
Prior becoming a successful SP bookie, Freeman continued to pursue his vision of becoming 
the biggest crook in Sydney, by organising and being involved in various robberies around 
Australia (Reeves 2011; Freeman 1988; Hickie 1985; Coy 2010; Deans 2010), however 
Freeman also continued to be caught and sent to prison (Reeves 2011; Freeman 1988; Hickie 
1985; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). Freeman was known for his disobedience, and uncooperative 
behaviour and attitude in prison (Reeves 2011; Freeman 1988; Hickie 1985; Coy 2010; 
Deans 2010). A corrupt police official offered Freeman a fizzing deal once, but Freeman 
refused, based on advice from McPherson, who he met in prison (Reeves 2011; Freeman 
1988; Hickie 1985; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). Later, Freeman realised that he was fighting a 
losing battle, as being disobedient was causing more damage than good (Reeves 2011; 
Freeman 1988; Hickie 1985; Coy 2010; Deans 2010), and so Freeman became a collaborator, 
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which was a turning point in his criminal career (Reeves 2011; Freeman 1988; Hickie 1985; 
Coy 2010; Deans 2010). 
Freeman effectively became the SP bookie for his prison, and took bets from everybody, 
including prison guards (Reeves 2011; Freeman 1988; Hickie 1985; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). 
On his release from prison, Freeman decided never to go back, and to find new less seriously 
illegal activities that were less likely to lead him to jail: illegal gambling and SP bookmaking 
(Reeves 2011; Freeman 1988; Hickie 1985; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). After prison Freeman 
worked as a bodyguard for a bookie, who was his SP bookmaking mentor (Reeves 2011; 
Freeman 1988; Hickie 1985; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). After the death of Freeman’s mentor, 
Freeman started working closely with McPherson, who provided him with protection and 
connections (Reeves 2011; Freeman 1988; Hickie 1985; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). McPherson 
became Freeman’s new mentor (Reeves 2011; Freeman 1988; Hickie 1985; Coy 2010; Deans 
2010). By joining forces with McPherson, Freeman became part of the elite group who 
robbed, bribed and blackmailed their way to the top (Reeves 2011; Freeman 1988; Hickie 
1985; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). Freeman also became host to the US Mafia, and the 
ambassador of Sydney’s organised crime (Reeves 2011; Freeman 1988; Hickie 1985; Coy 
2010; Deans 2010).  
During his career, Freeman was involved directly with three murders, horserace fixing, illegal 
gambling, including illegal SP bookmaking, operating illegal casinos, was an adviser for 
other criminals involved in illegal activities, ran protection, extortion and prostitution rackets, 
and had connections to illegal abortions and illegal drug syndicates (Reeves 2011; Freeman 
1988; Hickie 1985; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). Freeman was mentioned in three royal 
commissions involving organised crime, corruption, bribery, establishing illegal casinos, and 
illegal SP bookmaking; the latter being the only crime he was convicted of, and paid fines of 
$500 and $5,000 (Reeves 2011; Freeman 1988; Hickie 1985; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). On the 
20th of March 1990, George Freeman died of a heart failure (Reeves 2011; Freeman 1988; 
Hickie 1985; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). Abraham Saffron, described in the next section,  
benefited from the activities of Freeman and McPherson, by requesting protection from other 
criminals in the area in addition to their criminal activities against him (Reeves 2007b).  
4.5 Abraham Saffron’s biographical background  
Abraham Gilbert “Abe” Saffron was a successful criminal entrepreneur, born in Annandale, 
Sydney on the 16th of October 1919 (Piper 2010; Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; 
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Deans 2010). Saffron grew up in a Jewish household that emphasised the importance of 
education (Piper 2010; Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; Deans 2010). As a child 
and a teenager, Saffron was not well-built or tough like other criminals, but he was smart and 
social, with a keen business mind (Piper 2010; Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; 
Deans 2010). As a youngster, Saffron started his entrepreneurial career by selling cigarettes 
to his father’s friends when they came to visit (Piper 2010; Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; 
McNab 2005; Deans 2010). Saffron also sold used books to other students in school (Piper 
2010; Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; Deans 2010). From a young age, Saffron 
wanted to be nothing but a successful businessman, like his father, which he definitely 
became (Piper 2010; Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; Deans 2010).   
Saffron’s serious criminal career started when he bought the Roosevelt Club (Piper 2010; 
Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; Deans 2010). The Roosevelt Club became one of 
the most successful clubs in Sydney, selling liquor illegally after hours (Piper 2010; Saffron 
2009; Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; Deans 2010). In addition to the illegal income, the 
Roosevelt Club provided numerous contacts for Saffron, and established him as a well-
connected businessman (Piper 2010; Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; Deans 
2010). Although the Roosevelt Club flourished on bribes, Saffron’s connections could not 
prevent or protect him from honest police, and the Roosevelt Club was declared ‘disorderly’ 
and closed for a short period of time (Piper 2010; Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; 
Deans 2010). Saffron had to fight various charges, including violating liquor licensing laws, 
and tax evasion (Piper 2010; Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; Deans 2010).  
The charges caused great damage to Saffron’s reputation, which he cared about greatly (Piper 
2010; Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; Deans 2010), so he joined a criminal group 
called the ‘Crowd’ made up of corrupt police and politicians (Piper 2010; Saffron 2009; 
Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; Deans 2010). The ‘Crowd’ provided protection to Saffron in 
exchange for bribes and favours, and his criminal career flourished (Piper 2010; Saffron 
2009; Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; Deans 2010).  
Despite the protection Saffron enjoyed, a number of police were starting to become envious 
of Saffron enormous success, and greedy, and started pressuring him and blackmailing him to 
pay bigger bribes, threatening to expose his illegal activities, including the bribes he paid 
them (Piper 2010; Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; Deans 2010). Saffron needed a 
stronger grip on the corrupt police and politicians who were blackmailing him, so he started 
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the ‘White House’ which was a sex party business (Piper 2010; Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; 
McNab 2005; Deans 2010). Saffron hosted high-profile government officials including 
judges, politicians and/or police officials and provided private sex parties and prostitutes free 
of charge (Piper 2010; Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; Deans 2010). The 
dignitaries were secretly taped and filmed, and later blackmailed if they tried to interfere with 
Saffron’s businesses or illegal activities (Piper 2010; Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; McNab 
2005; Deans 2010).  
Later, Saffron was reported by the National Crime Authority (NCA) as involved in vice, 
including controlling prostitution, and importing and distribution of pornography around 
Australia (Piper 2010; Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; Deans 2010). Saffron 
owned a number of brothels, and was involved in money laundering, insurance fraud and a 
small protection racket (Piper 2010; Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; Deans 
2010). Saffron was also a suspect in different conspiracies, including the disappearance of 
Juanita Nielsen and the Ghost Train fire at Luna Park that killed seven innocent people (Piper 
2010; Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; Deans 2010). Saffron was indirectly 
involved in the drug business, by allowing consumption and trade on his premises (Piper 
2010; Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; Deans 2010). Although Saffron was part of 
various criminal activities, he was only charged with tax evasion and sentenced to three 
months in prison (Piper 2010; Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; Deans 2010). 
Saffron died on the 15th of September 2006, at the age of 86, of natural causes (Piper 2010; 
Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; Deans 2010).     
4.6 Sir Robert Askin’s biographical background    
The eldest of three sons, Robin William Askin was born on the 4th of April 1907 in Sydney, 
Australia (Goot 2007; Hancock 2006; Reading 1989; Hickie 1985). Askin grew up hating his 
name, and preferred to be called either Robert or Bob, and became the Premier of New South 
Wales: under his administration, corruption and organised crime flourished in Sydney (Goot 
2007; Hancock 2006; Reading 1989; Hickie 1985).  
Askin was educated at the Glebe public school and was awarded a bursary to Sydney 
Technical High School (Goot 2007; Hancock 2006; Reading 1989; Hickie 1985). Askin 
started his career as an electrical technician, before landing a job at the Government Saving 
Bank of New South Wales as a clerk (Goot 2007; Hancock 2006; Reading 1989; Hickie 
1985). In 1940, Askin was appointed as the manager of the Rural Bank Service Department, 
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which focused on public relations (Goot 2007; Hancock 2006; Reading 1989; Hickie 1985). 
Being in a public relations division exposed Askin to a huge social capital, and encouraged 
his social skills and nature (Goot 2007; Hancock 2006; Reading 1989; Hickie 1985). The fact 
that Askin also played rugby with the local team in the local league, and was an executive 
member of the New South Wales swimming association showed his social nature, good 
connections, active nature and involvement in the community, which made him suited for the 
public relation job (Goot 2007; Hancock 2006; Reading 1989; Hickie 1985). Askin also 
served as vice-president and eventually the president of the rural bank branch of the United 
Bank officers’ association, before enlisting in the Australian Imperial Forces on March 30th 
1942 (Goot 2007; Hancock 2006; Reading 1989; Hickie 1985).  
Askin was a sergeant in the army (Goot 2007; Hancock 2006; Reading 1989; Hickie 1985). 
He was demobilised from the army in 1946, and on his return to Australia he re-joined the 
Rural Bank, and managed the travel department (Goot 2007; Hancock 2006; Reading 1989; 
Hickie 1985). On his return, Askin ran an illegal SP bookmaking operation that did not last 
long, before turning his attention to politics and joining the Liberal Party in 1947 (Goot 2007; 
Hancock 2006; Reading 1989; Hickie 1985).  
Starting a new career in politics, Askin became president of Manly branch of the Liberal 
Party, the Manly state electorate conference and the Mackellar Federal electorate conference, 
was the W.C. Wentworth campaign manager and a member of the party’s federal council 
(Goot 2007; Hancock 2006; Reading 1989; Hickie 1985). In 1949, he beat 20 candidates and 
was preselected for the Collaroy seat (Goot 2007; Hancock 2006; Reading 1989; Hickie 
1985). Askin represented the constituency seat until it was removed in 1973, after which he 
represented the Pittwater seat until his retirement (Goot 2007; Hancock 2006; Reading 1989; 
Hickie 1985).  
By the time Askin joined the Liberal Party, it was ailing, divided and demoralised, 
particularly after the loss of six seats out of twenty-eight. Askin made his move and was 
appointed deputy leader of the State Parliament Party in 1954 (Goot 2007; Hancock 2006; 
Reading 1989; Hickie 1985). While other members were challenging one another for the 
leadership of the party, Askin remained quietly as the deputy until Morton narrowly lost the 
leadership and Askin was elected unopposed (Goot 2007; Hancock 2006; Reading 1989; 
Hickie 1985). To show his commitment to the leadership, Askin sold a printing business he 
owned and declared himself a fulltime politician (Goot 2007; Hancock 2006; Reading 1989; 
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Hickie 1985). On his second electoral run as leader of the Liberal Party, Askin succeeded in 
becoming New South Wales Premier in 1965 (Goot 2007; Hancock 2006; Reading 1989; 
Hickie 1985).  
As NSW Premier, Askin was said to be a friend of organised crime (Goot 2007; Hancock 
2006; Reading 1989; Hickie 1985). Although Askin was never arrested or charged with a 
crime, he facilitated the needs of organised crime (Goot 2007; Hancock 2006; Reading 1989; 
Hickie 1985). Askin accepted bribes in cash, stocks, favours and racing tips (Goot 2007; 
Hancock 2006; Reading 1989; Hickie 1985). He provided protection for other protection 
providers, such as corrupt police, including the police commissioner (Goot 2007; Hancock 
2006; Reading 1989; Hickie 1985). Askin was heavily involved with illegal casino operators 
and SP bookies (Goot 2007; Hancock 2006; Reading 1989; Hickie 1985). He was a regular at 
the races and often bragged about guaranteed wins (Goot 2007; Hancock 2006; Reading 
1989; Hickie 1985). Askin was also accused of selling knighthoods for $20,000 to $60,000 
(Goot 2007; Hancock 2006; Reading 1989; Hickie 1985). When Richard Riley, an informant 
who had a list of all those involved in corruption and organised crime, with Askin’s name 
believed to be among them, was murdered (Goot 2007; Hancock 2006; Reading 1989; Hickie 
1985), Askin ensured that the investigators had to report directly to him during the 
investigation, which was an unorthodox procedure (Goot 2007; Hancock 2006; Reading 
1989; Hickie 1985).  
The Department of Taxation made no finding of criminality, but it reported that a substantial 
part of Askin’s estate came from undisclosed sources, other than shares or gambling (Goot 
2007; Hancock 2006; Reading 1989; Hickie 1985).             
4.7 Modus Essendi 
Modus essendi enables a researcher to understand the behaviour of successful criminal 
entrepreneurs. This section outlines the leadership and identity of successful criminal 
entrepreneurs, through modus essendi. Leadership is consistent with leadership style, 
orientation and vision. 
4.7.1 Vision 
Vision is the blueprint that guides an entrepreneur to where they want to be or become (Filion 
1991). This section describes the vision of the four criminal entrepreneurs in this study. The 
entrepreneur’s vision is extracted from the data by outlining the vision statement they 
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provided, and the goals and mission set by them. The author also extracts behaviours that 
reflect the vision. The first the four phases of criminal careers are defined and measured.  
4.7.1.1 Leonard McPherson’s life and career phases 
McPherson’s Phase One began in 1921, which is when he was born, and lasted until 1949 
which is the period prior to his engaging in crime. Phase Two was from 1950 to 1965 which 
is the period of his unsuccessful criminal career, referred to in this study as the ‘prior success’ 
phase. During this period McPherson was involved in various crimes, served time in prison 
and acknowledged his limitations in crime and the need for a new approach (Reeves 2007a; 
Coy 2010; Bottom 1979; Deans 2010). The end of Phase Two was the activation of 
McPherson’s relationship with Ray Kelly, a notoriously corrupt detective, who provided 
McPherson with immunity from prosecution, which was a catalyst and turning point in 
McPherson’s career (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 1979; Deans 2010). Phase Three was 
the peak of McPherson criminal career, starting in 1957, and lasted from the start of 
McPherson and Kelly’s immunity arrangement to 1991, when McPherson lost his immunity 
from prosecution (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 1979; Deans 2010). Phase Four lasted 
from 1992 to 1996, when McPherson lost some of his power and authority as he was 
prosecuted and imprisoned (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 1979; Deans 2010). Table 15 
shows McPherson’s vision in the four phases on his life.      
Table 11 Leonard McPherson’s vision  
Phase One Phase Two Phase Three Phase Four 
Years  Years  Years  Years 
1921 – 1949 1950 - 1956 1957 – 1991 1992 - 1996 
Vision 
(modi essendi) 
Vision 
(modi essendi) 
Vision 
(modi essendi) 
Vision 
(modi essendi) 
 
None 
 
Become a crime boss. 
 
Becoming the ‘Big 
Gun’ of Sydney, 
Australia and an 
international member 
of organised crime, a 
commission agent. 
 
 
Humanitarian 
Evidence/behaviour 
(modi intelligendi) 
Evidence/behaviour 
(modi intelligendi)  
Evidence/behaviour 
(modi intelligendi) 
Evidence/behaviour 
(modi intelligendi) 
 
None 
 
Attempting to imitate Al 
Capone, and saw him as a 
role model. 
 
McPherson read 
 
Eliminating 
challenging criminals. 
 
Gathered loyal 
journalists to control 
 
Working at the 
homeless shelter. 
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everything about Al 
Capone. 
 
Went to the United States 
to form connections with 
the American Mafia (failed 
on his first attempt). 
 
Challenged any criminal 
claiming to be the Mr Big 
of Sydney organised 
crime. 
 
McPherson was perceived 
and described as a crime 
boss in a number of royal 
commissions, and by 
officials in the police force 
(Ray Kelly). 
the media and his 
public image. 
 
Developed a 
cooperative and 
working relationship 
with corrupt police.  
 
Started to develop a 
controlled criminal 
network around him 
with different 
divisions and services. 
 
Using a mafia style 
system to skim poker 
machines. 
 
Sending Freeman to 
establish connections 
with the United States 
Mafia.  
 
Has a prostitution 
rackets in the 
Philippines. 
 
Became a member of a 
prostitution racket in 
Australia, Asia and the 
Middle East.   
 
Would charge $51,510 
to talk to someone. 
References  References  References  References 
  
(Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; 
Bottom 1979; Deans 2010; 
Reeves 2011) 
 
(Reeves 2007a; Coy 
2010; Bottom 1979; 
Deans 2010; Reeves 
2011) 
 
(Reeves 2007a; Coy 
2010; Bottom 1979; 
Deans 2010) 
 
Based on the data collected as shown in Table 12, McPherson did not have a vision in Phase 
One. The researcher’s interpretation of the vision data drawn from Reeves (2007a, 2011), 
Coy (2010), Bottom (1979) and Dean (2010) is based on the definition of ‘vision’ which is 
‘an idealized future goal state, as a plan for the future goal attainment, and as an image of the 
future that articulates the values, purposes and identify of followers’ (Strange and Mumford 
2005, 122). The data does not show that McPherson had an idealised future goal, a plan or an 
image of his future nor a direct description of a vision in Phase One. In Phase Two, 
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McPherson’s vision was clear, as he stated that he wanted to be a crime boss like Al Capone 
(Reeves 2007a, 2011; Coy 2010; Hickie 1985). In Phase Three, McPherson’s vision was to 
become an international crime boss and be a member of an international crime organisation, 
as he contacted the US Mafia and referred to himself as a crime boss in Sydney (Reeves 
2007a, 2011; Coy 2010; Hickie 1985). In Phase Four, McPherson’s vision had changed based 
on his behaviour, as he started engaging in humanitarian activities such as volunteering at the 
homeless shelter (Reeves 2007a, 2011; Coy 2010). The researcher’s interpretation of 
McPherson’s vision in Phase Four is based on his behaviour rather than a clear statement. For 
instance, McPherson changed his name, distanced himself from other criminals, attended 
religious events and volunteered at the homeless shelter (Reeves 2007a, 2011; Coy 2010), 
these behaviours  reflects a plan, a new future image and goal McPherson aimed at achieving. 
The new changes and goals McPherson adopted show different values, purpose and a new 
identity which is based on the type of activities was a humanitarian identity. All these 
changes made by McPherson reflect a new vision based on Strange and Mumford (2005) 
definition of vision.  
4.7.1.2  George Freeman’s life and career phases  
This section starts by outlining the four phases of Freeman’s life and career, starting with 
Phase One. Freeman’s Phase One was from 1935 to 1955, which is from his birth until the 
point where he acknowledged his limitations in crime and considered himself a failed 
criminal (Reeves 2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010). Phase 
Two was from 1956 to 1966 when Freeman was more cooperative and was being mentored 
by a successful SP bookie (Reeves 2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; 
Coy 2010). Phase Three, was the start of Freeman and McPherson’s criminal partnership, 
which lasted from 1967 to 1972, when Freeman changed his operational approach and social 
network behaviour (Reeves 2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 
2010). Phase Four was from 1973 which is when Freeman changed his operational approach, 
becoming a commission agent and a consultant for other criminals, until his death in 1990 
(Reeves 2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010). The next 
section describes Freeman’s vision as the four phases, starting with Phase One. 
In Phase One, Freeman’s vision was becoming a successful, powerful, feared, influential and 
respected criminal, as described by himself (Reeves 2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 
2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010). In Phase Two, Freeman aimed to become a member of 
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organised crime groups and an SP bookmaker, based on his behaviour as shown in Table 16, 
which reflects his vision (Reeves 2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; 
Coy 2010).  
The researcher’s interpretation of Freeman’s behaviour and vision in Phase Two is based on 
Strange and Mumford’s (2005) definition of vision, as he set  himself a clear goal of 
becoming a member of organised crime by working and collaborating with organised crime 
members, and learning the art of SP bookmaking (Reeves 2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 
2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010). Freeman eventually became one of the most successful 
illegal SP bookies, and a leader in organised crime, in Sydney in Phases Three and Four of 
his life (Reeves 2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010), which 
meant working selectively with organised crime members and SP bookies was aimed at a 
future goal Freeman planned to achieve, and the fact that he stated in various occasions that 
he wanted to be a criminal and illegal SP bookmaking and race fixing were crimes (Reeves 
2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010). 
In Phase Three, Freeman’s vision was to become an elite member of international organised 
crime, as he established connections with the US Mafia (Reeves 2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; 
Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010). Freeman also cut his social ties with some criminals 
in an attempt to rehabilitate, re-establish and transform his public and criminal image into 
that of an elite successful criminal (Reeves 2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 
1979; Coy 2010). The researcher interprets this behaviour as planning and aiming to build a 
new criminal status and image, which falls within Strange and Mumford’s (2005) definition 
of vision. Table 16 summarises Freeman’s vision throughout his life and career.  
Table 12 George Freeman’s vision  
Phase One Phase Two Phase Three Phase Four 
Years Years Years Years 
1935 – 1955 1956 - 1966 1967 – 1972 1973 - 1990 
Vision 
(modi essendi) 
Vision 
(modi essendi) 
Vision 
(modi essendi) 
Vision 
(modi essendi) 
 
A successful, powerful, 
feared, influential and 
respected criminal. 
 
A member of organised 
crime groups and an SP 
bookmaker. 
 
Becoming an 
international elite 
member of an 
organised crime group. 
 
 
A commission agent 
Evidence/behaviour 
(modi intelligendi) 
Evidence/behaviour 
(modi intelligendi) 
Evidence/behaviour 
(modi intelligendi) 
Evidence/behaviour 
(modi intelligendi) 
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Stated by him. 
 
Chose Darcy Dugan a 
local criminal as his 
role model. 
 
Started stealing at a 
young age, to become a 
professional criminal. 
 
 
Becoming more 
cooperative with 
corrupt police. 
 
Worked as a 
bodyguard for an SP 
bookmaker. 
 
Started his SP 
bookmaking career 
while working as a 
bodyguard. 
Went to the United 
States to meet with 
executive members of 
Mafia. 
 
Hosted executive 
members of the United 
States Mafia. 
 
Specialised in illegal 
SP bookmaking and 
controlling the illegal 
SP market in Sydney. 
Distanced himself from 
other hard-core 
criminals (lower level). 
 
Promoting himself as a 
commission agent. 
 
Associating with 
executive members of 
organised crime. 
 
Organiser of organised 
crime. 
 
An adviser of 
organised crime 
(advising other 
criminals and granting 
favours). 
 
Negotiated peace deals 
with other criminal 
groups. 
 
Charged $5,000 
(equivalent of $12,877) 
to talk to someone. 
References References References References 
 
(Reeves 2011, 2007a; 
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(Reeves 2011, 2007a; 
Freeman 1988; Deans 
2010; Bottom 1979; 
Coy 2010) 
 
4.7.1.3 Abraham Saffron’s life and career phases  
This section defines the four phases of Saffron’s life and career, starting with Phase One. 
Saffron’s Phase One was from 1919 to 1941 which is prior to buying the Roosevelt Club 
(Reeves 2007b; Saffron 2009; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). Phase Two, was from 1942, which 
was the debut of Saffron’s official criminal career by buying The Roosevelt Club, and when 
he started bribing corrupt police to sell liquor illegally after hours, until 1952, the year before 
joining the ‘Crowd’, a criminal organisation (Reeves 2007b; Saffron 2009; Piper 2010; 
McNab 2005). Phase Three, the peak of Saffron’s criminal career, was from 1953 to 1979 
when he was a senior member of the organised crime community and considered one of 
Sydney’s ‘untouchables’, as he had immunity from prosecution through his connections with 
various corrupt police and politicians, including the ‘Crowd’ (Reeves 2007b; Saffron 2009; 
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Piper 2010; McNab 2005). Phase Four was from 1980 to 2006, where Saffron lost his 
immunity and spent time in prison as a result of tax evasion charges, and later died of natural 
causes (Reeves 2007b; Saffron 2009; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). The next section describes 
Saffron’s vision in the four phases, starting with Phase One.  
In Phase One Saffron’s vision was becoming a businessman, as stated by him (Reeves 2007b; 
Saffron 2009; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). In Phase Two, Saffron’s vision was to become a 
successful businessman, and a humanitarian based on his behaviour as shown in Table 17 
(Reeves 2007b; Saffron 2009; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). The researcher’s interpretation of 
Saffron’s vision in Phase Two from the data is guided by Strange and Mumford’s (2005) 
definition of vision as in addition to Saffron’s clear statement about wanting to be a 
successful businessman (Reeves 2007b; Saffron 2009; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). He also 
engaged in humanitarian activities (by launching Persona, a charity fundraiser), aiming to 
build a new public image and social status, which falls within the definition of vision.    
In Phase Three, Saffron’s vision was to become a leader of organised crime in Sydney, to 
have greater control of organised crime and secure immunity from prosecution (Reeves 
2007b; Saffron 2009; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). The researcher’s interpretation of Saffron’s 
vision in Phase Three is based on his activities, as he joined an organised criminal group, 
aiming and planning to expand his illegal businesses and have a stronger grip on corrupt 
police (Reeves 2007b; Saffron 2009; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). Aiming and planning clear 
goals for the future fall within Strange and Munford’s (2005) definition of vision. The 
researcher thus argues that Saffron’s vision in Phase Three was becoming a leader of 
organised crime in Sydney. 1979 was the end of Phase Three and the beginning of Phase 
Four, when Saffron’s criminal immunity provider Police Commissioner Mervyn ‘Merv’ 
Thomas Wood, resigned from the police force following an accusation of corruption (Reeves 
2007b; Saffron 2009; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). In Phase Four, Saffron’s vision was to 
become a successful businessman and a humanitarian. The researcher’s interpretation of 
Saffron’s vision in Phase Four is based on Saffron’s focus on his businesses and restoring his 
public image by donating to, and fundraising for charity organisations, and reducing his 
engagement in crime due to the loss of his immunity arrangement (Reeves 2007b; Saffron 
2009; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). In planning and expanding his businesses, and donating to 
and fundraising for charity organisations, Saffron’s behaviour reflects the vision of a 
successful businessman and humanitarian based on Strange and Mumford’s (2005) definition 
of vision.   
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 The end of Phase Four was in 2006 were Saffron died of natural causes. Table 17 
summarises Saffron’s vision in the four phases.  
Table 13 Abraham Saffron’s vision  
Phase One Phase Two Phase Three Phase Four 
Years Years Years Years 
1919 - 1941 1942 - 1952 1953 – 1979 1980 - 2006 
Vision 
(modi essendi) 
Vision 
(modi essendi) 
Vision 
(modi essendi) 
Vision 
(modi essendi) 
 
Become a businessman 
 
Become a successful 
businessman and a 
humanitarian. 
 
Become a leader in 
organised crime in 
Sydney 
 
 
A successful 
businessman and a 
humanitarian 
Evidence/behaviour 
(modi intelligendi) 
Evidence/behaviour 
(modi intelligendi) 
Evidence/behaviour 
(modi intelligendi) 
Evidence/behaviour 
(modi intelligendi) 
 
Told a journalist ‘had  
no other desire than to 
go into business’ 
 
Left school early to go 
into business. 
 
Sold cigarettes to his 
father’s friends. 
 
Resold old books to 
new students at school. 
 
Bought the Roosevelt 
Club and turned it to 
the most successful 
club in Sydney. 
 
Bought a number of 
hotels and pubs. 
 
Launched Persona, a 
major charity 
fundraiser. 
 
Joined a group called 
the ‘Crowd’ formed of 
corrupt police and 
politicians. 
 
Started a blackmailing 
business, as an 
insurance policy 
against those who 
blackmailed him. 
 
Hosting sex parties 
(Free of charge). 
 
Hosting corrupt police, 
politicians and 
criminals at his 
nightclubs and strip 
clubs. 
 
Becoming involved in 
prostitution rackets, 
allowing the 
distribution and 
consumption of illegal 
drugs on his premises. 
 
Importing and 
distributing 
pornography. 
 
 
 
Donated enough 
money to be appointed 
life governor in NSW 
by Federal Health 
Minister Michael J. 
McKellar. 
 
 
References References References References 
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2009; Piper 2010; 
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4.7.1.4 Robert Askin’s life and career phases 
Askin’s Phase One was from 1907 to 1947, which is prior to his political career. Phase Two 
started in 1947, which marked Askin’s debut into politics by joining the Liberal Party, and 
lasted until 1964 which was prior to his becoming NSW Premier (Hickie 1985; Hancock 
2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989). Phase Three started in 1965, which was the beginning of 
the Askin premiership, a turning point in his career, and ended in 1974, when his Premiership 
ended (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989). Phase Four was from 1975 
to 1981, which is when Askin lost his power and authority by losing his premiership, which 
was a turning point in his life, and lasted until his death in 1981 (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; 
Goot 2007; Reading 1989).     
Throughout his career, Askin’s vision did not change dramatically. In Phase One, Askin 
stated that he wanted to be a tradesman of some kind, without specifying which trade 
(Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989). Askin did not have a vision by definition, as one 
must have a clearly defined goal, of what they aims to be and/or achieve. 
 In Phases Two and Three, Askin stated and acted upon a clear vision, which was to become a 
politician. Askin sold the printery he owned to dedicate his time to politics (Hancock 2006; 
Goot 2007; Reading 1989). Askin also referred to himself on numerous occasions as a 
professional politician (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989). Askin attend 
various social events to listen to his follower’s needs, in order to address them as a 
policymaker and attract more votes, which is behaviour that reflects his vision (Hickie 1985; 
Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989).  
In Phase Four, Askin did not state or act on a clear vision, therefore this study argues that 
Askin did not have a vision in Phase Four. Table 18 outlines Askin’s vision throughout the 
four phases of his life.  
Once the criminal entrepreneurs of this study had formed their visons, their leadership style 
enabled them to attract followers and accomplished the vision. The next section extracts the 
four criminal entrepreneurs of this study leadership style and orientation. 
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Table 14 Robert Askin’s vision  
Phase One Phase Two Phase Three Phase Four 
Years Years Years Years 
1907 - 1946 1947 - 1964 1965 – 1974 1975 - 1981 
Vision 
(modi essendi) 
Vision 
(modi essendi) 
Vision 
(modi essendi) 
Vision 
(modi essendi) 
 
No clear vision 
 
Becoming a 
professional politician 
 
Become the most 
powerful politician in 
Sydney. 
 
No clear vision 
Evidence/behaviour 
(modi intelligendi) 
Evidence/behaviour 
(modi intelligendi) 
Evidence/behaviour 
(modi intelligendi) 
Evidence/behaviour 
(modi intelligendi) 
 
Become a tradesman of 
some kind. 
 
Own a small printery 
 
Stated in the data 
collected 
 
Joined the Liberal 
Party 
 
Became Sydney 
Premier. 
 
Retired from politics. 
References References References References 
 
(Hancock 2006; Goot 
2007; Reading 1989) 
 
(Hickie 1985; Hancock 
2006; Goot 2007; 
Reading 1989) 
 
(Hickie 1985; Hancock 
2006; Goot 2007; 
Reading 1989) 
 
(Hickie 1985; Hancock 
2006; Goot 2007; 
Reading 1989) 
 
4.7.2  Leadership Style and Orientation 
This section describes the leadership styles and orientation of the criminal entrepreneurs, 
based on Strange and Mumford (2002) measurement of charismatic leadership, social and 
personal orientation. The extraction process is guided by Strange and Mumford (2002) 
charismatic leadership questions in Table 7. The next section thus fulfils the Strange and 
Mumford (2002) charismatic leadership style questionnaire, starting with McPherson.   
4.7.2.1 Leonard McPherson’s leadership style 
McPherson had a charismatic leadership style, with a personal orientation. From an early 
stage of his criminal career, McPherson had always had a vision of becoming a crime boss 
like Al Capone (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 1979; Deans 2010; Reeves 2011). 
Throughout his career McPherson always looked at the bigger picture, which was to become 
an international crime boss (as demonstrated by attempting to establish a connection with the 
US Mafia twice, with the second attempt being a success) (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 
1979; Deans 2010; Reeves 2011). McPherson was selective in his associates, and always 
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expected high performance from them (he would ask his men to conduct rehearsals prior to 
carrying out a job) (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 1979; Deans 2010; Reeves 2011).  
A high degree of confidence was placed by McPherson in his followers and associates to 
meet expectations, by delegating duties to his followers, including Freeman, who laundered 
money through his SP bookmaking syndicate). When expectations were met, McPherson 
demonstrated power, achievement and success by providing immunity (protection from 
prosecution) to his members and associates (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 1979; Deans 
2010; Reeves 2011). McPherson was greatly feared by other criminals and civilians in 
Sydney (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 1979; Deans 2010; Reeves 2011). One of the 
reasons that some criminals joined McPherson was corruption, and the higher levels of crime 
rates in the area, so they were not attracted to McPherson himself, but the privileges of being 
part of his team (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 1979; Deans 2010; Reeves 2011).  
Other members of McPherson’s criminal group had their own branches of criminal activities 
(e.g. George Freeman focused on illegal SP bookmaking) (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 
1979; Deans 2010; Reeves 2011). When McPherson gave orders to other members and 
associates of his criminal organisation, it was mostly for the benefit of his vision and the 
criminal organisation (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 1979; Deans 2010; Reeves 2011).  
In the second phase, and early in the third phase, McPherson gave direct orders to the higher 
ranking members of his organisation, but later in the third phase he communicated in such a 
way that attention was not paid to him (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 1979; Deans 2010; 
Reeves 2011). Although McPherson was a professional criminal, he cared about his image as 
a crime boss in the second and early third phases of his criminal career. Towards the end of 
the third and fourth phases of his criminal career, however, McPherson cared about his image 
as a good citizen (e.g. he changed his name to Murray and worked at a homeless shelter) due 
to the investigations being conducted by investigation authorities (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; 
Bottom 1979; Deans 2010; Reeves 2011). McPherson also conducted interviews in an 
attempt to persuade the public to believe that he was innocent (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; 
Bottom 1979; Deans 2010; Reeves 2011).  
McPherson was not very persuasive or a good negotiator, but he was intimidating (Reeves 
2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 1979; Deans 2010; Reeves 2011). In conflicts, McPherson would 
try to persuade high profile criminals to join his vision (e.g. organised a meeting for 
organised crime leaders in Sydney to end the drug war) (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 
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1979; Deans 2010; Reeves 2011). Although negotiation was also not McPherson’s strongest 
suit, he was open to negotiating his ideas with his followers and associates when it fitted his 
vision and enhanced his image (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 1979; Deans 2010; Reeves 
2011).  
In crime, McPherson motived his associates to commit crimes that others (such as rival 
criminal groups) were already committing (such bribery and extortion) in society (Reeves 
2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 1979; Deans 2010; Reeves 2011). Regardless of the outcome of 
negotiations, McPherson used money and protection as a reward to keep his associates and 
followers motivated (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 1979; Deans 2010; Reeves 2011). As 
the rewards kept followers motivated and attracted new followers; the size of the criminal 
organisation grew. As the organisation grew, McPherson delegated duties to his followers 
and associates in order to achieve his vision of becoming an international organised crime 
leader. For instance, in Phase Three McPherson sent Freeman to the US to establish 
connections with the US Mafia (Reeves 2007a, 2011; Deans 2010).  
The drive behind McPherson’s success was the accomplishment of his vision, and took into 
account his criminal empire when taking decisions (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 1979; 
Deans 2010; Reeves 2011), however McPherson would not put the criminal organisation 
before his personal vision; therefore he was narcissistic and always wishing to bring power 
and attention to himself in Phases Two and Three. The orientation of McPherson’s leadership 
style was thus personal. In other words, McPherson’s leadership behaviour (modi 
intelligendi), as extracted from Reeves (2011, 2007a), Coy (2010), Bottom (1979) and Deans 
(2010), reflects a personal leadership orientation (modi essendi). Table 19 summaries 
McPherson’s leadership style and orientation. The next section describes McPherson’s 
identity and identity status, by answering Marcia’s (1966) identity questions, as described in 
Table 4.        
Table 15 Leonard McPherson’s leadership style and orientation  
Phase One Phase Two Phase Three Phase Four 
Years Years Years Years 
1921-1949 1950-1956 1957-1991 1992-1996 
Leadership Style Leadership Style Leadership Style Leadership Style 
None Charismatic Charismatic Charismatic 
Leadership 
Orientation 
Leadership 
Orientation 
Leadership 
Orientation 
Leadership 
Orientation 
None Personal Personal Personal 
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4.7.2.2 Leonard McPherson’s Identity 
In this study, identity is composed of 10 elements as shown in Table 4, starting with self-
conception. McPherson’s self-conception was that he was a criminal. His short term goal was 
to be the most feared and influential criminal in Sydney, and based on his actions, behaviour 
and stated vision, his long term goal was to become an international crime boss (Reeves 
2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 1979; Deans 2010). McPherson had high levels of resilience 
regarding peer-pressure, as there are no recorded events where McPherson gave in to the 
pressure of one of his peers. In fact, McPherson was known to pressure his peers (such as the 
order he gave jointly with Freeman to murder Chris “Mr Rent-a-Kill” Flannery, an 
outrageous criminal who brought unwanted attention to their criminal organisation (Reeves 
2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 1979; Deans 2010). McPherson also pressured Freeman to distance 
himself from Stanley Smith, who was involved in the drug trade, of which McPherson did not 
approve (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 1979; Deans 2010).   
This behaviour also shows McPherson as a decision maker. McPherson’s decisions to 
pressure his followers and associates into murdering Flannery (who was a friend of Freeman 
and McPherson) were to the advantage of his criminal organisation and his life in Phase Two 
and early in Phase Three when he was moderately optimistic that it would flourish to control 
a greater area and expand his illegal businesses (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 1979; 
Deans 2010). McPherson was not very optimistic at the peak of his criminal career, however, 
due to the drug war in Sydney between organised crime groups (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; 
Bottom 1979; Deans 2010).  
The loss of his protection provider when corrupt detective Ray Kelly retired from the police 
force contributed to the decrease in McPherson’s optimism. Kelly was the most efficient 
protection provider McPherson had in his career, more so than his new protection providers 
(such as Roger Rogerson) (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 1979; Deans 2010). In fact, 
Rogerson was dismissed from the force after allegations of corruption (Reeves 2007a). 
McPherson lost his immunity and protection provider. In fact in Phase Four, McPherson’s 
optimism was at its lowest, as he was imprisoned (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 1979; 
Deans 2010). McPherson went into a deep depression (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 
1979; Deans 2010).  
McPherson never took responsibility for what happened to him or others around him, good or 
bad, or whether they were victims of crime or the beneficiaries of it. McPherson was not 
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independent in crime, as he carried out crimes with co-offenders, as in the murder of ‘Pretty 
boy’ Walker, and received protection from Kelly (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 1979; 
Deans 2010). In his life of crime, despite being listed (in official documents) as a Christian, 
no religious values or beliefs, or political views, prevented McPherson from his participation 
in crime (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 1979; Deans 2010). In fact, McPherson was very 
accepting of himself as a criminal. McPherson fulfils 90% of the identity questionnaire in all 
four phases. McPherson’s identity in Phases One and Two was that of a Christian crime 
leader, with an achieved identity status. In Phase Three, McPherson’s identity was that of a 
Christian organised crime leader, with an achieved identity status. In Phase Four, 
McPherson’s identity was that of a good Christian citizen with a foreclosure identity status. 
In other words, based on the outcome of the identity measurement (modi intelligendi), and 
drawn from the data extracted from Reeves (2007s), Coy (2010), Bottom (1979) and Deans 
(2010), McPherson’s identity (modi essendi) was that of a Christian crime leader in Phase 
Two, a Christian organised crime leader in Phase Three and a good Christian citizen in Phase 
Four. Table 20 summarises McPherson’s identity.   
Table 16 Leonard McPherson’s identity      
 Phase One Phase Two Phase Three Phase Four 
Self-concept  A crime leader A crime leader Organised crime 
leader 
A good citizen 
Long and short 
term goals 
Long: become a 
crime boss. 
 
Short: become 
the most feared 
Long: become a 
crime boss. 
 
Short: arrange 
protection 
Long: 
international 
crime boss 
 
Short: control 
and organise 
organised crime 
in Sydney 
Stay out of prison 
Resilience 
toward peer 
pressure  
High Low Low High 
Self-acceptance High High High Low 
Decision making  High High High High 
Optimism High High Medium Low 
Taking 
responsibility 
No  No No No 
Independency  High Medium Medium Low 
Religious beliefs  Christian Christian Christian Christian 
Political view  None None None None 
 Identity Status Identity Status Identity Status Identity Status 
 Identity Achieved Identity Achieved Identity achieved Foreclosure 
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4.7.2.3 George Freeman’s leadership style and orientation 
In the first phase of his criminal career, Freeman did not lead with a charismatic leadership 
style. Through Phases Two, Three and Four, Freeman did lead with a charismatic leadership 
style. As a youngster, Freeman strived to become a crook (Reeves 2011, 2007a; Freeman 
1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010). As a young criminal who focused mostly on 
stealing, Freeman was fixed on his vision of becoming a crook, which was his goal 
throughout his career, as stated by him in the data collected (Reeves 2011, 2007a; Freeman 
1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010). Most of his activities were also based on this 
vision, he was aware of the criminality of his actions and behaviour, and was willing to take 
the risk and face the consequences. He reported in his book that when he went to prison he 
had a sense of pride (Reeves 2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 
2010)).  
From Phase Two to Four, Freeman adopted charismatic leadership to achieve his long term 
goal and vision of becoming a crime boss, by allowing himself to be mentored by the 
‘Butcher’ and McPherson (Reeves 2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; 
Coy 2010). Freeman joined the ‘Butcher’ and ‘McPherson’, as they were known, for their 
efficiency in their operations (Reeves 2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 
1979; Coy 2010). As Freeman became a successful leader in his field of SP bookmaking, the 
success of his criminal operations reflected the high efficiency of his followers and team, and 
the great confidence he had in them (Reeves 2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; 
Bottom 1979; Coy 2010).  
When expectations were met, Freeman rewarded his followers and team members by 
providing immunity from prosecution, which demonstrated his power and authority (Reeves 
2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010). In effect, other members 
of the society feared Freeman for his power and authority, which led to extreme reactions of 
respecting and avoiding challenging him, from his followers and the public (Reeves 2011, 
2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010). Some followers were attracted 
to Freeman for the privilege of being part of his team, rather than to be close to Freeman 
himself. In fact, some of Freeman’s associates had their own criminal activities in which 
Freeman was not directly involved, such as Stanley Smith who was involved in the illicit 
drug trade (Reeves 2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010). 
Despite some members having their own criminal operations, Freeman would still delegate 
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duties to his trusted affiliates and followers, as he had over 600 phone lines collecting bets 
from all states in Australia (Reeves 2011).  
Although Freeman was collecting bets from around Australia, he connected with the greater 
number of his followers, clients and associates directly in Sydney, by attending various 
events (Reeves 2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010). 
Connecting directly with his followers intended to bring attention to himself, as in his vision 
he continually referred directly to himself when he stated ‘I want to be a crook’ (Reeves 
2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010). Freeman also cared 
about his image, which is why he distanced himself from lower-level criminals, and other 
criminals who would damage his image, such as Stanley Smith and Chris Flannery (Reeves 
2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010).  
In addition to his image, Freeman also cared about his vision, and therefore he took decisions 
that favoured his vision and criminal organisation, such as avoiding going to prison by 
focusing on crimes that would not result in him being in jail (Reeves 2011, 2007a; Freeman 
1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010). Freeman focused on SP bookmaking after 
securing immunity from prosecution through McPherson’s connections (Reeves 2011, 2007a; 
Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010). In Phase Four, despite having 
McPherson’s protection, Freeman changed his operational approach to reduce the attention 
on him by becoming a commissioning agent (Reeves 2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 
2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010). As a commissioning agent, Freeman advised and negotiated 
deals with other criminals and non-criminals (Reeves 2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 
2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010). On occasion Freeman would negotiate deals on behalf of 
McPherson (Reeves 2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010).  
The changes in Freeman’s operational approach were made to respond to the Royal 
Commissions that were investigating his criminal activities. The level of awareness of his 
crimes can be seen in the fact that Freeman was denied a UK tourist visa (Reeves 2011, 
2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010). The changes to Freeman’s 
operational approach were in line with his vision of becoming a successful criminal, 
however, which was his main driving force (Reeves 2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 
2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010). Throughout his career Freeman led mostly to benefit himself 
first, and the criminal organisation second, and therefore his leadership orientation is 
personal. Based on Freeman’s leadership behaviour (modi intelligendi) as extracted from 
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Reeves (2011, 2007a), Freeman (1988), Dean (2010), Bottom (1979) and Coy (2010), his 
leadership orientation was personal (modi essendi). Table 21 is a summary of Freeman’s 
leadership style throughout his career. The next section describes Freeman’s identity and 
identity status.              
Table 17 George Freeman’s leadership style and orientation 
Phase One Phase Two Phase Three Phase Four 
Years Years Years Years 
1935-1955 1956-1966 1967-1972 1973-1990 
Leadership Style Leadership Style Leadership Style Leadership Style 
Not Charismatic Charismatic  Charismatic  Charismatic  
Leadership 
Orientation 
Leadership 
Orientation 
Leadership 
Orientation 
Leadership 
Orientation 
Personal Personal  Personal  Personal 
4.7.2.4 George Freeman’s Identity 
Freeman had different identities throughout his career. During the first phase of his criminal 
career, Freeman’s self-concept was as a crook, with the same short and long term goal of 
being the most powerful, influential and successful criminal in Sydney (Reeves 2011, 2007a; 
Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010). Freeman was very resilient to peer-
pressure, and was known for his stubbornness which led him into trouble, particularly in 
prison (Reeves 2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010). In Phases 
Two, Three and Four, however, Freeman had lower levels of resilience towards peer-
pressure. McPherson would pressure Freeman to distance himself from particular lower-level 
criminals, and to accept mentorship from other criminals and follow their orders (Reeves 
2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010). 
Despite being a criminal, Freeman was very accepting of himself throughout his life (Reeves 
2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010). In fact, Freeman was a 
decision-maker with an optimistic view of his life and those around him, as he kept engaging 
in crime despite royal commissions investigating his organised criminal activities (Reeves 
2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010). Despite being a member 
of a criminal organisation, Freeman was independent throughout his life, except in his crimes, 
which he carried out with co-offenders (Reeves 2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; Deans 2010; 
Bottom 1979; Coy 2010). In his life of crime, Freeman never took responsibility for his 
actions or their outcomes. On a personal level, Freeman was listed as a Christian, without 
political views, as shown in his official documents (Reeves 2011, 2007a; Freeman 1988; 
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Deans 2010; Bottom 1979; Coy 2010). Freeman fulfilled 90% of the identity questionnaire. 
In Phases One and Two Freeman’s identity was that of a Christian crook, with an achieved 
identity status. In Phase Three, Freeman’s identity was that of a Christian crime boss, with an 
achieved identity status. In Phase Four, Freeman’s identity was that of a Christian crime 
commission agent, with an achieved identity status. In other words, based on the outcome of 
the identity measurement (modi intelligendi) extracted from Reeves (2011, 2007a), Freeman 
(1988), Dean (2010), Bottom (1979) and Coy (2010), Freeman’s identity (modi essendi) was 
that of a Christian criminal in Phases One and Two, a Christian crime boss in Phase Three 
and a Christian crime commission agent in Phase Four. Table 22 is a summary of Freeman’s 
identity and identity status throughout his career.     
Table 18 George Freeman’s identity  
 Phase One Phase Two Phase Three Phase Four 
Self- concept A crook A crook A crime boss A commission 
agent 
Long and short 
term goals 
Long: 
become a 
crime boss 
Short: 
become an 
influential 
criminal 
Long: become 
a crime boss. 
Short: join a 
criminal 
organisation 
Long: An international 
crime boss 
Short: become Sydney 
biggest illegal SP 
bookmaker and establish 
connection with the US 
Mafia 
Long: an 
international 
crime boss. 
 
Short: maintain 
control over 
organised crime 
rackets 
Resilience 
toward peer 
pressure 
High Low Low Low 
Self-acceptance  High Low High High 
Decision making  High Low Medium Medium 
Optimism  High Low High High 
Taking 
responsibility  
No No No No 
Independency  High Low Medium Medium 
Religious believe  Christian Christian Christian Christian 
Political view  None None None None 
 Identity 
Status 
Identity 
Status 
Identity Status Identity Status 
 Identity 
achieved 
Identity 
achieved 
Identity achieved Identity achieved 
4.7.2.5 Abraham Saffron’s leadership style and orientation 
In the first phase, Saffron did not lead and, did not have a leadership style and orientation, but 
from the second to the fourth phase, Saffron led with a charismatic leadership style with a 
personal and social orientation.  
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Throughout his leadership, Saffron led towards a clear vision and goal of becoming a 
successful businessman, and took all measures, legal and illegal, to achieve his vision 
(Reeves 2007b; Saffron 2009; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). In effect, Saffron’s behaviour of 
investing in social capital (such as connecting with all his customers including students) 
reflects his understanding of the value of social networks and the benefits they can bring in 
the future, as well as being a base of loyal customers (Reeves 2007b; Saffron 2009; Piper 
2010; McNab 2005). In other words, Saffron aimed at long-term rather than short-term goals. 
The success of Saffron’s business empire (Saffron was part-owner of over 100 businesses 
throughout his career) reflects the high efficiency of his followers and team (Saffron 2009; 
Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010). Where Saffron’s followers and associates broke the law, he 
would demonstrate his power and authority by providing protection and immunity from 
prosecution, as Saffron paid bribes to various police officers to turn a blind eye to his illegal 
activities (Reeves 2007b; Saffron 2009; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). In fact, Saffron never 
asked his followers or associates to carry out crime that did not already exist in the 
community (such as selling liquor illegally after hours). Through his power and authority, 
Saffron rewarded his followers with protection, immunity, and cash (Reeves 2007b; Saffron 
2009; Piper 2010; McNab 2005).   
Despite having wealth and power, Saffron was able to attract followers and associates 
through his charismatic personality, as he was well-known for his gentle manners and soft-
spoken voice (Reeves 2007b; Saffron 2009; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). In fact, Saffron would 
introduce himself to all his followers, customers and associates directly (Reeves 2007b; 
Saffron 2009; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). Saffron’s charismatic personality and direct 
relationships with his followers were aimed at building his public image, which he cared 
about greatly (Reeves 2007b; Saffron 2009; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). In fact Saffron 
launched ‘Persona’, a charity fundraiser, to rehabilitate his public image after the exposure of 
a sex scandal involving himself, his brother and a friend (Reeves 2007b; Saffron 2009; Piper 
2010; McNab 2005).      
In addition to caring for his public image, Saffron excelled in persuasion and negotiations, as 
he negotiated over one hundred business partnerships (Reeves 2007b; Saffron 2009; Piper 
2010; McNab 2005). As Saffron’s business expanded, his illegal operation expanded and, 
therefore, he delegated duties to his followers, such as Jimmy Anderson (later Saffron 
stopped working with Anderson due to trust issues) (Reeves 2007b; Saffron 2009; Piper 
2010; McNab 2005). Saffron’s decisions were all driven by the accomplishment of his vision. 
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In fact, Saffron was labelled ‘narcissistic’ by his son Allan, due to his obsession with his 
business vision and financial gain (Reeves 2007b; Saffron 2009; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). 
Saffron’s leadership orientation is defined as personal and social, as he donated to, and hosted 
charity fundraisers for various charity organisations in Australia and Israel, arguably to 
rehabilitate his scarred public image from various criminal accusations (Reeves 2007b; 
Saffron 2009; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). Based on Saffron’s leadership behaviour (modi 
intelligendi) as extracted from Reeves (2007b), Saffron (2009), Piper (2010) and McNab 
(2005), his leadership orientation was personal and social (modi essendi). Table 23 
summarises Saffron’s leadership style and orientation.    
Table 19 Abraham Saffron’s leadership style and orientation 
Phase One Phase Two Phase Three Phase Four 
Years Years Years Years 
1919-1941 1942-1952 1953-1979 1980-2006 
Leadership Style Leadership Style Leadership Style Leadership Style 
None Charismatic Charismatic Charismatic 
Leadership 
Orientation 
Leadership 
Orientation 
Leadership 
Orientation 
Leadership 
Orientation 
None Social and personal Social and personal Social and personal 
4.7.2.5 Abraham Saffron’s identity 
Saffron started out with a clear self-concept that remained with him his entire career, which 
was that of a businessman (Reeves 2007b; Saffron 2009; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). The goal 
Saffron strived to achieve was becoming a successful businessman in the long and short term 
(Reeves 2007b; Saffron 2009; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). Saffron gave in to peer-pressure 
throughout his career in addition to being blackmailed and the victim of extortion in crime 
(Reeves 2007b; Saffron 2009; Piper 2010; McNab 2005), however he was accepting of who 
he was: ‘an immoral businessman’. As a businessman and a criminal entrepreneur Saffron 
was a decision-maker with high levels of optimism, but never took responsibility for what 
happened to him or those around him during his career.  
 
Saffron was independent in his personal life, but relied heavily on his Jewish community in 
forming partnerships, particularly in Phase Two of his career (Reeves 2007b; Saffron 2009; 
Piper 2010; McNab 2005). Saffron was raised in a Jewish household and remained Jewish his 
entire career, but did not have a clear political view (Reeves 2007b; Saffron 2009; Piper 
2010; McNab 2005). Saffron retained the same identity as a Jewish businessman, and had an 
achieved identity status throughout his life. Based on the outcome of the identity 
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measurements (modi intelligendi) extracted from Reeves (2007b), Saffron (2009), Piper 
(2010) and McNab (2005), Saffron’s identity (modi essendi) was that of a Jewish 
businessman. Table 24 summarises Saffron’s identity and identity status throughout his life.     
Table 20 Abraham Saffron’s identity 
 Phase One  Phase Two  Phase Three  Phase Four  
Self-concept  Businessman Businessman Businessman Businessman 
Long and short 
term goals  
Become a 
successful 
businessman 
Short terms goal, 
gain immunity 
from corrupt 
police 
Member of 
organised crime 
Stay powerful 
Resilience 
toward peer 
pressure  
Low High High High 
Self-acceptance  High High High High 
Decision making  High High High High 
Optimism  High High High High 
Taking 
responsibility 
No No No No 
Independency  Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Religious 
believes  
Jewish Jewish Jewish Jewish 
Political views  None None None None 
 Identity Status Identity Status Identity Status Identity Status 
 Identity achieved Identity achieved Identity achieved Identity achieved 
4.7.2.6 Sir Robert Askin’s leadership style and orientation  
Throughout his career Askin led with a charismatic leadership style, however in Phases Two 
and Three Askin led towards a clear goal which was improving the living conditions of the 
middle-class through his vision of becoming a politician (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 
2007; Reading 1989). Once Askin developed his vision, everything he did was aimed at 
achieving his goal and vision. For instance, Askin attended various social events and 
interacted with local people, and argued that it was important to do so, as they all have 
influential votes that would strengthen his political position, which was the backbone and 
facilitator of his criminal activities (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989).  
As a leader, Askin placed great confidence in his followers (his cabinet members and staff) 
by giving them great freedom in running their divisions (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 
2007; Reading 1989). When expectations were met, Askin exercised his power by providing 
protection and immunity from prosecution for those who broke and violated the law, such as 
the police commissioner (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989). For 
crimes such as bribery and blackmail, Askin rewarded his followers and associates by 
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providing protection, and shared illegal income such as bribes (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; 
Goot 2007; Reading 1989). 
Askin was feared by other politicians as he would target them for blackmail (Hickie 1985; 
Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989). In addition to his power and authority, followers 
were also attracted to his charismatic personality (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; 
Reading 1989). His charismatic personality also brought attention to himself, which he loved, 
and used to his advantage to attract more voters (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; 
Reading 1989).  
As a leader, Askin was also well known as an excellent negotiator, and for being persuasive 
(Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989). In fact, Askin was able to turn 
Milton Morris, who hated and disagreed with his decisions, into an Askin admirer (Hickie 
1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989), however unlike McPherson and Saffron, 
Askin did not care a great deal about his public image, despite being accused of corruption 
(Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989). This reflects Askin’s focus and 
drive towards accomplishing his vision, regardless of the outcome. Askin’s leadership 
orientation was social and personal, as in his last year in office he voted for Tom Lewis as his 
successor instead of the more obvious successor Eric Willis, because Lewis promised him a 
knighthood (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989). As the leader of the 
Liberal Party, he was listed as Christian despite the fact that he was not very religious (Hickie 
1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989). Based on Askin’s leadership behaviour 
(modi intelligendi) which is drawn from Hickie (1985), Hancock (2006), Goot (2007) and 
Reading (1989), his leadership orientation was personal and social (modi essendi). Table 25 
summarises Askin’s leadership style and orientation.    
Table 21 Robin Askin’s leadership style and orientation 
Phase One Phase Two Phase Three Phase Four 
Years Years Years Years 
1907 – 1946 1947 – 1964 1965 – 1974 1975 – 1981 
Leadership Style Leadership Style Leadership Style Leadership Style 
Charismatic Charismatic Charismatic None 
Leadership 
Orientation 
Leadership 
Orientation 
Leadership 
Orientation 
Leadership 
Orientation 
Social and Personal Social and personal Social and personal Personal 
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4.7.2.7 Robin Askin’s identity 
Throughout the first phase of his career, Askin’s self-concept was that he was a ‘mixer’ as he 
mixed with different types and classes of people in his community (Hickie 1985; Hancock 
2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989). In Phase One, Askin did not have a defined vision, but had 
a vague goal of becoming a tradesman of some kind (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 
2007; Reading 1989).  
In Phases Two and Three, Askin had a clear vision and goal (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; 
Goot 2007; Reading 1989). As a leader, Askin had high resilience towards peer-pressure as 
he was known to take decisions independently (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; 
Reading 1989). In fact, when Askin disagreed with his peers, he would announce his cabinet 
decision to the media, prior to the cabinet reaching a decision (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; 
Goot 2007; Reading 1989). Askin was thus known to be a decision-maker (Hickie 1985; 
Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989). Throughout his career, Askin always showed 
optimism, despite the challenges and accusations he faced, and his self-concept as a 
successful professional politician stayed with him until his death (Hickie 1985; Hancock 
2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989). In Phase One Askin’s identity was that of a Liberal 
Christian mixer with an achieved identity status. In Phases Two, Three and Four Askin’s 
identity was that of a Christian Liberal politician, with an achieved identity status. In other 
words, based on the outcome of the identity measurement (modi intelligendi) extracted from 
Hickie (1985), Hancock (2006), Goot (2007) and Reading (1989), Askin’s identity (modi 
essendi) was that of a Liberal Christian politician. Table 26 summaries Askin’s identity and 
identity status.  
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Table 22 Robin Askin’s identity  
 Phase One Phase Two Phase Three Phase Three 
Self-concept A mixer A politician A professional 
politician 
A politician 
Short and long 
term goals 
Some kind of 
tradesman 
Become a leader 
of the liberal party 
Maintain power 
and stay in office 
None 
Resilience 
toward peer 
pressure 
Medium Medium High High 
Self-acceptance Medium High High High 
Decision making High High High High 
Optimism Medium High High Low 
Taking 
responsibility 
Medium Low Low Low 
Independency High Medium High High 
Religious 
believes 
Christian Christian Christian Christian 
Political view Liberal Liberal Liberal Liberal 
 Identity Status Identity Status Identity Status Identity Status 
 Identity achieved Identity achieved Identity achieved Identity achieved 
 
4.8 Modus essendi summary  
All four criminal entrepreneurs had a clear vision during their criminal careers. The visions 
described here were drawn from clear statements provided by the criminal entrepreneurs, 
such as ‘I wanted to be a crook’ which is modi essendi. Behaviours such as engaging in crime 
were the criminal entrepreneur’s interpretation of their vision, which is modi intelligendi. The 
same approach was applied to the criminal entrepreneur’s leadership style and orientation.  
The leadership style of the criminal entrepreneurs was charismatic with personal orientation 
(the leadership orientation of Saffron and Askin was personal and social) which is the modi 
essendi. The criminal entrepreneurs fulfilled 28 out 30 of Strange and Mumford’s (2002) 
charismatic leadership, personal and social orientation requirements. McPherson fulfilled all 
the requirements for a charismatic leader with personal orientation, except followers being 
attracted to him and excelling in persuasion. This thesis argues that his followers were 
attracted to the privileges and benefits of being part of his criminal organisation rather than to 
him. McPherson also intimidated others rather than persuaded them. Freeman fulfilled all 
requirements for charismatic leadership with personal orientation with the exception of 
followers being attracted to him. As with McPherson, this thesis argues that his followers 
were attracted to the privileges and rewards of working with Freeman rather than being 
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attracted to him. Saffron fulfilled all the requirements of a charismatic leader with personal 
and social orientation. Askin fulfilled all requirements of a charismatic leader with personal 
and social with the exception of caring for his public image. A criminal entrepreneur’s 
leadership is their modi essendi, and their behaviour as charismatic leaders is their modi 
intelligendi. The same approach was applied to the identity of the criminal entrepreneurs. 
As with vision, the self-conception of the criminal entrepreneur was stated as ‘I am a 
businessman’ which is their modi essendi. Owning and running a business was their 
interpretation of their self-conception, which is modi intelligendi. With modi essendi and 
modi intelligendi this thesis has established modi significandi which is the requirements to 
have modus essendi.  
The four criminal entrepreneurs had different visions and identities, they were consistent in 
having a vision, charismatic leadership and an achieved identity status in Phases Two and 
Three. The importance of understanding the criminal entrepreneurs’ modus essendi and in 
particular their identity is to identify whether they plan and intentionally aimed to get 
involved in crime. Some criminal entrepreneurs do not plan to get involved in crime such as 
the case of Saffron who’s involved in crime was driven by financial gain and expanding his 
business. Saffron started his criminal career bribing police officers so he could keep his 
business operating in addition to expanding it. On the other hand, McPherson and Freeman 
had always aimed to be gangsters and criminals and identified themselves as criminals and 
gangsters. By examining the identity of the criminal entrepreneurs, the author can have an 
insight on how the criminal entrepreneurs viewed themselves, which can explain some of 
their behaviours. Furthermore, the changes in the identity can also provide an insight to what 
could change their identity and how they view themselves. Although, the information on 
identity are brief, it can provide an insight into further research on how criminal 
entrepreneurs view themselves and how those whom view themselves as criminal or non-
criminal behave or operate and how do they justify their behaviours. The next section will 
outline the criminal entrepreneurs featured in this study modus operandi.      
4.9 Modus Operandi 
Modus operandi is the operational approach followed by the four criminal entrepreneurs 
featured in this study throughout their careers, as described in this section. Modus operandi is 
extracted based on an event, which is an incident or behaviour that had a significant positive 
or negative influence on or contribution to the criminal entrepreneur’s career and/or life. The 
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events are described through characters who were involved in the incident; their role, ‘what’ 
the event was, where it occurred (what city, state and country); ‘why’, which is the motive 
and/or the explanation for the event; and ‘how’ which provides detail of how the event took 
place. Modus operandi is described based on the four phases of the criminal entrepreneur’s 
life described earlier.      
4.10 McPherson’s modus operandi 
In Phase One, McPherson’s modus operandi reflected the vision of a crime leader, as he 
granted other criminals favours such as bailing them out of prison to gain their loyalty and 
fellowship. As shown in Table 27, McPherson engaged in various criminal activities. Early in 
Phase One, McPherson was engaged in random criminal activities, such as stealing and 
receiving stolen goods, which landed him in prison (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; 
Small and Gilling 2009). After prison, McPherson collaborated with corrupt police, by 
providing information about other criminal activities in the area (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; 
Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009). The motive behind McPherson’s collaboration with the 
police was to protect himself, as he was abused by other criminals in prison, and to eliminate 
competitors (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009). In exchange for 
the information McPherson provided, the corrupt police provided him with immunity by 
turning a blind eye to his petty crimes (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and 
Gilling 2009).  
The outcome of McPherson’s modus operandi in working with corrupt police and providing 
information was that he gained more enemies and was labelled as untrustworthy in the 
criminal milieu (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009). This label 
is why McPherson tried to build the loyalty and trust of other petty criminals by granting 
favours such as bailing them out of prison and providing them with immunity for their petty 
crimes (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009). By bailing other 
criminals out of prison and arranging immunity, McPherson showed the first signs of his 
vision of becoming a crime leader and the modus operandi toward it. 
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Table 23 Leonard McPherson’s Phase One modus operandi  
Year Who What Where Why How Comments 
1932 McPherson Stealing Sydney Unknown Unknown  
1934 McPherson Minor stealing 
charges 
Sydney Unknown Unknown  
1938 McPherson Charged with 
avoiding one penny 
tram fare 
Sydney Unknown Unknown Felt embarrassed as 
he considered himself 
a gang leader 
1940 McPherson Avoided going to 
war in Germany 
Sydney Unknown His father found him a 
job at the repair yard 
for the Australian 
sloops, where the 
dock’s employees 
were exempt from 
military call-up. 
 
1946 McPherson Fined for stolen 
goods found in his 
custody 
Sydney Unknown Unknown  
1946 McPherson Guilty of receiving 
stolen goods 
Sydney Unknown Unknown Sentenced to 12 
months hard labour at 
Long Bay 
1946 John Frederick Wanted McPherson 
belted 
McPherson was 
causing trouble 
McPherson was scared of 
being harassed or hurt in 
prison 
McPherson threatens 
anyone who harassed 
him, to open his head 
up from behind. 
 
1947 John Henry, Joey 
Hollibone and 
Martin Goode 
They raped a 
woman pregnant 
with McPherson’s 
child. 
Sydney McPherson provided 
information about them to 
the police. 
  
1947 McPherson Told the police 
about criminal 
activities in the 
area. 
Sydney To eliminate the 
competition, establishing 
protection from other 
criminals, forming a bond 
Providing information 
to selected police. 
 
Surrounding himself 
McPherson created 
many enemies by 
informing on other 
criminals. 
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with corrupt police, and 
gaining immunity from the 
police 
with bodyguards. 
1947 McPherson Granting favours to 
petty criminals 
Sydney To secure their loyalty Asking the police to 
turn their backs on 
their petty criminal 
activities. 
 
Bailing them out of 
jail if they got caught 
 
 References  
 (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Bottom 1979; Deans 2010; Reeves 2011) 
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In Phase Two, McPherson’s vision was becoming a crime boss like Al Capone (Reeves 
2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009), and his modus operandi was aimed 
at accomplishing this vision, as shown in Table 28. To accomplish the vision, McPherson had 
to stay out of prison, and therefore McPherson bought his criminal files through his police 
connections, so they would not be used against him in court (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 
2010; Small and Gilling 2009). Due to his criminal record, however, McPherson had to forge 
his travel documents to be granted a travel visa to the United States (Reeves 2007a; Deans 
2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009). The aim of the trip was to establish connections 
with the US Mafia (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009). 
McPherson failed in establishing connections with US mafia on this trip (Reeves 2007a; 
Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009). On his return, McPherson carried out a 
number of crimes aimed at establishing his reputation as a crime leader and gaining income 
(Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009), but the criminal activities 
landed McPherson in prison (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009).   
On his release, McPherson worked in a motel to fulfil his parole conditions (Reeves 2007a; 
Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009). In a brainstorming session while working in 
the motel, McPherson’s nephew suggested building additional rooms on the roof of the motel 
as a safe-haven for wanted criminals on the run (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; 
Small and Gilling 2009). The safe-haven complemented McPherson’s ‘fizzing’ modus 
operandi, as by hosting wanted criminals at large, he controlled critical information that was 
wanted by the police (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009). In 
other words, the safe-haven enabled McPherson to become a broker as he controlled valuable 
information, which in effect made McPherson valuable to the police, as he could provide 
them access to valuable information on criminals at large in Sydney. 
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Table 24 Leonard McPherson’s Phase Two modus operandi 
Year Who What Where Why How Comments 
1950s McPherson Bought his criminal files Sydney So they would not 
be used against him 
in court 
Through 
corrupt police 
 
1952 McPherson, Gilbert 
Brice Griffith, including 
two others 
Charged with forging a 
document to wit a passport 
application 
From 
Sydney to 
the US 
Forming 
connection with the 
US Mafia 
 It was a failed attempt. 
1953 McPherson and John 
Henry Hutchinson 
Breaking and entering with 
the intention of stealing 
Sydney Stealing With tools and 
explosives 
They were caught red handed, 
charged and sentence to 3.5 years 
in Long Bay Prison 
1954 McPherson Wrote a clandestine letter and 
attempted to pass it out of jail 
Sydney, 
Long Bay 
Prison 
 Unknown Failed 
1955 McPherson Charged with 3 counts of 
possession of unlicensed 
pistol 
While he 
was in 
prison 
  He was found guilty and sentence 
to 12 months for each charge. 
1956 McPherson and his 
nephew Norman Foster 
Built a safe house for 
criminals on the run 
On the roof 
of a motel, 
Sydney 
McPherson had to 
fulfil his parole by 
working at the 
motel. McPherson 
would have his 
finger on the pulse 
of crime. 
They built 
additional 
rooms on the 
roof. 
 
1956 McPherson Telling selective corrupt 
police about criminals on the 
run, staying at his hotel. 
Sydney In exchange for 
immunity. 
Establishing 
agreement 
between 
McPherson 
and corrupt 
police 
It was the beginning of a proper 
criminal network 
References  
(Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009) 
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In the third phase, McPherson’s modus operandi towards accomplishing his vision of 
becoming a crime leader like Al Capone included murder, providing protection, and running 
illegal businesses, including prostitution rackets (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; 
Small and Gilling 2009). As McPherson occupied a valuable brokerage position, corrupt 
police preferred collaborating with McPherson instead of arresting him (Reeves 2007a; 
Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009). The first to collaborate with McPherson 
was corrupt detective Ray Kelly (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 
2009). McPherson provided information for Kelly to make an arrest in exchange for 
providing protection for McPherson and his associates for their criminal activities (Reeves 
2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009).  
McPherson expanded his modus operandi to include murder. The murder was aimed at other 
criminals who challenged or conspired to murder or hurt McPherson (Reeves 2007a; Deans 
2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009). McPherson resorted to murder to protect himself 
(Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009), but it also spread fear 
among those who conspired against him (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and 
Gilling 2009). Murder allowed McPherson to establish his status as a crime leader in Sydney 
(Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009). The modus operandi of 
McPherson’s murders also suggests an agreement between him and the police (Reeves 2007a; 
Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009).  
McPherson mostly murdered vicious criminals (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small 
and Gilling 2009). By murdering other criminals, the public were relieved rather than 
concerned (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009). The public and 
the police also argued that those who were murdered were murdered for the crime they had 
committed (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009). In other words, 
McPherson’s murders did not reflect badly on the police nor the political party in office 
(Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009). 
Where the victims of the murderer were not vicious criminals, McPherson’s modus operandi 
was to dump the victim’s alive far into the ocean, without harming them physically so no 
marks would appear on the bodies if they were discovered (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 
2010; Small and Gilling 2009). In addition to dumping live victims into the ocean, 
McPherson’s murder modus operandi included cremating the victims’ bodies after they were 
murdered so it would be hard to identify them, and therefore tracing the murder back to him 
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(Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009). The changes in 
McPherson’s murder modus operandi reflect a change in his immunity arrangement, and 
suggest that his corrupt police connection was unable to provide protection. This conclusion 
is reached as McPherson murdered some of his victims early in Phase Three in public without 
disposing of the bodies, as his corrupt police connection would steer the investigation away 
from him.  
In addition to murder, McPherson provided protection to various illegal clubs, through his 
corrupt police connections (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009). 
The motive behind his protection racket in the clubs was to gain illegal income and control 
the organised crime scene in Sydney (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and 
Gilling 2009). The protection arrangement for the clubs also reflects his brokerage position, 
as McPherson was providing an exclusive service that corrupt police channelled through him 
(Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009). McPherson also extorted 
payment from businesses as protection from other criminals in the area, including himself 
(Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009).            
In addition to murder, protection and extortion, McPherson operated prostitution rackets 
(Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009). McPherson imported and 
exported sex workers in and out of Australia, and also had a prostitution racket in Manila 
(Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009). The white slavery 
operations were intended to bring in illegal income (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; 
Small and Gilling 2009). Operating in vice at an international level also fulfilled 
McPherson’s vision of being an organised crime leader like Al Capone (Reeves 2007a; Deans 
2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009). Using the media was another modus operandi that 
McPherson adapted to reach Al Capone’s status (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; 
Small and Gilling 2009).  
McPherson had journalists who worked with him in establishing his image as a crime leader 
(Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009). During the third phase of 
McPherson’s criminal career, journalists who featured McPherson in their stories sent him a 
copy of the article prior to publishing the story (Reeves 2007a). They had to obtain 
McPherson’s permission before featuring him in their stories (Reeves 2007a). McPherson 
used journalists to damage the reputation of those who hindered his operations, including 
honest police and judges (Reeves 2007a).  
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It is clear from McPherson’s modus operandi that he was motivated and dedicated to 
accomplishing his vision. The modus operandi on which McPherson focused included 
murder, protection, extortion, white slavery, and using the media (Reeves 2007a; Deans 
2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009). McPherson’s modus operandi was facilitated 
through his brokerage position. Table 29 summarises McPherson’s modus operandi in Phase 
Three. McPherson continued using brokerage towards the end of his criminal career, but it 
was not successful.  
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Table 25 Leonard McPherson’s Phase Three modus operandi 
Year What Who Where Why How Comments 
1959 The murder of 
Joey Manners 
George Joseph 
Hackett 
Sydney McPherson was not 
involved in the murder 
but arranged brokerage. 
The eye witness did not show 
up in court and left his job, 
due to McPherson’s 
intimidation 
Obstruction of justice, 
conducted by McPherson 
1959 The murder of 
Hackett 
McPherson, Ray 
and Clayton 
Sydney  Clayton arranged it, 
McPherson and Ray shot 
Hackett 
 
1959 Getting away 
with the murder 
of Hackett 
McPherson, “The 
Major” in prison, 
Chris Campbell, 
Phil Roach, two 
paid witness, Ray 
Kelly and Robin 
Askin 
Sydney To get away with 
murder 
McPherson reached out to the 
major in Prison who reached 
to Chris Campbell reach to 
the lawyer Phil Roach. 
 
Paid for two witnesses. Pulled 
strings with Ray Kelly, and 
paid Robin Askin $10000. 
By the end, McPherson had 
established himself as a 
well-connected and a 
powerful criminal. 
1959 The failed 
attempt of 
murdering John 
Joseph Unwin 
McPherson and 
Snowy Rayner 
(also known as 
Snowy) 
Sydney  Rayner was driving and 
McPherson did the shooting 
Unwin shot Rayner in the 
shoulder. 
 
McPherson, Rayner and 
Unwin were charged with a 
range of offences. 
McPherson was favoured 
and police made minimum 
efforts to collect evidence, 
charges against McPherson 
dropped. 
 
Unwin refused to say 
anything that would 
incriminate McPherson. 
1950s 
– 
Protection of 
white slavery 
McPherson and a 
man with Hong 
Sydney To kill the competition 
and make sure the 
They brought women into 
Australia, not only Asians but 
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1960s gangs Kong origins with 
an Australian 
accent 
authorities did not 
interrupt 
also exporting Australian 
women to Saud Arabia 
1960 McPherson 
threatened to split 
his wife in half. 
McPherson Sydney McPherson thought she 
was having an affair 
Tied one leg to a tree and the 
other to his car. 
 
1960 McPherson 
assaulted his wife 
McPherson Sydney McPherson’s dinner 
was late. 
Hit her with his gun She pressed charges, and 
Ray Kelly got involved and 
she dropped the charges. 
1962 Arrested for 
consorting with 
known criminals 
McPherson, 
arrested by 
Chaseling and 
Keith Kelly – 
young detectives 
from the 
consorting squad. 
Sydney For consorting with 
known criminals 
They were asked to release 
McPherson at once by Ray 
Kelly, over the radio 
 
1962 Visiting 
newcomers into 
the criminal 
milieu. 
McPherson Sydney For those who did not 
pay respect to 
McPherson 
Sometimes McPherson would 
make the visit himself, on 
others he would sent someone 
to represent him. 
His visits were often 
accompanied by violence. 
1963 The murder of 
‘pretty boy’ 
Robert James 
Walker 
McPherson, Stan 
Smith, and a 
prostitute 
Sydney Walker assaulted Stan 
Smith 
The prostitute set Walker up, 
by calling Smith when 
Walker left her place, Smith 
was driving and McPherson 
shot him with an Owen sub-
machine gun 
After the murder, there were 
no ties to McPherson. 
1964 Framing 
Raymond 
‘Ducky’ 
O’Connor for the 
murder of ‘pretty 
boy’ Robert 
James Walker 
McPherson, Ray 
Kelly and 
Raymond 
‘Ducky’ 
O’Connor 
Sydney Raymond O’Connor 
always challenged 
McPherson, and to 
teach him a lesson. 
McPherson set him up, and 
Ray Kelly framed him and 
informed on him. 
 
1964 The murder of McPherson Sydney A conflict over the While Bourke was entering Sources close to Ray Kelly 
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Charlie Bourke protection of Riley’s 
new baccarat club. Plus 
Bourke was stepping 
over some of 
McPherson protection 
territories. 
his home, a man opened fire 
from the bushes and killed 
him with 10 shots, then came 
close to the body and fired 
another 10 shots. 
confirmed that the murder 
was carried out by 
McPherson. Again, no 
traces or motives behind the 
murder were found by the 
police and no fingers were 
pointed at McPherson, 
courtesy of Ray Kelly. 
1965 The shooting of 
Robert Lawrence 
‘Jacky’ Steele 
McPherson, 
Raymond 
O’Connor, Stan 
Smith and John 
Andrew Stuart 
Sydney Oz magazine listed 
McPherson as number 
2 in the underworld, 
and Steele as number 1. 
McPherson was driven 
by his ego. 
Used a real or a clone CIB 
car, all member were wearing 
police detective hats. 
McPherson was the brains 
behind the shooting but was 
not in the car. 
McPherson and his 
associates had no less than 
eight rehearsals before 
carrying the shooting. 
1965 Visited Richard 
Neville, the 
author of the 
article that listed 
McPherson as 
number 2 of the 
crime world 
McPherson Sydney McPherson wanted to 
make sure that the 
article was not written 
by a rival enemy. 
McPherson visited him in 
person 
 
1965 Using the media 
to his own 
advantage 
McPherson Sydney If McPherson needed 
publicity, or planned a 
damaging story about 
an opponent such as an 
honest policeman, a 
politician, a judge or 
another criminal. 
  
1965 Immunity McPherson and 
Ray Kelly 
Sydney To provide information 
to corrupt police and 
politicians, to keep 
arrests high so 
politicians and curious 
journalists stop asking 
questions. 
McPherson provides 
information about criminals 
and criminal activities in the 
area and Ray Kelly provides 
protection 
The better the information 
McPherson provided, the 
higher up the corruption 
chain he climbed. 
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1966 Informed on 
Ryan and Walker 
McPherson and 
Ray Kelly 
Sydney They did not have the 
money to pay for the 
forged passports 
McPherson organised 
for them, and they were 
going to carry out 
operations in Sydney to 
pay McPherson. 
McPherson told Ray Kelly 
who made the arrest and 
looked like a hero, as both 
were wanted and on the run. 
 
1967 The cell trial of 
‘Ducky’ 
O’Connor 
McPherson Billy Walsh’s 
cell in prison, 
Sydney 
O’Connor was accused 
of hating McPherson 
and wanting him dead 
and was sentenced to 
death. 
O’Connor was 
conspiring with Chicka 
Reeves to knock 
McPherson. 
They wanted to control 
the criminal milieu. 
McPherson summoned other 
prisoners into Walsh’s cell. 
McPherson explained in 
simple terms to the invited 
prisoners that they were 
witnesses, and that O’Connor 
was the person who stood 
accused of ‘conspiring with 
Chicka Reeves to kill 
McPherson. 
 
1967 The murder of 
‘Ducky’ 
O’Connor 
McPherson, 
Jackie Clark, 
William, detective 
sergeant Morrie 
Wild of CIB and 
another detective. 
In a nightclub in 
Sydney, the 
Latin Quarter 
operated by 
Sammy Lee and 
gambler Reg 
Boom. 
For conspiring to kill 
McPherson. 
He was shot in public in the 
nightclub. There are different 
stories about what exactly 
happened, but McPherson 
may have walked up to his 
table and shot him. The lights 
were dimmed and there was 
loud music, and chaos. 
 
1967 The murder of 
Maurice Bernard 
‘Barney’ Ryan 
By four men, 
ordered by 
McPherson 
Sydney. 
He was given a 
warning at a 
kangaroo court 
by McPherson 
He threatened to knock 
McPherson out. 
Four men hid in the shrubbery 
at Ryan’s home after dark 
awaiting his arrival. 
Gave an order to kill him, 
despite the fact that he 
forgave him, or perhaps 
McPherson lied to him. 
Ryan was friends with 
Chicka Reeves and 
O’Connor. The 
investigation found no 
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motives or clues to help 
them solve the case. 
1968 McPherson 
accused of drug 
dealing 
Accused by Bob 
Bottom 
Sydney Dealing in drugs and 
corruption. 
An article was written in the 
Daily Mirror 
McPherson had a 
conversation with Bottom 
that concluded with 
McPherson stating he was 
not involved in drugs. 
1969 McPherson was 
charged with 
consorting with 
criminals 
By Sergeant Greg 
Field 
Sydney For consorting with 
criminals between 
1968 and 1969 
Mysteriously McPherson 
managed to escape with only 
minor charges 
 
1960s Running 
prostitution 
rackets in Manila  
McPherson Manila  He was importing young 
women into Australia from 
the Philippines and other 
countries 
 
1972 Convincing the 
world he is 
innocent 
McPherson On the radio 2U, 
Sydney 
He was accused of 
bring crime to the clubs 
by a royal commission 
Conspiring with Wally Dean. 
McPherson was also 
providing protection from 
himself and other criminals in 
the area 
Abe Saffron also paid 
McPherson for protection. 
1970s Arrested McPherson Sydney Collecting protection 
money from a strip 
joint owned by Tibby 
Black 
McPherson argued that Tibby 
arranged for McPherson to 
meet a man who could take 
him to a place where he can 
buy things more cheaply, 
which is why he had cash on 
him 
 
1972 Provided 
protection for the 
33 Club and the 
Palace 
McPherson and 
Wally Dena 
Sydney Provided protection 
from himself and other 
criminals in the area 
McPherson was banned from 
the 33 Club, so he arranged 
for Wally Dean to collect the 
protection money 
 
1974 The murder of 
Jackie Clark 
Murderer is 
unknown, the 
order was given 
Sydney He bragged about one 
day “taking out” 
McPherson, also he 
He was in a bar with Philip 
Birnie, Birnie’s wife and four 
hotel staff. 
Mr Birnie quickly assured 
the police that no one saw 
the gunman. 
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by McPherson may have started a 
standover business in 
McPherson territory 
 
McPherson gave the order to 
kill him 
 
He was the last to be 
gunned in public. 
After 
1974 
Changed his  
method of 
removing bodies 
McPherson, Sydney So no traces can be 
found, more effective 
and economical 
Dumping undesirables into 
the ocean carried out by Tim 
Bristow. 
 
Also, dual burial and 
cremations 
One of the victims was Mad 
Dog Miller associates. 
1975 Arrested in the 
Philippines 
McPherson Philippines Accused of conspiring 
to murder the President 
of the Philippines, 
Ferdinand Marcos 
 An article was published in 
the Sunday Mirror, by 
Gordon MacGregor, the 
editor ran the article by 
McPherson first before 
publishing it, which was the 
norm at the time. 
1970s Liquor license 
transfer 
McPherson Suburbs of 
Sydney 
   
1970s 
and 
1980s 
Kept hard cash at 
home 
McPherson At home, 
Sydney 
For himself, gambling 
and bailing others 
  
1985  Standover  McPherson  Sydney  Richard Knebel sold a 
home building 
company, but kept part 
of it. The new owner 
wanted him gone. 
McPherson spoke to and 
intimidated Knebel 
There is not strong evidence 
for this story. 
 Providing 
information  
McPherson to  
Ray Kelly  
Sydney  To secure immunity  McPherson used a reel-to-reel 
tape recorder to compile a 
monthly report of criminal 
activities in Sydney. 
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In the fourth phase, McPherson’s only crime modus operandi was arranging the assault of 
Darron Burt who had a conflict with his son (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small 
and Gilling 2009). McPherson was charged and sent to prison (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; 
Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009), which suggests that he had lost his immunity and 
protection provider, and therefore his brokerage position with the police. Table 30 
summarises Phase Four of McPherson’s modus operandi.                       
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Table 26 McPherson Phase Four modus operandi 
Year What Who Where Why How Comments 
1991 Darron Burt 
was assaulted 
McPherson 
gave the order 
Sydney Due to Burt resigning from 
liquor importing company 
owned by Danny McPherson, 
Leonard McPherson’s son. 
Branko Balic arranged the assault, 
Nicholas Constantin and Jim 
Taousanis carried out the assault, on 
orders given by McPherson 
McPherson was 
charged with the 
assault. 
1990s Doing 
volunteer work 
McPherson Sydney at the 
homeless 
shelter 
To rehabilitate his poor 
image and reputation.   
Serving dinner to the homeless Seeking sympathy from 
the court 
1994 Sentenced to 4 
years in prison 
McPherson Sydney The assault on Darren Burt  He was eligible for 
parole in 2.5 years due 
to his health condition. 
1996 The death of 
McPherson 
McPherson In prison, 
Sydney 
Due to health condition A heart attack while talking to his 
wife on the phone 
 
References  
(Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010; Small and Gilling 2009) 
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4.11 Freeman’s modus operandi  
In Phase One, Freeman’s approach to achieving his vision of becoming an influential and 
feared criminal was stealing (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). In 
addition to stealing, Freeman was involved in a number of robberies in and outside Sydney, 
which he was charged with in court (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). 
As well as the robberies and theft charges, Freeman was charged with the possession of an 
unlicensed pistol (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). In Phase One, 
Freeman’s modus operandi does not reflect a brokerage nor a central position. His main 
modus operandi was committing crimes solo or in collaboration for personal gain, and 
building a reputation as a criminal (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010), 
which reflects lower self-control as shown in Table 31.   
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Table 27 George Freeman’s modus operandi Phase One 
Year What Who Where Why How Comments  
At a 
young 
age 
Stealing Freeman Sydney  Stealing small items from 
shops such as biscuits from 
a local factory 
 
1947 Charged with the possession 
of unlicensed pistol 
Freeman Sydney    
1947 Stole unattended parked car 
and removed some crockery 
and ornaments from the boot 
and sold them to a regular 
receiver 
Freeman Sydney    
1947 Charged in court Freeman Sydney Stole a sheath knife, fountain pens 
and some cash 
  
1951 Received three convictions Freeman Two outside 
Sydney and 
one in Sydney 
The first charge was stealing, the 
second was evading train fare, and 
third was using foul language 
  
1951 Sent to ‘the naughty house’ 
(a juvenile prison) 
Freeman Sydney Unlicensed driver in a smash-and-
grab raid and faced the court on 
charges of breaking and entering, 
stealing, illegal use of a motor 
vehicle, and stealing a car radio and 
electric fan 
  
After 
prison 
Stealing Freeman 
and Stan 
Smith 
Sydney    
1954 Charged with breaking and 
entering and auto theft 
Freeman Sydney    
On his 
release 
from 
prison 
Carried out numerous 
robberies 
Freeman NSW and ACT  Stealing property valued at 
many thousands of dollars. 
At times, safes were opened 
on the premises or 
transported away and later 
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opened in bushland with 
explosive charges. 
Stolen motor vehicles were 
frequently used as a means 
of transport. 
1955 Charged with and convicted 
of possessing house-
breaking implements 
Freeman Melbourne    
Reference 
(Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010) 
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In the second phase, Freeman’s modus operandi in achieving his vision of becoming a 
member of organised crime and an illegal SP bookie included developing his criminal human 
capital and collaborating with other criminals (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; 
Deans 2010). In the second phase, Freeman spent time in prison for robbery (Freeman 1988; 
Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). In prison, Freeman was disobedient to prison guards 
and uncooperative (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010), which reflects 
lower self-control. Due to Freeman’s disobedience, the prison guards abused him in prison, 
and he had an unpleasant experience (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010).  
In effect, Freeman changed his modus operandi to become collaborative and became an SP 
bookie in prison (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). Freeman rejected a 
fizzing offer from corrupt detective Fred Krahe, based on advice from McPherson (Freeman 
1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). Freeman also feared being extorted by Krahe 
(Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011). 
On his release, Freeman worked as a bodyguard for an SP bookie, ‘The Butcher’, collecting 
money from losing punters (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). Freeman 
argued that ‘The Butcher’ taught him the art of SP booking and picking winners (Freeman 
1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). In the second phase, Freeman’s modus operandi 
was developing human and social capital (including criminal capital) to achieve his vision. 
Table 32 summarises Freeman’s modus operandi in Phase Two.   
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Table 28 George Freeman’s modus operandi Phase Two 
Year What Who Where Why How Comments 
1957 Caught after robbing two 
shops 
Freeman and 
Rowntree 
brothers 
    
1959 Introduced to the art of 
fizzing 
To Freeman by 
detective 
Frederick Krahe 
In prison To gain 
information 
He rejected the proposal 
based on advice from 
McPherson 
According to Freeman, once Krahe 
arrested you, the payments start for 
bail, reduced sentences and verbal 
evidence or not giving evidence. 
1959 Stopped disobeying prison 
guards 
Freeman In prison It was 
ineffective 
Started cooperating with 
prison guards. 
 
1959 Became the jail bookie Freeman In prison  Taking bets of ‘a shilling, 
half an ounce of tobacco, 
food, whatever was 
available 
 
Mid-
1960s 
Illegally taking bets on 
horseracing, widely known 
as starting price (SP) 
bookmaking 
Freeman Sydney It was a less 
illegal activity 
  
1963 Went into partnership with 
an SP bookie 
Freeman with 
an SP bookie 
Henson 
Park Hotel, 
Sydney 
  Freeman did not give up stealing, he 
returned to it as his SP bookmaking 
was not an instance success. 
1963 Worked as a body guard for 
an SP bookie who also 
worked as a butcher 
Freeman Sydney  Freeman would collect 
debt from losing punters. 
Freeman also claimed that the 
butcher taught him how to pick 
winners 
Reference 
(Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010) 
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In the third phase, Freeman’s modus operandi towards accomplishing his vision of becoming 
an elite organised crime leader included SP bookmaking, robberies and establishing 
connections with the US Mafia (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). In the 
third phase, Freeman developed human capital in SP bookmaking and standing-over losing 
punters (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). Freeman developed social 
and criminal capital in the SP bookmaking field (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; 
Deans 2010). After the death of his SP mentor, Freeman partnered with a successful SP 
bookie and started his SP bookmaking operations (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; 
Deans 2010). Freeman joined McPherson to access his protection arrangements (Freeman 
1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). 
Freeman’s arrangement with McPherson placed him in a brokerage position, as he also 
provided protection to a number of SP bookies who worked in partnership with him (Freeman 
1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). The structure of Freeman’s SP bookie 
arrangement was: Freeman provided protection for selected bookies (Freeman 1988; Reeves 
2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010); Freeman was protected by McPherson (Freeman 1988; 
Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010); McPherson was protected by corrupt police, including 
the police commissioner (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010); and the 
police including the police commissioner were protected by the authoritative personnel in the 
government, including the Premier (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010).  
In addition to his successful SP bookmaking operations, Freeman was collaborating with 
members of the US Mafia to import Bally Poker machines after driving local poker machine 
manufacturers out of business (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). Despite 
his success Freeman continued to occasionally carry out robberies (Freeman 1988; Reeves 
2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010) as shown in Table 33. Freeman’s success also continued in 
Phase Four.  
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Table 29 George Freeman’s modus operandi Phase Three  
Year What Who Where Why How Comments 
1967 Teamed up with a major 
bookie 
Freeman teamed up with Mick 
Bartley, also known as ‘Deaf 
Mick’ 
Sydney To start a successful 
SP bookmaking 
business 
After the death of his SP 
mentor, the Butcher 
 
1967 Robberies Freeman and associates Sydney, 
stores before 
and during 
Christmas 
time 
High shopping 
season 
They would hide inside the 
store, before closing time, 
and after midnight, they 
would crack the safe. 
They would find 
more money than 
they imagined. 
The operations 
were conducted 
in Perth, and they 
were all arrested 
in the airport 
before leaving 
Perth. 
1967 Contacting the Chicago 
mafia 
Freeman and Smith United 
States 
To expand the 
criminal empire of 
McPherson and 
Freeman. 
McPherson could 
not go to the US 
due to his criminal 
record 
Freeman and Stan Smith 
were sent by McPherson. 
 
1967 Obtaining a forged 
passport 
Freeman and Stan Smith Sydney They could not 
obtain visas with 
their current 
passports and 
criminal records 
Leo ‘The Liar’ Callaghan 
provided the forged 
passports 
 
1967 McPherson was not 
happy with the forged 
passport provided by 
Leo, and asked Freeman 
and Smith to apply with 
their real passports 
Freeman, Smith and McPherson Sydney The quality of the 
forged passport 
were not good 
Freeman and Smith 
applied for real passports 
using aliases. 
Freeman’s alias was 
Kenneth Laurence Keane. 
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1967 Ronnie Lee informed 
Joseph Dan Testa on 
Freeman and Smith 
Freeman, Smith, Ronnie Lee and 
Joseph Dan Testa 
Chicago, 
United 
States 
To host Freeman 
and Smith 
  
1968 Shoplifting Freeman and Smith Los Angeles    
1968 The trip to the United 
States was a success 
Freeman, Smith and McPherson Sydney and 
United 
States 
Great connections 
were made, with the 
right criminals 
McPherson saw the trip as 
successful, as seeds were 
planted for expansion, and 
it would bear fruits later 
 
 Freeman ran a house in 
Maroubra Junctio, where 
bets were collated from 
SP bookies all over 
Sydney. During this time 
Freeman controlled up 
600 phone lines during 
busy race days 
Freeman Sydney Decided to 
specialise 
Freeman must have had 
connections with the 
Postmaster General’s 
Department to have all 
these phones lines (over 
20) connected to one place. 
 
 Notes: The operators in the pubs would invariably retain a few of the bets placed with them – their own little gamble – but all the rest of the money 
that had been lost by the punters, minus a percentage for the operator, was passed up the line. Some of it went right to the top. Freeman would take a 
slice for himself and McPherson before handing over the rest to the corrupt police who provided protection for the racket and to Robin Askin, the 
politician who had once been an illegal SP bookie himself and now remained loyal to those still in the game. 
1969 Hosted Joes Testa when 
he came to Australia 
Freeman and Joe Testa Sydney Testa came to 
supply the Bally 
poker machines. 
Local criminals would be 
the exclusive supplier of 
Bally machines, after 
driving local 
manufacturers out of 
business. 
 
1970 Unpaid tax bill of 
$23,000 (equivalent of 
$237,706 today) 
Freeman and his accountant Sydney  His accountant, who was 
engineering international 
money-laundering and tax 
avoidance scams for 
Freeman, was able to 
negotiate a settlement of 
around $12,000 
(equivalent of $124,020 
today) 
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1971 Freeman set up a 
construction company 
called Grant 
Construction 
Freeman in partnership with Joes 
Testa 
Sydney To build a high rise 
building 
The company bought three 
old blocks of flats in 
Double Bay and replaced 
them with high-rise units. 
The local council rejected 
the plan and they sold the 
blocks for almost nothing. 
The mistake could have 
been avoided had they 
simply checked the 
building height regulations 
in the area. 
It was during Joe 
Testa second visit 
to Australia and 
he was hosted by 
Freeman again. 
1972 The meeting Hosted by Karl Bonnette, 
attended by Stan Smith, George 
Freeman, Leonard McPherson, 
Paddles Anderson, Milan ‘Iron 
Bar Miller’ Petricevic, Albert 
Ross Sloss (The Labour Party 
State MP for the inner-city seat 
of King), Arthur ‘The Duke’ 
Delaney, The Fiber, Leo ‘The 
Liar’ Callaghan and Murray 
Riley 
Sydney The purpose of the 
meeting was to 
discuss the current 
criminal activities 
in the area, and 
reorganised crime 
in Sydney 
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In the fourth phase, Freeman’s modus operandi in achieving his vision of becoming an 
organised crime leader, included murder, money laundering, providing protection, 
counselling other criminals, blackmail, and operating illegal casinos and brothels (Freeman 
1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010), as shown in Table 34. Although Freeman’s 
protection racket remained the same, the difference from the third phase was that Freeman 
also had connections with corrupt police (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 
2010). Freeman’s SP bookmaking arrangement also remained the same, but he expanded his 
services to providing racing tips (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). 
Freeman was able to provided guaranteed wins, as he had arrangements with horse trainers 
where he provided performance enhancement drugs to ensure his picks won (Freeman 1988; 
Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010).  
Freeman also bribed other horse trainers to dope their horses to ensure they lost (Freeman 
1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). Freeman was also able to launder ill-gotten 
gains (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). Through his money laundering 
scheme, Freeman occupied a brokerage position for those seeking a money launderer and/or 
cash flow (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). In fact, Freeman’s success 
in SP bookmaking and money laundering provided him with access to higher profile 
criminals (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010).  
Operating illegal casinos also connected Freeman to high profile criminals (Freeman 1988; 
Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). Despite his success, Freeman continued to carry out 
murders against those who attempted to kill him or disturbed his operations (Freeman 1988; 
Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). In the fourth phase, Freeman succeeded in 
establishing himself as a successful organised crime leader, which was consistent with his 
vision (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010).      
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Table 30 George Freeman’s modus operandi Phase Four  
Year What Who Where Why How Comments 
1973 Freeman distanced 
himself from the  
activities of his 
close friend  
Freeman from 
Stan Smith 
Sydney Stan Smith became 
deeply involved in 
selling drugs 
  
1973 Promoting himself 
as a commission 
agent 
Freeman Sydney  Providing racing tips for 
punters and helping them 
lay their bets. 
At the time he was the 
major controller of SP 
book activities. 
But nearly all the other 
tipsters and bookies at 
work had to pay him 
commission to keep the 
police away 
 
1977 Hit and run 
shoplifting spree 
Freeman, Stan 
Smith, William 
Joseph Stevens 
and Judith 
Shirley Campbell 
Perth, Western 
Australia 
  Took a break from SP 
bookmaking 
1977 Freeman arranged 
for McPherson to 
collect SP 
bookmaking money 
Freeman and 
McPherson 
Sydney Freeman was on the 
robbery spree in Perth 
  
1977 Illegal casino 
operator 
Freeman, Bruce 
Hardin, Perc 
Galea, Tony 
Torok, George 
Walker 
‘Goulburn Club’ 
and Joe Taylor 
Sydney   They remained active, as the 
government has legalised 
casinos 
1977 Pulled strings to get Freeman, Kevin,     
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Kevin Humphrey 
away after stealing 
the Balmain Rugby 
League club money 
Murray Farquhar 
and Fred Hanson 
1977 A brothel and 
blackmail business 
Freeman and 
Michael Hurley 
Woolloomooloo, 
Sydney 
For blackmail and 
bribery purposes 
Installed video cameras in 
Freeman brothel operated 
by Michael Hurley’s wife 
with whom he had an 
affair 
 
1979 Freeman shot in the 
neck 
Freeman shot by 
Jacky Muller 
Sydney Freeman had an affair 
with Hurley’s wife and 
told his father in law, 
and he promised to take 
care of it. 
Freeman was shot next to 
his car, in front of his 
house. 
 
1979 The murder of 
Jacky Muller 
Freeman Sydney Because Muller 
attempted to murder 
him 
Freeman created an alibi 
for himself through his 
friend Dr Nick Paltos. 
Paltos would confirm if 
he was ever asked, that 
his patient Freeman had 
spent the whole night at 
Paltos new clinic for 
treatment for his asthma. 
Freeman was at Noosa Heads 
in Queensland at the time of 
the murder of Muller. 
1980 The Razelle casino 
was raided by 
detective Merv 
Beck 
The casino was 
controlled by 
Freeman and 
McPherson, and 
operated by 
Bruce Hardin 
Sydney    
 The Double Bay 
Casino 
Freeman was a 
partner in the 
casino 
    
1978 Caught and charged 
with ‘excludable 
person’ and 
Freeman and 
Paltos 
United States    
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voluntarily returned 
to Sydney 
 Money laundering Freeman Sydney Money laundry When a ‘fix’ was in place, 
crime-tainted money 
could passed through the 
TAB in the form of huge 
bets on sure winners, and 
on-course bookies were 
on a hiding-to-nothing. 
Freeman was not the only 
one to play the game this 
way: drug supremo 
Robert Trimbole was able 
to buy every jockey in any 
given race, and offered 
trainers a range of 
chemicals that could 
enhance or detract from a 
horse’s performance 
 
1981 Married Freeman married 
Georgina 
Catherine 
McLoughlin 
Sydney  Freeman got married after 
the biggest horse race fix 
of his career, the horse’s 
name was ‘Mr. Digby’ 
The horse’s owner was Peter 
Ernest Black, who worked for 
Freeman. 
1981 Consultant Freeman was 
consultant to Dr 
Nick Paltos, 
Graham Palmer 
‘Croc’ , Ross 
Karp, Daniel 
‘The Brain’ 
Chubb, Stephen 
Brown 
Sydney Smuggling Marihuana 
to Sydney 
Dr Nick Palto had the 
idea, Freeman was a 
consultant, Ross Karp 
provided cash to buy the 
drugs, Daniel Chubb 
would supervise the 
shipment of drugs from 
Darwin to Sydney and 
then look after the 
distribution 
Palto’s team was arrested, 
Karp, Paltos, Palmer and 
others in 1985 by federal 
police and charged with 
conspiring to import cannabis 
resin and supplying the drug. 
1984 Contacts Freeman Sydney  Freeman had connections 
with the media, police, 
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politicians and AJC 
1984 Assault on Frank 
Hing 
Freeman and 
Tony Torok 
Sydney   Frank has been described as 
an influential member of the 
Chinese Trade 
1985 Flew to London 
with his family for 
a holiday 
Freeman Sydney to London Sympathetic police let 
it be known that the 
Paltos gang was about 
to be arrested by 
federal police, which 
meant that the state 
police (where Freeman 
had connections and 
protection) could not 
interfere with the case. 
He was denied access to 
London as a result of his 
criminal record. 
There were also rumours that 
he was hiding from a contract 
killer from Melbourne, but 
Freeman denied it. 
Mid-
1980s 
Fear for their safety Freeman and 
McPherson 
Sydney Sydney gangland drug 
war. 
McPherson appointed 
Freeman as his negotiator 
 
Mid-
1980s 
Sayers murder 
contract 
Freeman offered 
the contract to 
Christopher 
Flannery 
Sydney Sayer owned Freeman 
money 
Freeman was to provide a 
car and a false beard for 
the job. 
Flannery met with Stan 
Smith’s close friend Tony 
Eustace, a heroin 
trafficker, to discuss the 
matter, before rejecting 
Freeman offer, 
but somebody accepted 
Freeman’s offer and did 
the job. 
Flannery rejected the offer 
1985 Conspiracy to kill 
Freeman 
Kathleen 
(Christopher 
Flannery’s wife), 
conspired with 
Melbourne 
criminal Amos 
Atkinson and Ian 
Sydney Kathleen believed that 
Freeman was behind 
the disappearance of 
her husband Flannery 
The plan did not go 
ahead, as Freeman 
received a call from Ian 
McLean (Ian gave 
Freeman an anonymous 
call to warn him) Freeman 
took the call seriously and 
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McLean fled the country to 
London were he was 
denied entrance. 
1985  Taking over 
construction 
companies 
Freeman and 
McPherson 
Sydney Exploiting the managerial 
weaknesses of building 
companies. The 
underworld had taken 
control of the building 
industry. 
There were also another 11 
projects with initial estimated 
costs of 6.7 million (around 
17.26 million) had grown to 
32.8 million ($84.48 million) 
by the time the final bill 
arrived. Companies had 
hundreds of thousands of 
dollars worth of equipment 
stolen, but the inquiry 
concentrated mainly on the 
GKN groups use of criminals 
to try to curb the thefts 
1985 The murder of 
Tony Eustace 
‘Spaghetti’ 
Ladisla ‘Joe’ 
Meissner shot 
him. It is 
believed that 
Freeman 
provided the gun. 
Sydney Kathleen said Freeman 
organised the murder of 
Eustace to protect his 
position, as Eustace 
suggesting killing 
Freeman to gain greater 
power in the 
underworld ‘it was a 
power struggle’ – it 
was the same reason 
Flannery was killed. 
 
Chris Flannery had an 
appointment to meet 
Eustace at the Airport 
Hilton on the night of his 
murder (he told the 
police), the next day he 
disappeared and was 
never seen again. 
Kathleen later said that 
Freeman provided the gun 
to murder Tony Eustace. 
She added that Tony 
Torok was the one who 
bought the car (under a 
fake name) and that Nick 
Paltos had given Freeman 
an injection to provide 
him with an alibi. The 
murder weapon was 
The car involved in the 
murder was found abandoned 
two days later at the airport – 
but the police couldn’t trace 
its owners – as it was bought 
using a false name. 
Meissner failed to appear in 
court, and Coroner Greg 
Glass closed the case, in what 
could be not surprising, 
police said they made 
inquiries and were satisfied 
about Meissner’s movement 
at the time of the murder – no 
further details were given. 
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thrown into Sydney 
Harbour from Pier One. 
 Invested large sums 
of ill-gotten money 
in real estate 
Freeman and 
McPherson 
Australia and 
elsewhere 
To be hidden from the 
authorities and others 
Ownership of the real 
estate was under their 
children’s names 
 
1989 Protection Freeman 
provided 
protection to 
Bruce Hardin 
Sydney To make sure there 
were no problems in 
the building industry 
and make sure no 
organised crime gangs 
were pinching their 
scaffold 
Bruce paid Freeman to 
provide protection. 
 
1989 To talk to someone Freeman Sydney  Would charge $5000 
($12,000 equivalent 
today). 
 
 The intimidation of 
Brian Baker of 
Alpine Scaffolding 
Freeman Sydney Bruce Hardin accused 
Brian Baker of stealing 
GKN’s scaffolding 
Baker turned to Freeman 
to solve the problem – 
Freeman charged him to 
fix it. 
Freeman and Baker met at 
the Chequers Club where 
Freeman, McPherson and 
others would spend time 
every Monday afternoon. 
McPherson was paid 
$20,000 ($51,510). 
 
Mid 
to 
late 
1980s 
The bricklaying 
contractor 
Robin Warren 
Bass, a 
bricklaying 
contractor, and 
Freeman 
Sydney Bass hired Freeman, 
when he believed the 
unions were forcing 
him out of business. 
He reached Freeman 
when he mentioned his 
problem to a horse trainer 
(Paul Sutherland) who 
gave him Freeman’s 
phone number. 
Freeman and Bass met at 
the Chequer Club. 
Freeman was with John 
When six weeks later, 
nothing happen Bass 
contacted Freeman who 
assured him it was taken care 
of, and added he has nothing 
to do with it, and Freeman 
should get Brady to call him. 
Later Bass met with Bronco, 
Charkey Ramon and John 
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Brady and Charkey 
Ramon. 
Bass thought that Brady 
was from a building 
union, and said he could 
do something for $20,000. 
Bass and Brady would 
meet again later and Bass 
would hand him the 
money (cash and 
cheques). Brady told Bass 
he would soon get a lot of 
work, but Brady would 
take a percentage. 
Brady who told him that 
$10,000 went to union 
officials and the rest of the 
amount covered expenses, 
and that ‘they’ wanted him 
out of the industry. 
 Using the media Freeman against 
Christopher 
Flannery 
Sydney Flannery was causing 
trouble and out of 
control 
Freeman created the 
Flannery moniker ‘rent-a-
kill’ and media followed 
Flannery also scared Freeman 
1990 The death of 
Freeman 
Freeman Sydney Suffered from multiple 
health conditions and 
pain. 
Freeman was a physical 
wreck, with asthma, 
kidney pain and 
constant stomach 
trouble, high blood 
pressure, smoked 
heavily and took 
Valium regularly to 
calm his nerves. 
Died of an overdose of 
pethidine that Freeman 
injected into himself 
He did not want an autopsy to 
be carried out on his cadaver, 
so no one would discover that 
his shoulder and thighs were 
a pin-cushion of injection 
scars from the pethidine and 
possibly other drugs from the 
mid-1970s, even before he 
was shot in 1979. 
References  
(Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010; Deans 2010) 
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4.12 Saffron’s modus operandi  
In Phase One, Saffron engaged in arbitrage in the black market, in efforts to achieve his 
vision of becoming a successful businessman, as shown in Table 35 (Saffron 2009; Reeves 
2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). From a young age, Saffron bought cigarettes from friendly 
retailors and resold them to his father’s friends when they visited (Saffron 2009; Reeves 
2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). Saffron also sold used books at school to new students 
(Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). Saffron was found guilty of illegal 
gambling and receiving stolen goods (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 
2005). Towards the end of the first phase of his career, Saffron attempted to avoid joining the 
army by arguing that his family relied on him to run the family business (Saffron 2009; 
Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). Saffron’s modus operandi in Phase One does 
reflect his efforts to become a businessman (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; 
McNab 2005). The beginning of Saffron’s official criminal career was when he bought The 
Roosevelt Club (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005) in the second phase, 
described next. 
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Table 31 Abraham Saffron’s modus operandi Phase One 
Year What Who Where Why How Comments 
1927 Operated a profitable trade 
in cigarettes on  the black 
market  
Abraham 
Saffron and his 
father 
Sydney  He arranged supplies from friendly local 
shopkeepers and then resold them to his 
father’s friends and schoolmates. 
 
1927 Selling used books to new 
students at school 
Abraham Sydney  Taking old books, cleaning them and reselling 
them 
 
1938 Gambling venture Abe Saffron Sydney   This was illegal and he was 
charged and fined in court – 
pleaded guilty 
1940 Taken before court Abe Saffron Sydney  Receiving stolen goods  
1940 Joined the army Abe Saffron Sydney  World War II Tried to opt out of military 
service by arguing that his 
father’s business relied on him 
References 
(Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005) 
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In the second phase, Saffron’s modus operandi for achieving his vision of becoming a 
successful businessman was selling liquor illegally, as shown in Table 36 (Saffron 2009; 
Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). With capital borrowed from his father and in 
partnership with Hilton Kincaid and Mendek Brunen, Saffron bought the Roosevelt Club 
(Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). The success behind the Roosevelt 
Club was selling liquor illegal after hours (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 
2005), which was possible through Saffron’s bribery of corrupt police (Saffron 2009; Reeves 
2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). Following the success of the Roosevelt Club it was 
declared a disorderly house, and closed for a short period of time (Saffron 2009; Reeves 
2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005).   
Due to the availability of liquor after hours at the Roosevelt Club, Saffron had a large 
customer base, and consequently, greater income (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; 
McNab 2005). Saffron therefore expanded his business by buying additional clubs, hotels and 
liquor licences (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). Saffron’s modus 
operandi in buying more liquor licenses than was allowed by the law was to use friends and 
family as fronts for his businesses (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). 
By controlling more liquor consuming and selling premises, and licenses, Saffron had a 
monopoly over the liquor market in the King’s Cross liquor market (Saffron 2009; Reeves 
2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). For instance, Saffron bought liquor from other suppliers 
and resold it at higher prices to other clubs and hotels, including on the black-market (Saffron 
2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). Due to Saffron’s excess supply of liquor 
(from suppliers and the other clubs and hotel he partly owned) he was able to offer the lowest 
prices on the market, and attract more customers (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; 
McNab 2005).  
Because of his success, Saffron was extorted by corrupt police to whom he paid bribes 
(Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). Corrupt police threatened to expose 
Saffron’s illegal operations, including the bribes he paid them (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; 
Piper 2010; McNab 2005). In the third phase, Saffron thus aimed to join a criminal 
organisation to control greedy corrupt police.  
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Table 32 Abraham Saffron’s modus operandi second phase 
Year What Who Where Why How Comments 
1942 Acquired the Roosevelt 
Club 
Abe Saffron in 
partnership with 
Hilton Kincaid and 
Mendek Brunen (a 
much older man) 
Sydney  Abe’s father provided the money. 
Mendel Brunen’s parents set him 
in a similar path as Abe parents in 
the mercery and clothing business. 
Hilton’s job was to attract 
American customers (US soldiers) 
to the club, since he was American 
 
1942 The Roosevelt Club 
was closed 
Abe Saffron Sydney It was declared ‘disorderly’ It was closed  
1943 Bought his first hotel: a 
pub at Kurri Kurri 
Abe Saffron and 
Hilton 
Sydney    
1944 Left the army Abe Saffron Sydney Due to health issues   
1944 Bought the Newcastle 
Hotel 
Abe and Hilton Sydney    
1944 Became a legal 
bookmaker 
Abe Sydney The sheer legality of these 
activates caused a lack of 
interest in Saffron 
Abe attempted to take over the 
local jockey club but he failed. 
 
1946 Acquired the West End 
Hotel 
Abe Saffron and 
Hilton 
Sydney Hilton’s involvement was 
not revealed due to his 
illicit liquor business. 
  
1946 Acquired the licence of 
the Goldstone Hotel 
Abe Saffron and 
Hilton 
 Later it was revealed that 
Abe corrupted the police 
and officials who should 
prosecute such charges 
 
At that time Abe was breaking the 
law as he was not allowed to have 
more than one hotel licence. 
 
 
 
1947 Took over the Mortdale 
Hotel 
Abe Saffron, his 
sister Beryl and 
Hilton 
Sydney  There was no reaction from the 
liquor authority when Saffron took 
over the Mortdale Hotel 
 
1947 The Cumberland Hotel Abe Saffron and 
Emil Kornhauser 
‘Eddie’ 
Sydney    
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1947 The Albert Hotel Abe, his brother 
Henry Saffron and 
Hilton 
Sydney    
1947 Civic Hotel Abe and Harold 
Taylour 
Sydney    
1947 To get hotel licences Abe Saffron Sydney  Used his family and friends as 
dummies to front illegally gained 
hotel licences. 
His sister Mrs Beryl 
Frack concealed her 
relationship with 
Abe from the 
Licence Court 
1947 Acquired a gun Abe Saffron Sydney   Charged in court for 
possession of 
unlicensed pistol 
1948 Tax evasion Abe Saffron and his 
accountant David 
Molland Evans 
Sydney    
1948 Lunched the Persona as 
a major charity 
fundraiser 
Abe Saffron Sydney To rebuild his image after 
the liquor law violation and 
tax evasion charges 
At the Roosevelt Hotel, for more 
than 180 children suffering 
cerebral palsy 
 
1948 The Roosevelt 
nightclub 
Abe Saffron and 
Hilton 
Sydney The motive behind the 
Roosevelt nightclub was 
selling alcohol illegally – 
during the early years of 
World War II there was a 
shortage of beer 
The Roosevelt nightclub sold 
liquor without a licence 
 
Late 
1940s 
The Roosevelt Club 
was one of the four or 
five most popular clubs, 
and did a brisk trade in 
prohibited liquor sales 
Abe Saffron Sydney Abe mad twice as much 
profit in the post-war 
period as most supplies 
came to the Roosevelt from 
his own brewery – 
providing to six hotels. 
He had an illegal 
controlling interest 
All clubs bought their illicit beer 
from the limited stocks of friendly 
hotels. 
 
Late Selling liquor illegally Abe Saffron Sydney Because Saffron could not With very minor competition from  
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1940s sell liquor at the Roosevelt 
Club. 
other night clubs – he cornered the 
market in illicit grog sales – what 
liquor he could not sell to his 
customers at the Roosevelt, he sold 
to sly grog shops at even a higher 
price 
Late 
1940s 
Created a monopoly 
and was in total control 
of it 
Abe Saffron Sydney  Abe would buy all surplus of 
liquor and sell at a higher price in 
the black market. 
 
Late 
1940s 
Bribery Abe Saffron Sydney Bribed corrupted licensing 
police to turn their back on 
the Abe illegal activities 
Abe handed money from the club 
to a corrupt official in a paper 
bundle, directly, or to their 
appointed ‘bagman’. Every Friday 
evening at the club 
 
1951 Opened a ‘housie’ 
(bingo) game 
Abe Saffron Sydney  To further enhance his reputation 
as a charity fundraiser. 
This venture was in breach of the 
Lotteries and Art Unions Act as it 
offered cash prizes. 
The Sunday Sun newspaper won 
the case and Abe had to pay 
damages. 
 
1951 Sold the Mortdale 
Hotel 
Abe and his sister 
Beryl Frack to Mr 
Bamford 
Sydney  Abe’s sister sold the hotel with 
Abe’s permission 
 
1952 Challenged the power 
of the state Governor to 
have issued the royal 
commission to Maxwell 
Abe Saffron Sydney    
1952 Spent the night in a 
police cell 
Abe Saffron and 
Judge McClement 
refused to grant him 
bail 
Sydney    
1952 Charged with perjury Abe Saffron Sydney Lying under oath   
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1952 Transfer of liquor 
licence of Cumberland 
Hotel 
From Emil 
Kornhauser to Eric 
Claud Norman (The 
new owner of the 
licence) 
Sydney   Norman assured 
Emil that he would 
not supply liquor to 
Saffron or the 
Roosevelt club 
References  
(Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005) 
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In Phase Three, Saffron’s modus operandi in achieving his vision of becoming a successful 
businessman and a member of organised crime royalty included bribery, blackmail, framing 
those who challenged him with crimes they had not committed, running prostitution rackets, 
arbitrage in the black market, protection, insurance fraud, receiving stolen goods and money 
laundering, as shown in Table 37 (Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; Piper 2010). All of Saffron’s 
modus operandi involved partnerships (Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; Piper 2010).  
Saffron joined a group of corrupt politicians and high ranking police officials known as the 
‘Crowd’ to limit the harassment of corrupt police (Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; Piper 2010). 
Despite joining a criminal organisation Saffron started his own blackmail operation called the 
‘White House’ to pressure and control honest and corrupt government officials, including the 
corrupt police (Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; Deans 2010). The White House was a free brothel 
were Saffron hosted high-profile members of the community including government officials 
and police officers (Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; Deans 2010). The ‘White House’ was 
equipped with hidden cameras that filmed and photographed the unaware guests while they 
were engaged in sexual activities (Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; Deans 2010). The films and 
pictures were later used to blackmail the guests (Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; Deans 2010).  
Another modus operandi Saffron used to control those who threatened him was framing 
(Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). For instance, an accountant who 
worked for Saffron threatened to expose his illegal income (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; 
Piper 2010; McNab 2005). The accountant was framed for an unsolved crime, and was sent 
to prison (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). On his release, the 
accountant fled Sydney (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005).  
Saffron used framing and blackmail for two main purposes: protecting himself, and forcing 
those who refused to cooperate (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). 
Saffron also engaged in brokerage, as he provided protection for select individuals through 
his connections with various corrupt police and politicians (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; 
Piper 2010; McNab 2005).  
Framing, blackmail and brokerage were not sources of income for Saffron, however, they 
were facilitators (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). There is also no 
hard evidence that Saffron generated income from selling illegal drugs (Saffron 2009; Reeves 
2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005), however Saffron allowed the consumption, and trade of 
illicit drugs in his premises (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). Saffron 
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generated illegal income from prostitution, illegal casinos and selling liquor illegally (Saffron 
2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005).   
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Table 33 Abraham Saffron’s modus operandi Phase Three  
Year What Who Where Why How Comments  
1952-
1966 
Banned from 
operating in the 
liquor trade 
Abe Saffron, his 
relatives and 
associates 
Sydney For violating liquor laws The Maxwell Royal 
Commission. 
No one was able to help 
Abe, not his close 
associate Chief Secretary 
Evatt nor his corrupt 
senior police  
Brought the collapse of the 
Saffron business, but Abe kept 
the Roosevelt Club as it was not 
licensed to sell liquor. 
 
1953 The remaining 
perjury charges 
against Abe 
mysteriously 
disappeared 
 Sydney  Abe won the perjury 
trials on a dubious 
technicality 
Abe took a psychological 
battering from all the legal 
actions 
 
 
1953 Joined the ‘Crowd’ Abe Saffron Sydney To protect his businesses 
from honest police 
 
He joined the group and 
started from the bottom 
and over time made his 
way to the top and 
gained the title ‘The 
Invincible’ 
The ‘Crowd’ was a group of 
senior criminals who, through 
the astute application of bribery 
and corruption, managed to 
carry on their affairs with little 
or no intrusion from inquisitive 
police or interfering politicians. 
1953 Considering the 
Roosevelt Club for 
illegal gambling 
Abe Saffron and 
Richard Riley 
Sydney    
1953 The Roosevelt 
Club was declared 
a disorderly house 
and was sold 
Abe Saffron Sydney The reason the Roosevelt 
was declared disorderly 
is, Saffron was illegally 
selling alcohol at the 
‘notorious and 
disreputable’ nightclub. 
Roosevelt sold alcohol 
illegally from 1947 to 
1952 
Argued that the 
appointment of 
Commissioner Colin was 
ineffective because the 
appointment of Judge 
Richardson’s 
appointment was invalid 
The defence strategy appeared to 
require the use of any argument 
except the innocence of the 
client (Abe). 
 
The same tactic was used by 
Barrister Garfield in defending 
Roosevelt club   
1953 Blackmailing Abe Abe Saffron Sydney Corrupt police were Corrupt police became  
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Saffron getting greedy greedy and keep pressing 
for more with constant 
threat of exposure not 
only of current criminal 
behaviour, but also of 
the very fact of having 
paid bribes 
Mid-
1950s 
A new sense of 
freedom 
Abe Saffron Sydney Joining the ‘Crowd’, his 
new acquaintances are 
Riley, Stuart-Jones and 
Kelly and some of their 
nefarious partners in 
crime 
They would have 
discussed ways to ensure 
their right to operate in 
their ‘free-enterprise’ 
system with as much 
flexibility for their 
activities as possible. 
 
Mid-
1950s 
Blackmail through 
the White House. 
Abe Saffron and 
Stuart-Jones 
Sydney The invitees were all 
being filmed or 
photographed – these 
photographs were used as 
insurance policy against 
them. 
Holding sex parties and 
inviting elite members of 
society. 
These parties were free 
of charge – in return Abe 
just wanted recognition 
as a perfect host 
The idea was driven by Abe’s 
insatiable sexual appetite. 
 
The parties grew to include all 
different types of sex. 
1956 Embarked on a 
more diverse series 
of group sexual 
activities 
Abe Saffron, Henry 
Saffron, Hilton 
Kincaid, Wayne 
Martin, and two 
different women 
Sydney  One woman told the 
police about the sex 
party; as she had a 
fallout with the group. 
It landed him in a flurry of court 
appearances over 18 months, 
dubbed by the media as 
‘scandalous conduct’. 
Bribery and protection money 
could not save him from the 
embarrassment. 
1956 Abe’s wife left 
him 
Abe Saffron Sydney Because of the sex 
scandal 
She went to Switzerland  
1957 The sex scandal 
charges were 
dismissed 
Abe Saffron Sydney    
1957 Abe was 
blackmailed 
Abe Saffron was 
blackmailed by 
Sydney  Bumper threatened to 
expose another ‘sexual 
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Bumper exhibition’ 
1957 Receiving stolen 
goods 
Abe Saffron and 
Jimmy Stebbins 
accused by Bumper 
Sydney  A refrigerator, television 
and a dishwasher Abe 
acquired recently for the 
Lodge 44 motel were 
stolen property 
Abe was later found guilty.  
1958 Took delivery of 
more than 35,000 
pornographic 
books and sold 
them all 
Abe Saffron Sydney  Made around $1,576,088 Free enterprise Saffron-style at 
its best 
1959 Imported seven 
hundred tons of 
chrome ore 
Abe Saffron and 
his younger brother 
Henry 
Sydney Not sure what he did 
with it – but it’s been 
assumed he did very well 
financially 
  
End 
of 
1950s 
Planned to open 
the first legal strip 
club 
Abe Saffron Sydney To sell liquor legally. There would be no 
harassment from the 
authorities due to the 
liberalisation of social 
and sexual mores and 
improved liquor laws 
 
End 
of 
1950s 
Opened Staccato, 
the first strip club 
Abe Saffron, 
Wayne Martin, 
Louis Benedetto 
‘Last Card Louis’ 
Sydney  They were all hired by 
Abe Saffron to run the 
strip club 
 
Early 
1960s 
The Latin Quarter 
nightclub 
Owned by Sammy 
Lee and managed 
by James Anderson 
Sydney The nightclub was very 
informative and 
educational for Anderson 
as he studied prostitution 
and corruption 
Among the regulars to 
the nightclub were Abe 
Saffron, Leonard 
McPherson, Perc Galea , 
Bernie Houghton and 
Jacky Clark 
 
Early 
1960s 
The Venus Room 
Club 
Abe Saffron and 
Anderson 
Sydney  Abe owned the club but 
offered 40% to Anderson 
to manage it 
 
  
Chapter 4: Data and Results 187  
Early 
1960s 
Involvement in 
vice 
Abe Saffron Sydney  Used and allowed the 
consumption of liquor 
illegally and prostitution 
on his premises 
 
1960s Stole a refrigerator 
from Royce Smeal 
Royce   Royce tried to get the 
attention of the police, 
but no one responded 
 
1960s Was willing to do 
anything to gain 
power 
Abe Saffron and 
Abeles 
Sydney To block government or 
bureaucratic interference 
Use blackmail Both believed in cultivating 
powerful people in influential 
positions as a way of publically 
demonstrating their own 
elevated social and corporate 
status 
1960s Blackmail Abe Saffron and 
Leonard 
McPherson 
Sydney To blackmail Keeping tapes on 
everybody important to 
them 
Aspiring politicians, policemen 
on the move up the ladder, their 
competitors, journalists and their 
editors, and the financiers of 
their grandiose schemes. Those 
who stepped out of line were 
blackmailed and those who did 
not care about being blackmailed 
were threatened with violence 
1967 Dropped assault 
murder charges 
Abe Saffron and 
Billy Green 
Sydney Billy Green was accused 
of murder 
Abe dropped assault and 
murder charges on the 
condition that Billy left 
the club 
 
1967 Forced a tenant to 
leave 
Abe Saffron and 
Nicholas Coumbis 
Sydney Rents were increasing 
but Nicholas had a 20 
year contract. 
Abe convinced Nicholas 
to rent  the premises for 
one of his companies, 
and then refused to pay 
the rent, which put him 
in breach of the head 
lease. 
In 1970 Nicholas Coumbis sued 
Abe Saffron for back rent 
1967 Opened the Pink 
Pussycat club and 
Abe Saffron and 
Peter Farrugia. 
Sydney during/after the Vietnam 
war – a lot of young 
McPherson provided 
girls in the case of a 
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Pink Parrot Leonard 
McPherson 
provided girls 
American soldiers were 
in Sydney on R&R 
shortage 
1970 The murder of 
Donald Hector 
Neville 
Murdered by 
Jimmy Anderson 
Sydney  Abe Saffron provided 
protection by using his 
connection with Labour 
Attorney-General Reg 
Downing to drop the 
charges against 
Anderson 
Abe possibly used blackmail to 
drop the charges 
1970 Opened a hotel Abe Saffron and 
Jack Rooklyn 
Adelaide  Did not obtain 
permission from 
Adelaide court 
 
1970-
72 
Considered a joint 
venture 
Abe Saffron and 
Jack Rooklyn 
Indonesia   But it did not happen 
1971 Opened a strip 
joint called La 
Belle, followed by 
the acquisition of 
the Castle Hotel 
and the Elephant 
Abe Saffron and 
Geoffrey Roy 
Cassidy was 
involved in the La 
Belle with three 
front men from 
Sydney 
South 
Australia 
   
1971 The King’s Cross 
Railway project 
Abe Saffron, Bob 
Askin, Peter 
Abeles, Paul 
Strasser and Robert 
Ryko 
Sydney When the project was 
finished in 1974 it was 
subleased to Abe’s 
Persian Room Theatre 
Restaurant Pty Ltd – a 
company in which 
Saffron and Vincent 
Farrugia (Peter 
Farrugia’s) had a 
controlling interest. 
Three years later, 
Constance Development 
transferred the head lease 
Peter asked Bob to lease 
the project to the 
Constance Development 
company, owned by his 
close friends and 
associated Paul Strasser 
and Robert Ryko. 
Abe was present in all the 
meetings. 
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to Togima Pty Ltd, which 
is another Saffron 
Company 
1972 Suspicious of drug 
involvement 
Abe Saffron Australia, 
US, Fiji, 
Scotland and 
the 
Philippines 
 Abe’s movement was 
monitored by the US 
Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Scotland 
Yard, and crime 
investigation bodies in 
Fiji and the Philippines. 
It remained for three years, and 
was withdrawn after political 
pressure was exerted on customs 
to ease off 
Early 
1970s 
Bourbon and 
Beefsteak Bar 
Abe Saffron, 
Bernie Houghton, 
Peter Abeles, Paul 
Strasser and John 
Charody 
Sydney The bar allowed heroin 
to be traded 
McPherson provided 
protection 
 
1974 McPherson’s 
protection 
Abe Saffron and 
Leonard 
McPherson 
Sydney Protection from 
McPherson himself and 
other criminals in the 
area 
  
Mid-
1970s 
The Venus Room 
Club 
Abe Saffron and 
Anderson 
Sydney It was a brothel The brothel had under 
age prostitute as reported 
to the police by one of 
the prostitutes working 
there 
 
1976 Tax evasion Abe Saffron Sydney    
1976 Money laundering Abe Saffron and 
Anderson through 
gambling operators 
Perc Galea and Joe 
Taylor 
Sydney    
1976 Arresting Edwin 
John ‘Ted’ 
Middleton 
Abe Saffron and 
Anderson 
Sydney  Anderson told Ted he 
was going to jail, as he 
has been fitted with a 
recently unsolved armed 
Detective Senior Constable 
O’Hagan made the arrest at the 
restaurant 
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robbery. 
Anderson knew the 
robbery, Gascoine and 
Callaghan. 
Ted was beaten up at 
King’s Cross by 
Anderson’s men. 
Then he was threatened 
(‘a contract has been 
taken on you – you 
either commit suicide or 
an accident will happen’) 
after leaving his 
solicitor’s office. 
He served his sentence 
and disappeared (not 
murdered) 
1976 Expanding Abe Saffron and 
Peter Farrugia were 
involved in five sex 
shops. Farrugia’s 
brother Vincent 
was partner in one 
and Peter Vardon 
Fairweather was 
partner in two 
shops 
South 
Australia 
  Abe’s companies ran five sex 
shops, an adult book shop and a 
movie club – all outlets for his 
pornography 
1978 Blackmail Abe Saffron 
blackmailed 
Premier Donald 
Allan Dunstan 
Adelaide For obstructing liquor 
licensing 
Saffron threaten to 
expose his homosexual 
relationship with John 
James Lang Ceruto 
 
1976 Involved in more 
than 100 
companies 
Abe Saffron Around 
Australia 
   
1970s Had connections Abe Saffron Sydney  Was at a Liberal Party  
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with the Liberal 
Party 
luncheon and visited by 
a Liberal state member 
of parliament 
Since 
1964 
Was never charged 
with a criminal 
offence 
Abe Saffron     
References 
(Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005) 
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In the fourth phase, Saffron retained the same vision of becoming a successful businessman 
and a leader of organised crime (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005), 
however due to his criminal record and scarred public image, Saffron donated the amount 
needed to be awarded an honorary life governor in NSW (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 
2010; McNab 2005). The National Crime Authority (NCA) reported and confirmed Saffron’s 
engagement in vice (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005), but Saffron was 
only charged with tax evasion and served three months in prison. Table 38 shows a summary 
of Saffron’s modus operandi in the fourth phase (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; 
McNab 2005).  
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Table 34 Abraham Saffron’s modus operandi Phase Four  
Year What Who Where Why How Comments 
1980 Appointed as 
life governor 
Abe 
Saffron 
Sydney To restore his public image Donated $3295.40 to the Benevolent 
Society of New South Wales. 
Abe knew how much 
he had to donate to be 
appointed. 
1994 Involvement in 
vice 
Abe 
Saffron 
Around 
Australia 
He controlled prostitutes. He 
produced and imported 
pornography and distributed it 
around Australia 
The National Crime Authority (NCA) 
reported that Abe was involved in vice, 
obtaining financial benefit from vice. 
 
References 
(Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005) 
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4.13 Askin’s modus operandi  
In Phase One, Askin did not have a defined vision, however he wanted to be a tradesman of 
some kind, as shown in Table 39 (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 2007). In the first phase 
of his career Askin’s modus operandi was thus not aimed at a specific vision, but he fulfilled 
his goal of becoming a tradesman by buying a small printery (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; 
Goot 2007). Although Askin did not have a vision in Phase One, he was very active socially 
(Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 2007).  
Askin was a member of various associations and societies (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 
2007), and in most he was either appointed president or vice president (Hickie 1985; 
Hancock 2006; Goot 2007). Askin also led protests demanding better wages and conditions 
for bank employees, prior to joining the army (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 2007). In 
the army, Askin managed his battalion’s accounts, and was the SP bookie (Hickie 1985; 
Hancock 2006; Goot 2007). After, the war, Askin worked on Percy Spencer’s political 
campaign and turned his attention to politics towards the end of Phase One (Hickie 1985; 
Hancock 2006; Goot 2007). In Phase Two, Askin developed a vision of becoming a politician 
and dedicated himself to politics.     
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Table 35 Robin Askin’s modus operandi Phase One  
Year What Who Where Why How Comments 
 Worked as an electrician Robin 
Askin 
Sydney  As an apprentice Lasted only two days 
1922 Joined the Savings Bank 
of NSW 
Robin 
Askin 
Sydney    
1922 Learned to admire 
accuracy and order 
Robin 
Askin 
Sydney  Working in the records department  
1922 Learning liberal ways Robin Sydney To fulfil his 
insatiable 
reading habit 
Collecting and reading liberal books  
1922 Tried his hand at 
freelance writing 
Robin 
Askin 
Sydney  Writing for Smith’s Weekly and had a 
short story in the Bulletin 
 
1931 Joined the Rural Bank of 
NSW 
Robin 
Askin 
Sydney    
1931 Joining different clubs 
and associations 
Robin 
Askin 
Sydney  He became a mixer and a joiner. In 
every club he joined he was either a 
president or a vice president. 
He developed great social skills 
and social capital. 
Late 
1930s 
Standing out Robin 
Askin 
Sydney To be seen as a 
hero and attract 
attention 
Askin would hide documents and later 
pretend to find them. 
 
Late 
1930s 
SP Bookmaking Robin 
Askin 
Sydney  He was promoted to manage the bank’s 
records and given a quiet location with 
unobserved access from Elizabeth St to 
a pub nearby. 
His bookmaking career was 
temporarily halted when a senior 
bank officer saw a late return to 
work. 
1931 Led protests Robin 
Askin 
Sydney Demanded better 
wages and 
conditions 
  
1937 Worked in Percy 
Spencer’s campaign 
Robin 
Askin and 
Mollie 
Askin 
Sydney  Robin and Mollie successful helped 
Spender won the federal seat of 
Warringah as an independent UAP 
candidate. 
 
1942 Managed the Battalion’s Robin   In the army  
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accounts, the canteen and 
mess funds. 
Askin 
1942 Was the Battalion SP 
bookmaker 
Robin 
Askin 
  During his time in the military  
References 
(Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 2007) 
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In the second phase, Askin’s vision was to become a successful politician; the modus 
operandi he used for accomplishing his vision was joining and re-establishing the Liberal 
Party as a serious contender for the Premiership, as shown in Table 40 (Hickie 1985; 
Hancock 2006; Goot 2007). The modus operandi Askin adopted to re-establish the Liberal 
Party was selling the Liberal Party’s ideas and principles to the average citizen (Hickie 1985; 
Hancock 2006; Goot 2007). Askin specifically focused on winning over teachers, public 
servants, shopkeepers, police officers and Christian (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 
2007). Askin also often addressed emotional issues to exploit voter emotions (Hickie 1985; 
Hancock 2006; Goot 2007). The Labour government member knew Askin for his aggressive 
approach in challenging government policies (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 2007). 
Phase Two was not the peak of Askin career, however, as in Phase Three he became the 
Premier of NSW and it was the peak of his career. 
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Table 36 Robin Askin’s modus operandi Phase Two  
Year What Who Where Why How Comments 
1947 Turned to politics Robin Askin 
helped 
Colonel 
Murray 
Robson MLA 
Sydney  Askin helped Colonel Murray 
Robson MLA retain his liberal seat 
of Vaucluse. 
 
1949 Leader Robin Askin Sydney  Became the president of his branch 
and of the Mackellar Federal 
Electorate Conference and was 
campaign manager for Bill 
Wentworth in the federal election 
 
1949 Stood against the 
Labour Party 
Robin Askin Sydney Robin opposed Labour’s attempt 
to promote ferry services by 
reducing direct bus transport 
between Warringah shire and 
Wynyard in the city 
  
1949 Stood against 
Premier Joe Cahill 
Robin Askin Sydney For not prosecuting SP 
Bookmakers 
  
1954 Elected Deputy 
leader of Liberal 
Party 
Robin Askin Sydney    
1955 Failed to become 
the Liberal Party 
leader 
Robin Askin Sydney He insisted on working closely 
with the Country Party 
Pat Morton succeeded him and 
became the Liberal Party leader 
 
1956 Became the 
Liberal Party 
leader 
Robin Askin Sydney Pat Morton was criticised for 
being a part-time politician and a 
full-time businessman, 
especially after losing state 
election in 1959 
Morton resigned and Eric Willis 
who supported Morton declined his 
nomination, so Askin immediately 
announced his willingness to lead 
and was unanimously elected leader. 
Askin was watching 
everyone in the party 
carefully. 
1958 Revealed the 
transport portfolio 
Robin Askin Sydney  Advocated a ‘get tough’ policy on 
road safety, a single fare for city 
travel on trams and buses, the 
abolition of the new road tax and 
Building a harbour tunnel 
would prevent problematic 
and extremely crowded 
Harbour Bridge in few 
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building a harbour tunnel. years. 
1959 Exploiting 
emotional issues 
Robin Askin Sydney When a labourer abducted, raped 
and brutally stabbed a 14 year 
old girl to death, and received 
life imprisonment. 
Called to restore the death penalty  
1959 Becoming less 
aggressive towards 
the government 
Robin Askin 
and Bob 
Heffron 
Sudney  Askin’s relationship with Bob 
Heffron, despite the fact that they 
were on different sides, did 
moderate Askin’s aggression. 
 
1960s Selling the 
Liberal’s ideas and 
principles to 
ordinary people. 
Robin Askin Sydney 
 
 By becoming a middle-of-the road 
man 
Askin also nominated 
himself for Opposition 
Leader 
1962 Rebuilding the 
Liberal Party’s 
image and leading 
it to power 
Robin Askin 
and Sir Frank 
Packer 
Sydney  With some help from Sir Frank 
Packer 
Within three years of his 
leadership of the Liberal 
Party. 
1962 Building a 
coalition of 
disaffected 
minorities 
Robin Askin Sydney To become the Premier of NSW By appealing to teachers, public 
servants, shopkeepers and police 
officers. 
A minority had a 
grievance against the 
Labour Government. 
1962 The campaign Robin Askin Sydney To become NSW Premier The campaign ‘With Askin you get 
action’ and ‘Strong leadership’ 
The campaign was carried 
out by the Packer-owned 
press and television. 
Reference 
(Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 2007) 
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In the third phase, Askin’s modus operandi towards accomplishing his vision of becoming a 
successful politician and improving the living conditions of the middle-class included 
working with other political parties, blackmail and receiving bribes (to allow the operation of 
illegal casinos and SP bookies who employed the middle-class) (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; 
Goot 2007).  
In the third phase, Askin became the Premier of New South Wales, and was known for 
making decisions on his own (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 2007). To limit the media’s 
ability to research and examine, or question his cabinet decisions, Askin often announced his 
cabinet decisions late in the afternoon, close to publishing deadlines (Hickie 1985; Hancock 
2006; Goot 2007). Askin was selective with journalists, as he gave exclusive tips to select 
journalists who worked for editors with whom he had good relations (Hickie 1985; Hancock 
2006; Goot 2007). Maintaining good relations was also Askin’s modus operandi in 
strengthening the Liberal Party’s political position by attending various social and sports 
events and connecting with the locals and the middle-class (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; 
Goot 2007). When socialising with the middle class, Askin listen to their issues and 
addressed them to his best ability.  
To deliver his promises, Askin needed funding from the Commonwealth government (Hickie 
1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 2007). The modus operandi Askin followed to pressure the 
Federal Government to agree to his funding demands, was threating to introduce the 
Canadian model, where the government had to return 30% of the taxes collected from the 
states (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 2007). Askin contacted all the premiers of 
Australian states and had them agree to the Canadian model (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; 
Goot 2007). Askin later drafted the proposal and threatened to introduce it if he was not 
allocated funds fairly (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 2007). Askin’s modus operandi was 
successful, however whenever Askin was unable to deliver on his promises, he placed the 
blame on the Commonwealth government’s lack of funding (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; 
Goot 2007). 
Askin is believed to have received bribes to allow the operation of illegal casinos (Hickie 
1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 2007). Askin was accused of accepting bribes to turn a blind eye 
to, and protect, the police commissioner, who was protecting illegal SP bookies, and illegal 
casino operators and other criminals (Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 2007). Table 41 
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describes all Askin’s modus operandi and contributions to the Liberal Party and NSW in the 
third phase of his career.  
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Table 37 Robin Askin’s modus operandi Phase Three  
Year What Who Where Why How Comments 
1965 Became the Premier of 
NSW 
Robin Askin Sydney  Won the elections  
1965 Cold welcome from the 
Australian Prime 
Minister 
Robin Askin 
by Robert 
Menzies 
Canberra Askin thought he would 
be favoured by the 
Prime Minister as both 
were liberals 
Askin was expecting 
generous treatment but failed 
to secure sufficient funds for 
NSW. 
 
1965 Broken promises Robin Askin Sydney Insufficient funds from 
Canberra 
Whenever Askin broke a 
promise, often to not raise 
taxes, blamed Canberra for 
their insufficient funds. 
It was admissible and 
sometimes necessary to break 
ranks with fellow Premiers and 
make separate deals with the 
federal government. 
1965 First two orders in office 
were to restore a direct 
air service between 
Sydney and Dubbo and 
getting the final price for 
the Opera House 
Robin Askin Sydney  Required Joern Utzon the 
designer of the Opera House. 
 
1965 Formed a close and 
agreeable partnership 
Robin Askin 
and Charles 
Cutler 
Sydney  Charles Cutler, the leader of 
the Country Party 
 
1965 Very cautious in making 
decisions 
Robin Askin Sydney  He wanted all the facts in 
front of him before making a 
decision. Sometimes would 
take the facts home to study 
them further before making a 
decision. 
 
1965 As premier, he was 
involved in gambling 
and betting 
Robin Askin Sydney Believed being involved 
with all members of 
society would affect his 
votes 
At the weekends he would 
attend sport and social events. 
Askin remembers every face 
and person he met. 
1965 Introduced unrestricted 
trading hours for small 
Robin Askin Sydney  In office as Premier of NSW  
  
Chapter 4: Data and Results 203  
shopkeepers. 
1965 Abolished juries for 
some motor accident 
cases 
Robin Askin Sydney  In office as Premier of NSW  
1965 Extended liquor trading 
hours 
Robin Askin Sydney  In office as Premier of NSW  
1965 Reforms to tackle 
pollution 
Robin Askin Sydney  In office as Premier of NSW  
1965 Forced well-off tenants 
in rent-controlled 
premises to pay 
economic rents 
Robin Askin Sydney    
1965 Reversed Labour’s 1949 
decision to abolish 
postal voting in state 
elections 
Robin Askin Sydney    
1965 Fiddled with the 
boundaries of the City of 
Sydney 
Robin Askin Sydney To ensure the elected 
council mirrored its 
own politics 
  
1967 Taking bribes Robin Askin, 
Fred Hanson 
Sydney To allow Perce Galea’s 
illegal casino to operate 
uninterrupted 
The bribes were collected by 
Stephen Mauger, the Liberal 
member of Monaro 
Under Askin organised crime 
was institutionalised for the 
first time. 
1968 Nothing escaped his 
attention 
Robin Askin Sydney He was a skilled 
manager of his Cabinet 
He checked the stock market 
and racing guide 
He always allowed discussion 
to flow. He changed the topic if 
it became bogged down and 
returned the issue to Cabinet 
when he knew a decision could 
be reached. 
1968 Taking decisions alone Robin Askin Sydney Under Askin, votes 
were not taken and 
formal party affiliates 
did not intrude 
Askin preferred to persuade, 
a technique that usually 
involved a few drinks to 
convince Ministers who had 
taken different sides that 
Such as Milton Morris who had 
to be approached differently, 
and became an Askin admirer. 
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they all won. 
1968 Using the media Robin Askin 
and Vince 
Kelly 
Sydney So no one affected his 
decisions 
When Askin was worried 
about a particular outcome, 
he might have his closest ally 
in the press – Vince Kelly of 
the Daily Mirror – announce a 
Cabinet decision before it 
was taken 
 
1968 Bad relations with 
media 
Robin Askin Sydney Askin reduced the 
number of press 
conferences 
Askin would answer specific 
questions lodged through the 
secretary 
Askin mellowed towards the 
media after the heart attack 
1968 Losing touch with those 
around him 
Robin Askin Sydney Asked the driver (as a 
joke) to run over the 
Anti-Vietnam protestors 
while in the car with US 
President Lyndon 
Johnson 
It reflected a lack of 
insensitivity, which even in 
1968, and certainly by 1976, 
marked him as a man out of 
touch with some of the 
changes occurring around 
him. 
 
1969 The Canadian model Robin Askin 
and the 
Premiers of 
Australian 
states 
All 
Australian 
states 
Receiving 30% of total 
income tax collected 
from the state 
On Askin initiative, the State 
Premiers met separately in 
late 1969 and agree to 
support the ‘Canadian model’ 
Askin submitted a 30 pages 
document on behalf of the 
Premiers of Australia, and 
made the strongest and most 
detailed case [for change] 
since Federation. 
1972 Allegation of organised 
crime 
Robin Askin Sydney The US Bally Poker 
Machine Company has 
links to the US Mafia 
Charges of a cover up and 
questions about Askin’s 
involvement forced the 
government to appoint a 
royal commission in 1973 
Four months later he told 
Parliament that the police had 
cleared Bally of these 
associations. 
1973 Askin was described as 
‘the most reactionary, 
obstructive and 
discredited’ person in 
As described 
by Gough 
Whitlam 
Sydney    
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Australia 
1973 The NSW Premiership 
election 
Robin Askin Sydney  Askin entered the election 
race almost alone 
Did not travel around the 
states and argued that the 
media was in Sydney 
1973 Did not attend meetings Robin Askin Sydney  Eric Willis represented him at 
meetings 
Jim Carlton devised and 
implemented the real 
campaign 
1974 Betrayed his close friend 
Eric Willis 
Robin Askin Sydney Tom Lewis promised 
Askin GCMG and 
Willis refused to 
commit himself 
 Whether Askin betrayed his 
deputy Eric Willis, purely to 
achieve greater recognition 
remains highly questionable. 
References 
(Hickie 1985; Hancock 2006; Goot 2007) 
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In the fourth phase, Askin did not have a vision and therefore did not have a modus operandi. 
After retiring from politics due to his health, Askin joined the board of Thomas Nationwide 
Transport (TNT), chaired by his close personal friend Sir Peter Abeles (Hancock 2006; Goot 
2007) as shown in Table 42. Askin’s membership of the TNT board bothered a number of the 
Liberal Party members, as they believed Askin should not be employed in a company that has 
done a great deal of business with the government (Hancock 2006). As23kin also faced a 
number of allegations of involvement in corruption (Abjorensen 2004; Hancock 2006; Goot 
2007; Hickie 1985). Although there was no solid evidence to convict Askin, it is widely 
believed that Askin accepted bribes and sold knighthoods (Abjorensen 2004; Hancock 2006; 
Goot 2007; Hickie 1985). This section has outlined the data collected in the fourth phase of 
Askin’s criminal career for further analysis in the next chapter.   
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Table 38 Robin Askin’s modus operandi Phase Four  
Year What Who Where Why How Comments 
1975 Retired as  Liberal 
Party leader 
Robin Askin Sydney Due to health Voluntarily  
1975 Accepted a 
directorship at 
Thomas Nationwide 
Transport (TNT) 
Robin Askin and 
Sir Peter Abeles 
Sydney His acceptance of 
the role bothered 
some Liberals. 
They believed Askin should not accept a 
job in an organisation which did so much 
business with the government. 
Askin spent most of his 
retirement with Abeles, his 
business associate. 
1981 Claims of corruption Robin Askin and 
Police 
Commissioner 
Sydney Avoided closing 
illegal casinos. 
Opening illegal casino in Chinatown by 
tossing the two-up pennies, receiving 
shares in mining companies doing 
business with NSW government. Selling 
knighthoods at $60,000 
According to Geoffrey 
Reading the accusations 
lacked evidence. 
A counter argument 
suggests, how could Mollie 
(Askin’s wife) own an estate 
in 1985 valued at $3.7 
million! 
Askin said once “I am not strictly honest but I am not outrageously dishonest; that is, I’ve bent the rules but I am not thoroughly “bent””. Clune and 
Turner (2006, p. 366) 
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4.14 Modus operandi consistent patterns 
As shown in Table 43, in Phase One the consistently shared patterns across the four criminal 
entrepreneurs featured in this study were forming social capital and developing human capital 
in their field. Receiving stolen goods was a modus operandi shared by McPherson, Freeman 
and Saffron. Saffron and Askin gambled illegally in Phase One, but Freeman and McPherson 
were the only ones who stole in Phase One. The criminal entrepreneurs also had non-shared 
modus operandi.  
The non-shared modus operandi was providing information and granting favours to other 
criminals, carried out by McPherson. Breaking and entering was a modus operandi carried 
out only by Freeman in Phase One.  
 
Table 39 Successful modus operandi of criminal entrepreneurs in Phase One 
Status McPherson Freeman Saffron Askin 
 
Shared 
modus 
operandi 
 
 
Forming social 
capital 
Developing human 
capital 
 
Forming social 
capital 
Developing human 
capital 
 
Forming social capital 
Developing human 
capital 
 
Forming social 
capital 
Developing human 
capital 
 
 
Semi-
shared 
modus 
operandi 
 
Receiving stolen 
goods 
Stealing 
 
Selling stolen 
goods 
Stealing 
 
Receiving stolen 
goods 
Gambling 
 
Gambling 
 
Non-
shared 
modus 
operandi 
 
Providing 
information 
Granting favours 
 
Breaking and 
entering 
 
Arbitrage in the black 
market 
Arbitrage in used 
books 
 
 
 
 
In Phase Two, as shown in Table 44, the consistent shared modus operandi across the four 
criminal entrepreneurs were forming and utilising social capital (which is using criminal and 
social connections for the entrepreneur’s advantage, such as co-offending or collaboration).  
The non-shared modus operandi were fraud, controlling information, and breaking and 
entering carried out by McPherson; Freeman was involved in SP bookmaking and stealing; 
Saffron’s non-shared modus operandi included arbitrage in the black market, and corrupting 
police with bribes; and Askin sold liberal ideas and principles to the average citizen in 
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Sydney, appealed to Christians and addressed emotional issues to exploit voter emotions and 
win their votes, which got him into office and facilitating organised crime to flourish.   
 
Table 40 Successful modus operandi of criminal entrepreneurs Phase Two 
Status  McPherson Freeman Saffron Askin 
 
Shared modus 
operandi 
 
Forming social 
capital 
Utilising social 
capital 
Cooperation 
 
Forming social 
capital  
Utilising social 
capital 
Cooperation 
 
Forming social 
capital 
Utilising social 
capital 
Cooperation 
 
Forming social 
capital 
Utilising social 
capital 
Cooperation 
 
 
Non-shared 
modus 
operandi  
 
Fraud 
Controlling 
information 
Breaking and 
entering 
 
SP bookmaking 
Stealing 
 
 
Arbitrage in the 
black market 
Corrupting police 
Bribery 
 
 
Selling  liberal 
ideas and 
principles to the 
average citizen 
Appealing to 
Christians 
Exploiting 
emotions 
 
 
In Phase Three, as shown in Table 45, the consistent modus operandi patterns across the four 
criminal entrepreneurs of this study were blackmail, intimidation, bribery, protection, using 
the media, taking initiative, betrayal and money laundering. The semi-shared modus operandi 
were providing information, collecting money for services, receiving payment for services, 
running and/or owning prostitution rackets, framing, murder, violence and owing/operating 
illegal casinos. The non-shared modus operandi were SP bookmaking, working as a 
commission agent, robberies, arbitrage (selling commodities but not services) in the black-
market, insurance fraud, receiving stolen goods, taking decisions alone and persuasion.  
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Table 41 Successful modus operandi of criminal entrepreneurs Phase Three 
Status McPherson Freeman Saffron Askin 
 
Shared-modus 
operandi 
 
Blackmail 
Intimidation 
Bribery 
Protection 
Using the media 
Taking initiative 
Betrayal 
Money laundering 
 
 
Blackmail 
Intimidation 
Bribery 
Protection 
Using the media 
Taking initiative 
Betrayal 
Money laundering 
 
Blackmail 
Intimidation 
Bribery 
Protection 
Used the media 
Taking initiative 
Betrayal 
Money laundering 
 
Blackmail 
Intimidation 
Bribery 
Protection 
Using the media 
Taking initiative 
Betrayal 
Money laundering 
 
Semi-shared 
modus 
operandi  
 
 
Providing 
information 
Collecting money 
for his services 
Prostitution racket 
Framing 
Murder 
Violence 
Illegal casino 
owner 
 
 
Stealing 
Providing 
information 
Collected money 
for his services 
Prostitution racket 
 
Murder 
Violence 
Illegal casino 
owner 
 
Stealing 
 
Paid money for 
services 
Prostitution racket 
Framing 
Murder 
Violence 
 
Stealing 
Providing 
information 
Collecting money 
for his services 
 
 
Non-shared 
modus 
operandi 
  
SP bookmaking 
Commission agent 
Robberies 
 
Arbitrage in the 
black market 
Insurance fraud 
Receiving stolen 
goods 
 
Taking decisions 
alone 
Persuasion 
 
As shown in Table 46, the four criminal entrepreneurs in this study did not have a shared 
modus operandi in Phase Four. The non-shared modus operandi in Phase Four included 
volunteering, arranging assaults, creating distance from other criminals, working as a 
commission agent, shoplifting, operating illegal casino, protection, owning brothels, 
blackmail, murder, counselling, money laundering, forming social capital, intimidation, using 
the media and SP bookmaking.               
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Table 42 Successful modus operandi of criminal entrepreneurs in Phase Four 
Status  McPherson Freeman Saffron Askin 
Non-shared 
modus operandi 
Volunteering 
Involvement in vice 
Indirect assault 
 
Distancing himself 
from some 
criminals 
Commission agent 
Shoplifting 
Illegal casino 
operator 
Protection 
Brothel 
Blackmail 
Murder 
Counselling 
Money laundering 
Social capital 
Intimidation 
Using the media 
SP bookmaking 
 
 
 
 
4.15 Modus vivendi 
Modus vivendi involves extracting the value of the social networks of the criminal 
entrepreneurs featured in his study. This section describes the social network data collected 
for the four criminal entrepreneurs in this study. Collecting data about social networks was 
used to extract their embedded resources. 
Embedded resources involve extracting the range of resources, which includes access to 
financial capital (to financially fund operations and/or business) and human capital, which 
includes mentors and the know-how of carrying out criminal and non-criminal operations, 
including operating a in corrupt environment. Embedded resources describe actors in the 
criminal entrepreneur network, based on their occupation. The occupations are divided into 
six categories: criminal capital which is the number of criminals in the network (criminals are 
defined as those who engaged in criminal activities that violate Australian law); police 
capital, individuals who worked in the police force in Australia; political capital including 
those who worked in the government or were members of political parties in Australia; 
money laundering capital including those who operated in the legal and illegal gambling 
industry, gang capital which are those who identified themselves as members of a specific 
gang; and other capital, which are actors in the network that the data sources did not provide 
sufficient information about regarding their role or occupation as criminal, police, political, 
money laundering or gang capital. 
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4.16 McPherson’s modus vivendi     
The embedded resources McPherson had in Phase One included six criminal capital, one 
police capital and one political capital. In total, McPherson’s network included 20 actors, and 
this increased in Phase Two. In Phase Two McPherson’s embedded resources included 
eleven criminal capital, one police capital and one political. In total, the size of McPherson’s 
network in Phase Two was 30 actors. McPherson’s embedded resources in the third phase 
were 64 criminal capital, 13 police capital, 10 political capital, 6 money launderers and 5 
others (unspecified). For the fourth phase, there is no significant data involving McPherson’s 
social network. Table 47 provides a summary of the embedded resources in McPherson’s 
social network throughout his career.  
Table 43 Leonard McPherson’s social network analysis  
McPherson  Phase One Phase Two Phase Three Phase Four 
Embedded Resources  
Criminal capital  6 11 64  
Police capital  1 1 13  
Political capital  1 1 10  
Money laundering capital None None 6  
Gang capital  Not known Not known Not known  
Other capital  None None 5  
 
4.17 Freeman’s modus vivendi  
In Phase One, the embedded resources in Freeman’s network included 6 criminals, 1 police 
capital and 1 political capital. In Phase Two, the embedded resources in Freeman’s network 
were 16 criminal capital, 5 police capital, 1 political, 3 money launderers and 3 others 
(unspecified capital). In the third phase, the embedded resources in Freeman network 
included 30 criminal capital, 5 police capital, 2 political capital, 7 money launderers and 4 
others (unspecified individuals). In the fourth phase, the embedded resources in Freeman’s 
network included 67 criminal capital, 14 police capital, 14 political capital, 33 money 
launderers, 3 gang capital, and 22 others. Table 48 summarises Freeman’s modus vivendi.  
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Table 44 George Freeman’s social network analysis  
Freeman  Phase One Phase Two Phase Three Phase Four 
Embedded Resources  
Criminal capital  4 16 30 67 
Police capital  None 5 5 14 
Political capital  None 1 2 14 
Money 
laundering 
capital 
None 3 7 33 
Gang capital  Not known Not known Not known 3 
Other capital 2 3 4 22 
4.18 Saffron’s modus vivendi 
There was insufficient data about Saffron’s Phase One, however in Phase Two, the embedded 
resources Saffron had in his network included 8 criminals, 4 police capital, 7 political capital, 
5 money laundered and 13 others (unspecified individuals). In the third phase, the embedded 
resources in Saffron’s network were 30 criminal capital, 23 police capital, 24 political, 13 
money launderers and 25 others (unspecified individuals). In the fourth phase, the embedded 
resources in Saffron’s network included 45 criminal capital, 24 police capital, 24 political 
capital, 15 money launderers and 30 others (unspecified individuals). Table 49 summarises 
the embedded resources in Saffron’s social network.  
Table 45 Abraham Saffron social network analysis 
Saffron  Phase One Phase Two Phase Three Phase Four 
Embedded Resources  
Criminal capital   8 30 45 
Police capital   4 23 24 
Political capital   7 24 24 
Money 
laundering 
capital 
 5 13 15 
Gang capital   Not known Not known Not known 
Other capital   13 25 30 
 
In Phase One the embedded resources that Askin had in his network were 5 criminal capital, 
3 political capital, 2 money launderers and 2 others (unspecified individuals). In the second 
phase, the embedded resources in Askin’s network included 24 criminal capital, 3 police 
capital, 7 political capital, 17 money launderers and 11 others (unspecified individuals). In 
the third phase, the embedded resources in Askin’s network included 39 criminal capital, 18 
police capital, 42 political capital, 32 money launderers and 72 others (unspecified 
individuals). In the fourth phase, the embedded resources in Askin’s network included 45 
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criminal capital, 18 police capital, 44 political capital, 31 money launderers and 71 others 
(unspecified individuals). Table 50 summarises Askin’s modus vivendi. The next section 
describes the combined network of the four criminal entrepreneurs featured in this study.  
Table 46 Sir Robert Askin’s social network analysis 
Askin  Phase One Phase Two Phase Three Phase Four 
Embedded Resources  
Criminal capital  5 24 39 45 
Police capital  None 3 18 18 
Political capital  3 7 42 44 
Money 
laundering 
capital   
2 17 32 31 
Gang capital  Not known Not known Not known Not known 
Other capital  2 11 72 71 
 
4.19 The combined networks of the four criminal entrepreneurs 
This section is divided into two main parts, prior success in crime and the peak of success, 
after afterwards. The first part describes the crime network, including all four criminal 
entrepreneurs in this study, prior to their peaks (Phase Three), from 1907 to 1956, which 
includes the four criminal entrepreneurs in Phases One and Two. The second part is the peak 
of their success, which includes criminal entrepreneur phases three and four, from 1957 to 
2006. The aim of mapping the complete network of the four criminal entrepreneurs is to 
describe the changes in their modus vivendi from the start to the end of their life and career. 
Table 51 shows the criminal entrepreneur modus vivendi prior their peak phase, which is Part 
One.     
In Part One, the network had four types of embedded resources: 38 criminal capital, 13 police 
capital, 17 political capital, 10 money laundry capital and 33 non-specified capital. The total 
size of the network was 111 individuals (each actor in the network was added once). The next 
section describes the networks of the criminal entrepreneurs at the peak of their careers, 
which is Part Two. 
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Table 47 Criminal network analysis prior success 
Part One (1907-1956) 
Embedded Resources 
Type of resources  Quantity   
Criminal capital  38  
Police capital  13  
Political capital  17  
Money laundering  
capital  
10  
Gang capital Not known  
Other capital  33  
Total  111  
In Part Two, the success phase as shown in Table 52, the network had five types of embedded 
resources, 164 criminal capital, 41 police capital, 76 political capital, 69 money laundry 
capital, 3 gang capital and 130 non-specified capital. The next section describes the 
consistent modi patterns across the four criminal entrepreneurs featured in this study. 
Table 48 Criminal network analysis during the success period 
Part Two (1957-2006) 
Embedded Resources 
Type of Resources Quantity   
Criminal capital  164  
Police capital  41  
Political capital  76  
Money laundering 
capital 
69  
Gang capital  3  
Other capital  130  
Total  483  
 
4.20 Consistent patterns 
This section describes the consistent modi of the four criminal entrepreneurs featured in this 
study, based on the four phases of their life and career, starting with Phase One.  
In Phase One, not all the criminal entrepreneurs in this study had a defined vision nor a 
leadership style or orientation, however they all had identities, albeit different identities. The 
modus operandi of all four criminal entrepreneurs in Phase One included forming social 
capital and developing human capital in their field, including criminal human capital. The 
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four criminal entrepreneurs did not share consistent embedded resources in their network in 
Phase One. In Phase Two the modi of the four criminal entrepreneurs were more consistent.  
In Phase Two, all four criminal entrepreneurs had a clear vision, defined identity, charismatic 
leadership style and personal orientation. The modus operandi of all the criminal 
entrepreneurs in this study included forming and utilising social and criminal capital, and 
collaboration with other individuals. Their social networks included criminal, police and 
political capital which were the embedded resources in their network. In the third phase, the 
criminal entrepreneurs of this study had more consistent modi. 
In Phase Three, all criminal entrepreneurs had a clear vision, defined identity, led with a 
charismatic leadership style and personal orientation. The modus operandi of all the criminal 
entrepreneurs in this study included blackmail, intimidation, bribery, protection, using the 
media, taking initiative, betrayal and money laundering. The social networks of the four 
criminal entrepreneurs in this study also included criminal, police, and political capital, and 
money launderers. All criminal entrepreneurs occupied a central position in their network of 
speciality, a brokerage position with other networks, however in Phase Four the four criminal 
entrepreneurs had no shared modi. Figure 24 illustrates the modi of the four criminal 
entrepreneurs featured in this study throughout their lives and careers.   
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Figure 24 The consistent modi of the four criminal entrepreneurs of this study throughout their life  
Modus Essendi                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               Timeline  
 
 
 
Modus Operandi                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Timeline 
  
 
 
 
 
Modus Vivendi                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               Timeline 
 
                                          
Not known  Clear vision 
Defined identity  
Charismatic 
leadership 
Personal orientation 
Clear vision 
Defined identity  
Charismatic 
leadership 
Personal orientation 
 
Forming social 
capital 
Developing human 
capital 
Forming and utilising 
social capital  
Collaboration 
 
Blackmail 
Intimidation 
Bribery 
Protection 
Using the media 
Taking initiative 
Betrayal 
Money laundering   
Phase One Phase Two Phase Three Phase Four 
Not Known  Criminal capital Criminal capital 
Police capital 
Political capital 
Money launderers  
None 
Not Known  
None 
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4.21 Conclusion  
This chapter has described the data extracted from the resources mentioned earlier in the 
methodology chapter. It started by providing a brief biographical background of the four 
criminal entrepreneurs featured in this study. The modus essendi of the criminal 
entrepreneurs was described, starting with leadership which is composed of vision, leadership 
style and orientation.  
The data showed that all four criminal entrepreneurs featured in this study had a clearly 
defined vision at the peak of their career. At the peak of their career, all four criminal 
entrepreneurs in this study led with a charismatic leadership style and personal orientation. 
Saffron and Askin led with a personal and social orientation at the peak of their career. All 
four criminal entrepreneurs also had a clearly defined identity with the exception of 
McPherson who lost his identity in Phase Four of his life, in terms of having a clear vision 
and goals. Although they all had clear identities, these differed between criminal 
entrepreneurs, as McPherson and Freeman’s identities at the peak of their criminal careers 
were as crime leaders. Saffron’s identity at the peak of his criminal career was that of a 
businessman and Askin’s was that of a politician.  
After outlining the modus essendi of the four criminal entrepreneurs in this study, this chapter 
described their modus operandi. McPherson and Freeman’s modus operandi in Phase One 
included petty crimes. In Phase Two, McPherson and Freeman’s modus operandi included 
robberies which led them to spend time in prison. At the peak of their criminal careers, 
McPherson and Freeman’s modus operandi included bribery, blackmail, extortion, murder, 
operating prostitution rackets and casinos. Freeman’s modus operandi also included illegal 
SP bookmaking. Saffron’s modus operandi throughout his life was mainly operating the 
illegal liquor trade, however his modus operandi in Phase Three, the peak of his criminal 
career, included bribery, blackmail, a prostitution racket and providing protection to select 
criminals. Askin’s modus operandi in Phases One and Two included forming social capital. 
In Phase Three, the peak of his career, Askin’s modus operandi was mainly providing 
protection to corrupt police, including the police commissioner, and receiving bribes.  
After outlining the modus operandi of the criminal entrepreneurs in this study, this chapter 
described their modus vivendi, starting with McPherson’s. McPherson had 6 criminal capital, 
1 police capital and 1 political capital in Phase One. In Phase Two, McPherson had 11 
criminal capital, 1 police and 1 political. In Phase Three, McPherson had 64 criminal capital, 
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13 police capital, 10 political capital and 6 money laundering capital. Freeman’s modus 
vivendi was then described. In Phase One Freeman had 4 criminal capital. In Phase Two, 
Freeman had 16 criminal capital, 5 police capital, 1 political capital and 3 money laundering 
capital. In Phase Three, Freeman had 30 criminal capital, 5 police capital, 2 political capital 
and 7 money laundering capital. In Phase Four, Freeman had 67 criminal capital, 14 police 
capital, 14 political capital, 33 money laundering capital and 3 gang capital.  
Saffron’s modus vivendi was described next. There was no data on Saffron’s Phase One, 
however in Phase Two he had 8 criminal capital, 4 police capital, 7 political capital and 5 
money laundering capital. In Phase Three, Saffron had 30 criminal capital, 23 police capital, 
24 political capital and 13 money laundering capital. In Phase Four, Saffron had 45 criminal 
capital, 24 police capital, 24 political capital and 15 money laundering capital.   
In Phase One Askin’s modus vivendi included 5 criminal capital, 3 political capital and 2 
money laundering capital. In Phase Two, Askin had 24 criminal capital, 3 police capital, 7 
political capital and 17 political capital. In Phase Three, Askin had 39 criminal capital, 18 
police capital, 42 political capital and 32 money laundering capital. In Phase Four, Askin had 
45 criminal capital, 18 police capital, 44 political capital and 31 money laundering capital.  
The consistent patterns across the four criminal entrepreneurs in this study are that they all 
had clear visions, and a defined identity with a charismatic leadership style at the peak of 
their career. At the peak of their career, the modus operandi of the criminal entrepreneurs 
featured in this study mainly included brokerage, bribery and blackmail. The consistency of 
their modus vivendi is that they all had criminal, police, political and money laundering 
capital and occupied a central position in their network of specialty and a brokerage position 
with other networks at the peak of their career. The next chapter discusses the outcome of the 
data and results chapter.    
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5 Chapter Five: Discussion  
5.1 Introduction 
This study aims at understanding successful criminal entrepreneurs in Australia, in order to 
understand non-hierarchical criminal organisations which are founded and managed by 
successful criminal entrepreneurs. The study picks up where Bright et al. (2015), Morselli 
(2009, 2003, 2001), Morselli, Tanguay and Labalette (2008),  Lauchs and Staines (2012), 
Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain (2012), and Lauchs, Keast and Yousefpour (2011) left off, 
these researchers having found that non-hierarchical organised crime is made up of loosely 
connected criminal entrepreneurs who collaborate towards a collective goal. Brokers play an 
essential and critical role in non-hierarchical organised crime, as they connect individuals and 
parties, and extend resources (Lauchs and Staines 2012; Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain 
2012; Morselli and Roy 2008). Non-hierarchically structured organised crime does not have 
the classic structure of a defined leader and differently ranked members, however brokers in 
non-hierarchically organised crime play the role of a leader as they connect, coordinate, 
access and control resources.  
This chapter discusses the outcome of the data and results chapter, starting with the criminal 
entrepreneur modus essendi. The vision and the sources of criminal entrepreneur visions are 
discussed, starting with the available resources. Within the available resources, social 
network, and in particular the influence of social capital on criminal entrepreneur visions is 
examined. The influence of role models on criminal entrepreneur visions is then discussed. 
The absence of a biological father and this effect on criminal entrepreneur visions is 
examined. The effect of the mass media on criminal entrepreneur visions is then discussed. 
Personal experience and strength are both examined and their influence on criminal 
entrepreneur vision is described. The original contribution of this study to the criminal 
entrepreneur vision formation process is described. The leadership style and orientation of 
entrepreneurs, and their identity and identity status are also discussed, and this thesis original 
contribution to the academic literature is described.  
Criminal entrepreneur modus operandi is discussed, starting with its filling a gap in the 
criminal market or milieu. Criminal entrepreneur brokerage in organised crime is then 
described and discussed. Then bribery modus operandi of the criminal entrepreneurs in this 
study is illustrated and discussed. The original contribution of this study to the academic 
bribery literature is described. When bribery failed, the criminal entrepreneurs in this study 
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turned to blackmail. The original contribution of this thesis to the academic literature on 
blackmail from a criminal entrepreneurship approach is described and presented. 
Criminal entrepreneur modus vivendi is discussed. First the role of mentors is outlined and 
their influence on criminal entrepreneur modus operandi is described. The original 
contribution of this study to the academic literature of mentorship and successful criminal 
entrepreneurship is described. Criminal human capital and its influence on the success of a 
criminal entrepreneur is described and discussed. The influence of the embedded resources in 
a criminal entrepreneur’s network is then discussed and presented, via their modus vivendi. 
Finally this chapter concludes by introducing the theory of successful criminal entrepreneurs. 
The limitations of this study and suggestions for future research are described last.  The next 
section will provide a brief outline of the methodology applied in the research in order to 
provide a clear guidance on how these arguments and conclusion were constructed and 
reached. 
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5.2 Modus essendi  
Modus essendi involves the characteristics and identity of successful criminal entrepreneurs. 
Due to the limited time and resources of this study, only leadership (comprised of vision, 
leadership style and orientation) and identity have been examined extensively, in each phase 
of the criminal entrepreneur careers. This section starts by discussing the vision of criminal 
entrepreneurs.  
5.2.1 Vision  
As the best planning strategy, vision is defined as “an idealized future goal state, as a plan for 
the future goal attainment, and as an image of the future that articulates the values, purposes 
and identify of followers” (Strange and Mumford 2005, 122). This section will examine the 
influence of available resources, social networks, personal strength and personal experience, 
which are known contributors to the formation of a business entrepreneur’s vision, on the 
formation of successful criminal entrepreneur visions and the vision formation process 
(Kaiser, Feldhusen and Fordinal 2013; Hanks and McCarrey 2015; Filion 1991; Strange and 
Mumford 2005). The rationale behind examining the sources and contributors of business 
entrepreneurs visions against that of criminal entrepreneurs is that they are also business 
entrepreneurs, but in a different field. Understanding successful criminal entrepreneur vision, 
and the sources and contributors to those visions, has implications for early intervention 
programmes.   
5.2.2 Available resources 
The available resources considered in this study are the accessible social and human capital 
of the entrepreneurs, as shown in Figure 25 below. This study argues that the resources 
available to criminal entrepreneurs have a significant influence on their vision and the vision 
formation process. The rationale behind focusing on social and human capital is in the 
implications they have for early intervention programmes, as investing in the right human and 
social capital could deter young adults from a career in crime. This section starts by 
examining social networks. 
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Figure 25 Available resources  
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.3 Social networks 
A social network in its simplest form is a connection of actors. To be able to describe the 
influence of social networks on criminal entrepreneur vision, this study focused on a criminal 
entrepreneur’s social capital, which is measured by examining the direct and indirect ties of 
entrepreneur within their network.  
5.2.4 Social capital  
Social capital is argued to be a source of inspiration for the entrepreneurial vision of business 
entrepreneurs (Strange and Mumford 2005, 2002; Hanks and McCarrey 2015). This study 
argues that social capital also inspires criminal entrepreneur vision.   
Freeman’s vision was strongly influenced by his social capital, which included Darcy 
Duncan, a local criminal he encountered and connected with in Phases One to Three 
(Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Deans 2010). Freeman stated in his book that from a young 
age (Phase One), he wanted to be just like Duncan, a successful crook (Freeman 1988; 
Reeves 2011; Deans 2010).  
Similar to Freeman, Saffron’s vision was inspired by his social capital, which included his 
businessman father (McNab 2005; Reeves 2007b; Saffron 2009). Saffron senior was a 
businessman who supported his son early in his business career by providing the financial 
and social capital (business partners) needed to buy the Roosevelt Club (McNab 2005; 
Reeves 2007b; Saffron 2009). Their similarity in trade and their close relationship suggests 
that Saffron’s vision of becoming a businessman was inspired by his businessman father. 
This study therefore argues that Saffron’s vision and vision formation process was influenced 
by his social capital, which included his father. Social capital also had an influence on 
Askin’s vision, although not through his father.      
Available resources 
Human capital Social network 
Role models Social capital Literature 
(Reading 
Material) 
Personal experience 
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Although Askin did not describe a specific individual as influencing his vision, the data 
suggests that his social capital had a significant influence on the formation of his vision. The 
idea of becoming a politician was suggested to Askin by Colonel Murray Robson while 
working on Percy Spencer’s political campaign (Hickie 1985; Reading 1989; Hancock 2006; 
Goot 2007). Based on the advice from Robson, Askin joined the Liberal Party, and 
accomplished his vision of becoming a successful politician by becoming the leader of the 
Liberal Party and the Premier of NSW in 1965 (Hickie 1985; Reading 1989; Hancock 2006; 
Goot 2007).  
Although Askin’s vision started with advice from Robson, Askin never suggested that 
Robson was his role model. Freeman, McPherson and Saffron, however, all had role models 
who significantly influenced their visions.  
5.2.5 Role models 
Role models had a significant effect on the vision of McPherson, Freeman and Saffron, but 
not that of Askin. A role model is ‘a cognitive construction based on the attributes of people 
in social roles an individual perceives to be similar to him or herself to some extent and 
desires to increase perceived similarity by emulating those attributes’ (Gibson 2004, 136). 
This study adopts Gibson (2004) definition of role models, as it differentiates between role 
models and mentors. The differentiation is crucial for this study, because role models have an 
effect on criminal entrepreneur vision and the vision formation process, but not on their 
modus operandi, which is influenced by mentors.  
With the exception of Askin, all three criminal entrepreneurs had clear role models in Phases 
One and/or Two (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011, 2007a; Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 
2010; McNab 2005). McPherson stated in Phase Two that his role model was Al Capone 
(Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Deans 2010), and he strived to mimic and emulate Al Capone’s 
career and iconic status throughout his life (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Deans 2010).  
Similar to McPherson, Freeman also had a criminal as his role model in Darcy Duncan (Coy 
2010; Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011). Although the data does not provide significant insight 
into Duncan’s criminal career, Freeman reported that he always looked up to Duncan and 
admired his social status as a rough, tough criminal (Coy 2010; Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011). 
Freeman later stated in Phase One that his vision was to be a ‘crook’ just like Duncan (Coy 
2010; Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011). 
  
Chapter 5: Discussion 225  
Saffron did not say he had a role model, but the data collected revealed that Saffron admired 
his businessman father, who taught him and supported his business career from Phase One by 
providing, financial, human and social capital (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; 
McNab 2005). In return, Saffron followed the footsteps of his father by building a business 
empire which was in line with his father’s career and expertise in business (Saffron 2009; 
Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). This study therefore argues that Saffron’s vision 
was influenced by his role model, who was his father.  
Askin neither stated that he had a role model, nor does the data indicate a specific person that 
Askin admired or considered his role model (Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989; 
Abjorensen 2004; Hickie 1985).  
The role models noted in this study contributed to criminal entrepreneur vision in Phases One 
and Two. The role models for the successful criminal entrepreneurs in this study were not all 
criminals, as in the case of Saffron, and moreover, the role models were not all part of the 
social capital of the criminal entrepreneurs, as in the case of McPherson, who had never 
personally met his role model, Al Capone (Reeves 2007a). The role models did not provide 
or inspire the modus operandi to accomplish a vision. Role models only provide a projected 
image of the future for the criminal entrepreneur that motivates them to achieve their vision. 
This finding extends the work of Hanks and McCarrey (2015), Strange and Mumford (2005, 
2002) who argued that social capital inspires and influences a vision, by adding role models 
as significant contributors to criminal entrepreneur vision. This also study found that criminal 
entrepreneurs can be inspired by both criminal and non-criminal role models. The study 
found that not all criminal entrepreneurs started with a criminal vision. 
Having a criminal as a role model can also be due to the absence of a biological father, which 
this study argues to have a significant influence on the vision of the criminal entrepreneurs 
featured in this study. 
5.2.6 Absence of a biological father 
The absence of a biological father had an effect on McPherson and Freeman’s vision and 
vision formation process. This conclusion was drawn by comparing the original visions of 
Saffron and Askin, who grew up with their biological fathers, to those of McPherson and 
Freeman who did not.  
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Saffron and Askin’s vision in Phases One and Two did not include criminal elements such as 
being a leader in organised crime (Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989; Hickie 1985; 
Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). In contrast, Freeman and 
McPherson stated a clear criminal vision from Phases One and Two (Freeman 1988; Reeves 
2011, 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010). The difference between McPherson and Freeman, and 
Saffron and Askin is the presence and absence of their biological fathers.  
Saffron grew up with his biological father, who had a significant influence on his vision, as 
he was his role model, as mentioned earlier (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; 
McNab 2005). Saffron’s father in fact, asked his friend who was Saffron business partner at 
the Roosevelt Club to report back on Saffron’s activities at the Roosevelt Club (Saffron 2009; 
Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). Although Saffron was involved in corruption and 
bribery, his original vision did not include crime (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; 
McNab 2005). Saffron had to bribe corrupt police for his business to survive (Saffron 2009; 
Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). In other words, this study suggests that the 
presence and close relationship between Saffron and his father prevented him from 
developing a criminal vision, as he supervised and mentored his son.  
Askin’s case is similar to that of Saffron, as neither of their visions originally included a 
criminal element (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005; Hancock 2006; 
Goot 2007; Reading 1989; Hickie 1985). Askin’s parents married in 1916 when Askin was 
nine years old, and the Askin family moved to Glebe (Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 
1989; Hickie 1985). This study assumes that Askin grew up with his biological father. 
Similar to Saffron, Askin chose corruption to accomplish his vision (Hancock 2006; Goot 
2007; Reading 1989; Hickie 1985).    
On the other hand, Freeman and McPherson grew-up without their biological fathers 
(Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011, 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010). As a result, they did not have 
a guardian who would prevent or filter the ideas and education they received. Freeman and 
McPherson also grew up in poverty surrounded by criminals, where stealing and crime was 
considered a moral activity as everyone in their community was begging or stealing to make 
ends meet (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011, 2007a; Deans 2010; Coy 2010). Both Freeman and 
McPherson were raised idealising and admiring criminals without an adult to prevent, correct 
or provide an alternative role model or vision (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011, 2007a; Deans 
2010; Coy 2010).  
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This study suggests that the absence of Freeman’s and McPherson’s biological fathers 
contributed to their adopting and developing a criminal vision. Biological fathers did not 
prevent a criminal career, but only a criminal vision. The presence of a biological father also 
influenced the nature of the criminal entrepreneur’s criminality. For instance, McPherson and 
Freeman, who grew up without a biological father, were engaged directly in violent crimes 
such as murder and assault. Saffron and Askin who grew up with their biological fathers, 
engaged in white-collar crimes such as fraud and bribery. These findings supports the work 
of Hanks and McCarrey (2015), Strange and Mumford (2005, 2002) who described the main 
sources of vision as including the absence of a biological father to influence the type of vision 
that was developed. This finding also supports Morselli (2001, 2003) and Lauchs and 
Straines’s (2012) studies of criminal entrepreneurs, by noting that the absence of a biological 
father contributes to the nature of crimes of the criminal entrepreneur. Those who did not 
grow up with a biological father, such as McPherson, replaced their father with a role model, 
such as Al Capone, who McPherson found through the mass media, which this study argues 
had a significant influence on his criminal entrepreneurial vision.  
5.2.7 Literature 
Literature is ‘the body of serious, thoughtful writing on whatever subjects are of interest to 
the members of that community’ (Edgerlon 1967, 122) which is considered in this study as 
mass media, and is argued to have a significant influence on the vision and vision formation 
process of criminal entrepreneurs in this study. 
Literature inspired McPherson’s and influenced Askin’s vision (Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; 
Reading 1989; Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010). Both criminal entrepreneurs read literature in their 
career (Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989; Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010). In Phase Two, 
McPherson read extensively about organised crime in the US, and particularly about Al 
Capone (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). Askin read liberal politics books extensively 
in Phases One and Two (Hickie 1985; Reading 1989; Hancock 2006; Goot 2007). Unlike 
McPherson, there is no evidence that Askin’s criminality was inspired by the liberal books he 
read. Both criminal entrepreneurs followed the path and culture of the literature they had read 
(Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989; Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010).  
In this study, the influence of literature on the entrepreneur’s vision and vision formation 
process is almost as strong as the influence of social capital. McPherson relied almost only on 
literature in forming his vision, and he became as successful as those whose vision was 
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inspired by social capital, such as Freeman, Saffron and Askin. There is no indication of 
another source of inspiration for McPherson than Al Capone and the US mafia (Coy 2010; 
Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010). During Phases One and Two, there were no US mafia personnel 
or successful criminals of Al Capone’s calibre close to McPherson to inspire him (Coy 2010; 
Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010). McPherson also referred to Al Capone and the US mafia as a 
reference for what organised crime in Sydney should be (Coy 2010; Reeves 2007a; Deans 
2010). As mentioned earlier, McPherson approached the US mafia twice for collaboration 
purposes (Coy 2010; Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010). Based on this evidence, this study argues 
that literature was the main source of inspiration to McPherson’s criminal vision.  
Similar to McPherson, Askin was heavily influenced by literature in forming his political 
vision (Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989; Hickie 1985). Based on the data collected, 
Askin read intensively on liberal politics in Phases One and Two (Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; 
Reading 1989; Hickie 1985). Despite growing up in a household that supported the Labour 
Party, Askin joined and led the Liberal Party to office in 1965 (Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; 
Reading 1989; Hickie 1985). Based on the link between the type of literature and the political 
party Askin joined, this thesis argues that Askin’s vision was influenced by literature, 
although it was not the main source of his vision, as with McPherson. This finding extends 
the findings of Hanks and McCarrey (2015), Strange and Mumford (2005, 2002) about 
sources of vision, by adding literature as a main significant source of vision. Literature can 
inspire both criminal and non-criminal visions. In addition to literature, Askin’s vision was 
also influenced by his personal experience.        
5.2.8 Personal experience 
Personal experience is an essential element in the formation of vision (Strange and Mumford 
2002), but not in the case of all the criminal entrepreneurs featured in this study. Experience 
includes the daily activities, feelings and thoughts of the criminal entrepreneur 
(Csikszentmihalyi 2014). In this context, personal experience can be divided into two main 
sections as shown in Figure 26, personal experience that inspires a vision and personal 
experience that changes a vision. 
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Figure 26 Personal experience and vision 
 
 
 
 
 
The data collected shows that the daily activities, feelings and thoughts of Askin and Saffron 
contributed to their visions and the vision formation process. Despite his civic engagement, 
involvement with various social clubs and the personal experiences gained from these 
engagements in Phase One, Askin did not have a clear vision (Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; 
Reading 1989; Hickie 1985), however Askin’s personal experience, working in the successful 
political campaign of Percy Spencer, contributed to his interest in becoming a politician and 
vision of what success looked like (Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989; Hickie 1985). 
Prior to working on Spencer’s political campaign, Askin wanted to be a tradesman of some 
kind (Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989; Hickie 1985). In fact, Askin stated that prior 
to being a politician he was wasting his time (Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989; 
Hickie 1985). This study therefore argues that in addition to social capital, personal 
experience had an influence on Askin’s vision and vision formation process.  
Similar to Askin, Saffron’s personal experiences in arbitrage contributed to the formation of 
his vision of becoming a successful businessman. As a youngster, Saffron’s daily activities 
included arbitrage as he sold cigarettes and books, and he grew up close to his father who 
owned a clothing business (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). 
Saffron’s early arbitrage activities, his stated vision of becoming a successful businessman, 
and his later (Phases Three and Four) arbitrage activities, are all consistent with having 
business as the core activity and Saffron’s main personal experience (Saffron 2009; Reeves 
2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). In addition to inspiring his vision, personal experience 
also slightly changed Saffron’s vision to that of becoming an organised crime leader.  
As a businessman, Saffron had to bribe corrupt police to turn a blind eye to his criminal 
activities, which included selling liquor illegally after hours (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; 
Piper 2010; McNab 2005). In effect, corrupt police began to extort Saffron to pay them 
bigger bribes if he did not want them to expose his illegal activities (Saffron 2009; Reeves 
2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). The experience of being extorted changed Saffron’s vision 
Personal experience 
Inspire vision Change the vision 
  
Chapter 5: Discussion 230  
to include becoming a member of organised crime to protect himself. This study therefore 
argues that personal experience contributed to Saffron’s vision and vision formation process. 
Unlike Askin and Saffron, the personal experiences of McPherson and Freeman did not 
influence their vision or vision formation process. In other words, there was no event or 
personal experience that inspired or sparked neither McPherson’s vision, nor a specifically 
defined obstacle that suggested a career in crime was the way to overcome it. Like 
McPherson, Freeman’s vision in Phases One and Two of becoming a successful criminal was 
not influenced by personal experience. The data collected does not show any personal 
experience that Freeman went through which inspired his vision of becoming a criminal.  
This finding confirms Hanks and McCarrey (2015) argument that personal experience is a 
primary sources of vision, as in the case of Saffron. This study suggests that personal 
experience contributes to the formation of criminal entrepreneur vision, but it is not the main 
or primary source of vision, as in the case of McPherson, Freeman and Askin. This study also 
rejects Kaiser, Feldhusen and Fordinal (2013) argument that personal strength is a primary 
source of vision, as discussed next.     
5.2.9 Personal Strength  
Personal strength is defined as comprising ‘a variety of personal traits which assist 
individuals in dealing with day-to-day work situations’ (Evers and Rush 1996, 281). Personal 
strength is measured by an entrepreneur’s ability to maintain 1) high energy levels, 2) 
motivation to function at an optimal level of performance, 3) function in stressful situations, 
4) a positive attitude, 5) the ability to work independently and 6) appropriate responses to 
constructive criticism (Evers and Rush 1996, 281) in addition to special skills and qualities. 
Kaiser, Feldhusen and Fordinal (2013) argued that an entrepreneur’s personal strength plays a 
role in the formation of their vision. This thesis argues that personal strength did not play a 
role in the formation of vision for the criminal entrepreneurs in this study.  
Although all entrepreneurs developed a vision in Phases One or Two, where only Askin had 
personal strength which included social skills and capital; not all the criminal entrepreneurs 
of this study identified and developed a personal strength in Phases One and Two. The data 
collected does not show any incident where the criminal entrepreneur’s personal strength 
sparked or initiated a vision. Personal strength did, however, play a critical role in executing 
the criminal entrepreneur vision. In other words, personal strength is strongly associated with 
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modus operandi rather than vision and the vision formation process. This study thus argues 
that personal strength has no significant effect on vision and the vision formation process of 
criminal entrepreneurs. 
5.3 Bringing it all together 
Vision is the starting point of all criminal entrepreneur careers. Vision can be formed in 
different phases, and can change through time, however the journey to success starts with a 
clearly defined vision. The literature suggests personal experience, personal strength, social 
network and available resources as the primary sources of vision (Kaiser, Feldhusen and 
Fordinal 2013; Hanks and McCarrey 2015; Filion 1991; Strange and Mumford 2005), and 
this study argues that not all the primary resources described in the literature inspired the four 
criminal entrepreneur visions in this study, such as personal strength. Vision can also be 
inspired from more than one source, such as social networks, role models and personal 
experience. This study adds the additional primary sources of vision, in its original 
contribution to the criminal entrepreneurship literature.  
5.4 Original contribution to criminal entrepreneurship literature    
The original contribution of this section to the vision literature is introducing literature (as 
mass media) as a primary source of criminal entrepreneur vision. Role models and the 
absence of a biological father are also contributors to a criminal entrepreneur’s ‘criminal’ 
vision. This study also found social capital and literature to be the most influential sources of 
vision. This study rejects personal strength as a primary source of vision, particularly in the 
case of criminal entrepreneurs. This study also argues that successful criminal entrepreneurs 
adopt charismatic leadership styles in accomplishing their vision.     
5.5 Leadership style and orientation 
Leadership style is the approach leaders use when interacting and attracting followers 
(O'Connor et al. 1996; Strange and Mumford 2002; House and Howell 1992; Oreg and 
Berson 2015; Hofmann 2015). This study argues that leadership style plays a significant role 
in accomplishing criminal entrepreneur vision. Leadership style is also highly influenced by 
the type of vision to be accomplished, whether it is political, business or criminal. The 
environment in which the entrepreneurs operate also has a significant influence on 
entrepreneur leadership style.   
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In this study, the four criminal entrepreneurs led with a charismatic leadership style at the 
peak of their career. This leadership style played a significant role in the success of their 
criminal entrepreneur vision. The significant influence of the leadership style in 
accomplishing the vision is in its effectiveness in attracting followers and associates to the 
criminal entrepreneurs, based on their network location. In other words, charismatic 
leadership style contributed to the success of criminal entrepreneurs who occupied brokerage 
and central positions in their network.     
As a broker, having a charismatic leadership style attracts followers and associates who 
provide information. As a broker it is also necessary to deal with different associates and 
criminal groups, and therefore the broker has to be flexible and adoptable to change, which is 
consistent with a charismatic leadership style.  
In Sydney, where the criminal entrepreneurs in this study operated, there were rival criminal 
groups (Reeves 2007a, 2007b, 2011) and so it was important for the criminal entrepreneurs to 
attract followers to their own criminal group rather than the rival groups. For instance, 
McPherson’s strength was his ability to provide information and connect criminals to corrupt 
police (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). Freeman’s strength was his ability to 
cooperate with other SP bookies and criminal groups (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 
2010). Saffron’s strength as a businessman was his ability to attract customers, investors and 
the cooperation of corrupt police (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). 
Askin’s strength was his ability to connect, relate, and attract votes, becoming NSW Premier, 
which enabled him to facilitate what was necessary for organised crime to work, by 
protecting protection providers such as corrupt police (Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 
1989; Abjorensen 2004; Hickie 1985). Charismatic leadership complemented the strength of 
the criminal entrepreneur’s, and contributed to their success. An additional contribution to 
Askin’s success was his leadership orientation, which was personal and social.  
As a politician, Askin had to serve the public which explains his personal and social 
orientation. This personal orientation fulfilled Askin’s need for personal success; while 
Askin’s social orientation enabled him to satisfy the public’s needs as a politician, which 
contributed to his success and to winning the Premiership in 1965.  
Similar to Askin, Saffron’s leadership was personal and social. This personal orientation 
fulfilled Saffron’s personal need for success; however the social orientation of Saffron’s 
leadership was due to his generous donations and charity fundraising efforts. The motive 
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behind Saffron’s social leadership approach was to rehabilitate his scarred public image, as 
he was linked to various criminal activities and a sex scandal (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; 
Piper 2010; McNab 2005). Although Saffron had a social leadership approach by definition; 
it was aimed at his personal interests.  
Unlike Askin and Saffron, McPherson and Freeman only had personal orientation in their 
charismatic leadership style, which reflects their narcissistic personality, a common trait 
among criminals and shared among the four criminal entrepreneurs featured in this study 
(Perri 2011). In other words, McPherson and Freeman only aimed at benefiting themselves, 
their followers and associates, in the accomplishment of their vision and by leading with a 
charismatic approach. These findings make a significant contribution to the criminological 
literature.  
5.6 Original contribution of leadership style and orientation 
The original contribution of the previous section is in confirming Wright’s (2013) argument 
that organised crime leaders are charismatic leaders. This study also found that criminal 
entrepreneurs who occupied brokerage and central positions in a criminal network were 
charismatic leaders in the field. Criminal entrepreneurs can have both personal and social 
orientation in their leadership style. The leadership style is also reflected in the identity of the 
criminal entrepreneur, which is discussed next.  
5.7 Identity and identity status 
The four criminal entrepreneurs featured in this study had defined identities, in Phases One, 
Two and Three. These identities changed throughout their career, as their goals and self-
conception changed. McPherson’s identity in Phases One and Two was a crime leader. In 
Phase Three, McPherson’s identity changed to that of an international organised crime leader, 
as he had connections to the US mafia, and prostitution rackets in Manila (Reeves 2007a; 
Deans 2010; Morton and Lobez 2011), however in Phase Four McPherson went through an 
identity crisis, when he was charged and sentenced to prison towards the end of Phase Four  
(Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Morton and Lobez 2011). McPherson changed his name and 
started volunteering at a homeless shelter  (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Morton and Lobez 
2011). In the fourth phase, McPherson went into a deep depression, and later suffered a heart 
attack in prison which resulted in his death (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Morton and Lobez 
2011).  
  
Chapter 5: Discussion 234  
This study argues that McPherson’s loss of his criminal capital (as friends and partners in 
crime), as most either died or were incarcerated, and the loss of his connections with the 
police, as most either retired or were prosecuted for corruption, led to his loss of power, 
authority and criminal status which led to his loss of identity. Despite the presence and 
support of his family, McPherson lost his identity and identity status. In other words, the loss 
of McPherson’s criminal capital resulted in the loss of his identity and identity status. 
Therefore this study argues that criminal capital has a significant influence on the identity and 
identity status of criminal entrepreneurs.  
On the other hand, the identities of Freeman, Saffron and Askin changed with their goals and 
self-conception. The identity measurement also confirms the collaborative attitudes of 
criminal entrepreneurs, which was a key element in their success, particularly in non-
hierarchically organised crime settings and a corrupt environment. These findings make a 
significant contribution to the criminal entrepreneur literature, as described next.  
5.8 Original contribution of identity  
The original contribution of the section about identity is in outlining the influence of criminal 
capital on the identity and identity status of successful criminal entrepreneurs, and confirming 
criminal entrepreneur collaborative attitudes. In other words, changes to and loss of criminal 
capital can lead to changes in the identity and identity status of criminal entrepreneurs. This 
also confirms that the identity of criminal entrepreneurs can change as they adopt new goals 
and self-concept. This study supports Gottschalk and Smith (2011) argument that criminals 
build new socially accepted identities to neutralise their criminal identity, as in the case of 
McPherson.  
5.9 Bringing it all together 
Modus essendi enabled the researcher to understand criminal entrepreneur behaviour. Due to 
constraints of time and resources faced by this study, the researcher focused on the leadership 
of four criminal entrepreneurs, which was composed of vision, leadership style and 
orientation, and identity and identity status. 
This study found that the criminal entrepreneurs had a clearly defined vision, which was the 
start of their career. Not all the criminal entrepreneurs in this study started with a ‘criminal’ 
vision. The criminality of the vision was strongly influenced by the source of vision. 
McPherson and Freeman both had a criminal vision at the beginning of their criminal career. 
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The strongest influence on McPherson’s vision was literature (such as mass media). On the 
other hand, the strongest influence on Freeman’s vision was social capital.  
Unlike McPherson and Freeman, Saffron and Askin’s visions were not criminal at first. 
Saffron’s initial vision was to become a successful businessman, while Askin’s vision was to 
become a successful politician, however due to external circumstances, including the corrupt 
environment he was operating in, Saffron focused on becoming a member of an organised 
crime group, in order to overcome the corruption in Sydney at the time. Once Saffron became 
a member of organised crime, he exploited all the criminal opportunities that he was able to 
harvest for his own benefit.  
Similar to Saffron, Askin’s original vision did not include any criminal elements, but he 
engaged in criminal activities to overcome the challenges in the political field, and for 
personal gain. In other words, the major contributors to Saffron and Askin’s criminal visions 
were external factors such as their personal experience working in a corrupt environment, but 
their original non-criminal visions were inspired by social capital. This thesis argues that in 
general, the most influential sources of vision are social capital, which is consistent with the 
arguments of Strange and Mumford (2005, 2002), Hanks and McCarrey (2015), and 
literature, which is an original contribution to the field. In addition to outlining the primary 
sources of vision, this study also describes significant contributions to the formation of 
vision. This study found that the most influential contributors to a criminal vision are 
personal experience, social capital and literature. This finding extends the primary sources of 
vision suggested by Strange and Mumford (2005, 2002) and Hanks and McCarrey (2015), by 
adding influential contributors which are not primary sources of vision but only contribute to 
the formation of it.          
Once the criminal entrepreneurs formed their vision, they all accomplished it at the peak of 
their career with a charismatic leadership style. The significance of the charismatic leadership 
style is its effectiveness and efficiency in a corrupt environment and a non-hierarchically 
organised crime setting. Charismatic leadership is also efficient and effective in brokerage 
and central positions within the criminal network. Leadership orientation is influenced by the 
criminal entrepreneur’s occupation and their public image. Criminal entrepreneurs who 
worked in public service positions had a social orientation that led them to fulfil their job 
requirements, such as those of being a politician. On the other hand, criminal entrepreneurs 
with scarred public images had a social orientation in their leadership style that led them to 
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rehabilitate their public image. This finding confirms Wright’s (2013) argument that 
organised crime leaders are charismatic. It also supports the studies of Morselli (2001, 2003, 
2009) and Luachs and Staines (2012) in noting that criminal entrepreneurs who occupy 
brokerage positions are charismatic leaders in their field. This study adds that being 
charismatic contributes to the success of brokers as it enables them to attract and influence 
followers in their position. In other words, to be able to occupy a brokerage position, it is 
necessary to be charismatic.  
Criminal entrepreneur identity is also reflective of their vision. For instance, McPherson and 
Freeman identified themselves as criminals, which was their self-conception. Saffron’s 
identity was as a businessman and Askin’s was that of a politician. Religion and beliefs are 
also a part of identity, and all four criminal entrepreneurs had religious beliefs, but this did 
not prevent them from engaging in criminal activities. With the exception of Askin, none of 
the criminal entrepreneurs had any political motives behind their crimes. Criminal 
entrepreneur identities change according to their visions and self-conceptions. These changes 
can be due to external factors such being labelled a criminal, which attracts unwanted 
attention such as the police. This finding is consistent with Gottschalk and Smith (2011) 
argument that criminals adopt a socially acceptable identity to neutralise their criminal 
identity. This finding confirms that criminal entrepreneurs are different from the impulsive 
criminals described in low self-control theory (Morselli and Tremblay 2004). To understand 
how the criminal entrepreneurs accomplished their vision, the next section describes their 
modus operandi. 
5.10 Modus operandi 
Modus operandi is the operational approach used by criminal entrepreneurs in this study in 
accomplishing their vision. Due to limited time and resources, this study focused only on 
three components of criminal entrepreneur modus operandi: finding a gap in the criminal 
market and/or field, bribery and blackmail. The rationale behind focusing on gaps in the 
market, bribery and blackmail, is their significance role in the success of the criminal 
entrepreneurs early in their career (Hickie 1985; Reeves 2007a, 2007b, 2011). 
This section will discuss these three components as stages in the modus operandi of 
successful criminal entrepreneurs. This author argues that filling a gap in the market is an 
important and critical step towards a successful criminal career. It also argues that gaps in the 
criminal market can be created by the police. Once a gap in the criminal market is identified 
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and filled, successful criminal entrepreneurs will start a bribery scheme to maintain control 
and ensure the cooperation of corrupt police in exploiting the market gap they have occupied.  
There are two main bribery scheme structures, a one-degree structure where A bribes B, and 
a triad structure where A bribes B, and B bribes C. This thesis argues that a one-degree 
structure bribery scheme is ineffective in a low-trust, non-hierarchal crime organisation. The 
successful criminal entrepreneurs in this study therefore adopted a triad structure bribery 
scheme, but when the triad bribery structure failed, the criminal entrepreneurs resorted to 
blackmail.  
Blackmail is a crime used by the four criminal entrepreneurs in this study to force 
collaboration and protect themselves from honest police, politicians or anyone who tried to 
interrupt or expose their illegal activities. This thesis argues that in a low-trust corrupt 
environment, a type of blackmail known as ‘entrepreneurial blackmail’ is the most effective. 
This section starts by explaining the gap in the market.      
5.11 Filling a gap in the field and/or market 
One of the most critical steps in a criminal entrepreneur’s career is identifying a gap in the 
market. A market is “meeting-places of considerable numbers of buyers and sellers, trading 
under something like true competitive conditions” (Fetter 1924, 520). Accordingly, the 
current study defines a gap in the market as the absence of a seller or a competitor in a given 
market place. There are a number of factors that contribute to creating a gap in the criminal 
market; however this study focuses on the role of the police in creating new gaps in the 
criminal market.   
Police create gaps in the criminal market by arresting active criminals and removing them 
from the criminal marketplace. This creates a new opportunity for criminal entrepreneurs to 
fill that gap. The effect of police arrests in creating criminal opportunities is important in 
loosely connected organised crime groups, as for the criminal entrepreneurs in Sydney 
featured in this study. From the early 1920s to the early 2000s, Sydney has had high levels of 
corruption and low levels of trust among criminal groups (Bottom 1979, 1984; Hickie 1985; 
Morton and Lobez 2011). It was a challenge for criminal groups to recruit new members, as a 
number of criminals were collaborating with corrupt police to expose the activities of other 
criminal groups (Morton and Lobez 2011; Reeves 2007a, 2011). Once criminal entrepreneurs 
gain the trust of a few select criminal groups in providing the products and services they 
  
Chapter 5: Discussion 238  
need, they are more likely to hold a monopoly in the crime market. In other words, the more 
efficient the police are in terms of making arrests, the more crime opportunities they create. 
The more crime opportunities that are created, the more criminal entrepreneurs are made.  
McPherson filled a gap in the criminal market by providing a hiding place for wanted 
criminals at large (Reeves 2007a; Morton and Lobez 2011; Coy 2010). In turn, McPherson 
provided a service for the police, providing the location of the wanted criminals at large, and 
any additional information needed about Sydney’s active criminals (Reeves 2007a; Morton 
and Lobez 2011; Coy 2010). The information McPherson provided led to police arrests. 
Police officers and detectives who made the arrests were rewarded and promoted for their 
outstanding efforts. In return, the political party in office was seen as efficient in bringing the 
most wanted and feared criminals to justice. Corrupt police and politicians therefore provided 
immunity to McPherson so as to benefit themselves.   
Freeman, on the other hand, filled different gaps in the criminal market: money laundering, 
illegal cash flow and providing protection for illegal SP bookies. Freeman’s ability to fill 
these gaps was due to his connections with horse trainers and jockeys, who he provided with 
performance-enhancing drugs to ensure that they would win, or doped their horses to ensure 
their loss; which was his horse fixing modus operandi (Coy 2010; Freeman 1988; Reeves 
2011). Through his horse race-fixing approach, Freeman ensured illegal cash flow and money 
laundering. Through his partnership with McPherson and corrupt policemen, Freeman was 
also able to provide protection to other illegal SP bookies operating in Sydney (Coy 2010; 
Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011).    
Saffron filled two gaps in the criminal market. The first was the provision of liquor outside 
trading hours (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). The second was the 
provision of exclusive and anonymous free prostitution services for high-profile government 
and community personnel (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). Askin 
filled a gap in the criminal market by providing protection to other providers of protection in 
NSW (Hickie 1985).    
5.12 Original contribution  
By identifying the importance of the individual’s ability to fill a gap in their field, this thesis 
has made an original contribution to the criminal entrepreneurship literature. A major factor 
in the success of criminal entrepreneurs is their ability to recognise and address a gap in their 
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field of operation. This finding is consistent with illicit enterprise theory (Haller 1990); 
however the gaps in the market are created by police through arrests and criminal groups by 
eliminating other goods and services suppliers. Not all eliminations and police arrests create a 
promising gap in the field, however. Arresting and eliminating criminals occupying a critical 
position in their network, such as a brokerage position, creates a promising gap in their field 
for a potential successful criminal entrepreneur. These findings extend Ramoglou and 
Zyglidopoulos (2015) argument that entrepreneurs create their own opportunity, by arguing 
that criminal entrepreneurs create new opportunities in the market by providing information 
about other active criminals, and having them arrested and incarcerated by corrupt police. 
This study supports the work of Gottschalk (2010), Ruggiero (2015), Kupatadze (2015), 
Alvarez and Barney (2007) who argued that criminal entrepreneurs are the products of the 
opportunities presented and use collaboration with resource holders to exploit opportunities, 
by arguing that opportunities can be created by police arrests and that criminal entrepreneurs 
cooperate with corrupt police to create new opportunities in the market by arranging to arrest 
other active criminals. Furthermore, the models, figures and tables presented also provide 
significant contribution to the fields of criminal entrepreneurship studies as it can serve as 
template to examine the careers of successful criminal entrepreneurs, which would link the 
findings directly to other existing studies in the field such as this thesis and the studies it 
building on.       
5.13 Brokerage  
Criminal entrepreneurs who occupy a brokerage position in the criminal market are more 
likely to succeed due to the privileges of the position. As a broker, a criminal entrepreneur 
controls valuable information for other criminals and criminal groups which includes their 
needs in terms of services such as money laundering, contract killers and/or information 
about any investigation being carried out against them, or goods such as guns, illicit drugs 
and/or forged documents. Conversely, the broker can also provide services to the police, such 
as the location of wanted criminals at large, any planned criminal activities, including those 
against honest police and/or judges, and providing the location of stored stolen goods and/or 
illegal products such as illicit drugs and unregistered guns.   
Information enables police to make arrest and collect evidence. The value of the information 
to other criminal groups is in their knowledge of the weaknesses and limitations of rival 
criminal groups, which can lead to outperforming and eliminating the competition. Knowing 
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the specific needs of a criminal group enables a broker to exchange the services and products 
needed at a price. Due to the low levels of trust in Sydney’s non-hierarchically organised 
crime (Hickie 1985; Morton and Lobez 2011; Bottom 1979, 1984), criminal groups are less 
likely to work with other brokers once they have worked with a trusted efficient broker. In 
other words, criminal entrepreneurs who successfully occupy a brokerage position hold a 
monopoly in the criminal market. Although all four criminal entrepreneurs in this study 
occupied a brokerage position at the peak of their career; McPherson’s and Askin’s brokerage 
positions in particular played a crucial role in their success.   
McPherson provided information about criminal activities in Sydney and aided the police in 
making arrests (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Morton and Lobez 2011). Through his brokerage 
position, McPherson eliminated a number of his competitors, and challengers such as 
Raymond ‘Ducky’ O’Connor (Reeves 2007a; Coy 2010; Deans 2010). In exchange, the 
police turned a blind eye to McPherson’s criminal activities, and provided immunity from 
prosecution, which was the force behind his extraordinary success in crime (Reeves 2007a; 
Deans 2010; Morton and Lobez 2011). McPherson also provided protection to selected 
criminals who worked and cooperated with him (Reeves 2007a; Deans 2010; Morton and 
Lobez 2011). Figure 27 illustrates McPherson’s brokerage.  
Figure 27: Brokerage 
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Similar to McPherson, Askin also occupied a brokerage position in Phases Two and Three. In 
Phase Two, as a ‘mixer’, Askin had social capital from the lower, middle class and upper 
classes citizens of NSW (Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989; Abjorensen 2004; Hickie 
1985). Once Askin joined the Liberal Party he connected the three social classes to the party. 
Askin collected votes from citizens of all different classes and brought the Liberal Party to 
power, which made him a broker in politics, as shown in Figure 28. In crime, Askin’s 
brokerage position was between illegal casino operators who were his close personal friends 
and associates and corrupt police through his connection and authority over the police 
commissioner (Hickie 1985).  
  Figure 28: Sir Robert Askin’s brokerage  
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Freeman’s brokerage was different from that of McPherson and Askin. Freeman’s brokerage 
focused on providing protection for illegal SP bookies operating in Sydney (Freeman 1988; 
Reeves 2011; Coy 2010). The protection services Freeman offered were an extension of 
McPherson’s immunity arrangement with corrupt police (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 
2010). Later, Freeman also had an arrangement with corrupt police and had his own 
immunity arrangement (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010). Freeman’s brokerage 
positon started with his partnership with McPherson.    
Unlike McPherson, Freeman and Askin, Saffron did not capitalise on brokerage. Throughout 
his criminal career, Saffron only provided protection through his brokerage position to the 
two main associates of his who were charged with murder and assault (Reeves 2007b; Piper 
2010; McNab 2005). Saffron was very selective in his brokerage deals, as he was focused on 
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his central position as one of the main illegal suppliers of liquor in King’s Cross. These 
findings make a significant contribution to the literature about criminal entrepreneurship.    
5.14 Original contribution  
My finding that a brokerage position within a network is of crucial significance in the success 
of a criminal entrepreneur’s career, which is consistent with the findings of Lauchs and 
Staines (2012), Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain (2012), Morselli (2001), Morselli and Roy 
(2008). Criminal entrepreneurs who occupy a brokerage position create further 
entrepreneurial opportunities for up-and-coming criminal entrepreneurs, which is also 
consistent with the arguments of Lauchs and Staines (2012), Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain 
(2012), Morselli (2001) and Morselli and Roy (2008). This study found that in addition to 
brokerage, criminal entrepreneurs occupied a central position in their network of specialty. 
Successful criminal entrepreneurs who occupy a brokerage and central position 
simultaneously lead with charismatic leadership in their network location. In order to remain 
leaders in their fields, the criminal entrepreneurs in this study engaged in a triad bribery 
scheme with corrupt police and politicians (Hickie 1985; Reeves 2007a, 2007b, 2011).  
5.15 The art of bribery  
Bribery is the bloodline of organised crime and corruption (Pritchard 1998; Banuri and Eckel 
2015; Lui 1985; Solar 2015; Lindgren 1993). Bribery is defined as:  
‘[a]ny valuable thing given or promised, or any preferment, 
advantage, privilege or emolument, given or promised corruptly and 
against the law as an inducement to any person acting in an official or 
public capacity to violate or forbear from his duty, or to improperly 
influence his behaviour in the performance of his duty.’ (Driscoll 
1984, 14)  
All four criminal entrepreneurs in this study paid or received bribes for personal gain. Most 
studies examine the classic one-degree bribery structure (see Figure 29) (Belch 2014; 
Pritchard 1998; Banuri and Eckel 2015; Driscoll 1984; Lindgren 1993). This study introduces 
a triad bribery structure. Prior to discussing the triad bribery structure, this thesis will outline 
the advantages and disadvantages of one-degree bribery.  
A one degree bribery structure, is a simple structure where A bribes B directly, as shown in 
Figure 29. One-degree structure is arguably the most common and well-known form of 
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bribery (Belch 2014; Pritchard 1998; Banuri and Eckel 2015; Driscoll 1984; Lindgren 1993), 
however the one-degree bribery structure is also an unreliable and unsafe method of bribery. 
The one-degree bribery structure is largely based on trust. Both A and B are exposed and 
unprotected in terms of A being able to blackmail or extort B for accepting a bribe. Extortion 
occurs when ‘a private citizen threatens to have a criminal arrested unless the criminal pays 
hush money to the private citizen’ or police acting in their capacity as private citizens 
(Lindgren 1993, 1701). B can extort payment from A (in the case when A is involved in 
criminal activity and pays B bribes to turn a blind eye).  
Figure 29: Classic bribery structure (One-degree structure): 
       
          A bribes B   
                    A (a criminal entrepreneur)      B (e.g. a policeman) 
In a low-trust environment, the one-degree bribery structure proves ineffective. For instance, 
in Phases One and Two, despite providing information and bribes to corrupt police, 
McPherson failed to protect himself from prosecution (Reeves 2007a; Morton and Lobez 
2011; Coy 2010). Saffron bribed the police in Phase Two, and later the police extorted money 
from him (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). In 1965 organised crime 
members developed a triad bribery structure that was safe and effective in a low-trust and 
corrupt environment. 
This triad bribery structure is formed by a briber and two bribees. The concept is that A 
bribes B, and B pays or bribes C (who has a higher rank or authority than B), while A is 
aware of B’s and C’s arrangement, as shown in Figure 30. The advantage of the triad bribery 
structure is that B cannot extort payment or blackmail A, as A can also expose B’s and C’s 
arrangement. A cannot blackmail C, as no direct exchange has occurred. If A attempts to 
expose C, then B and C can blackmail A as shown in the Figure 30. The triad bribery 
structure scheme immediately proved effective in low-trust, non-hierarchically organised 
crime operations. All four criminal entrepreneurs in this study arranged triad bribery 
schemes.  
In Phase Three, McPherson had a triad bribery structure arrangement with Ray Kelly and the 
police commissioner (Reeves 2007a; Hickie 1985; Deans 2010). Later in Phase Three, 
Freeman, McPherson and Saffron had a triad  bribery arrangement with the police 
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commissioner and the NSW Premier Sir Robert Askin (Reeves 2007a; Bottom 1979, 1984; 
Reeves 2011, 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). The arrangement lasted for almost a decade, 
with no hard evidence against any of them (Reeves 2007a; Bottom 1979, 1984; Reeves 2011, 
2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). In fact, all four criminal entrepreneurs had violated 
criminal laws without being prosecuted, and had income from non-disclosed sources (Reeves 
2007a; Bottom 1979, 1984; Reeves 2011, 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005).  
Figure 30: Triad bribery structure (bribery among untrusted parties) 
                            C (e.g. Police Commissioner)  
                                                          
A is aware of the B and C arrangement                              B bribes or pays a percentage of A 
bribe to C 
 
         A bribes B 
                               A (criminal entrepreneur)                   B (e.g. detective)  
 
5.16 Original contribution  
This section makes two main contributions to the literature of bribery and criminal 
entrepreneurship. The first main contribution to the literature is in outlining the initiation of 
bribery based on the criminal entrepreneur’s network location. Criminal entrepreneurs who 
engage in blue-collar crimes such as murder and robbery, as did McPherson and Freeman, are 
approached by corrupt police to arrange protection by paying them bribes to turn a blind eye 
on their criminal activities. Criminal entrepreneurs who engage in white-collar crimes, such 
as Saffron and Askin, approach police and/or politicians and persuade them to accept bribes. 
This extends and confirms the work of Lauchs and Staines (2012), finding that successful 
criminal entrepreneurs cooperate with corrupt police, and explains that corrupt police 
approach criminal entrepreneurs and offer them bribes and immunity arrangements, however 
white-collar criminal entrepreneurs such as Saffron and Askin approach police and offer them 
bribes in exchange for immunity arrangements (Hickie 1985; Reeves 2007a, 2007b, 2011).      
The second main contribution is in illustrating the triad bribery structure, which is the most 
efficient in loosely connected organised crime, and in a corrupt environment characterised 
with low-trust among its corrupt members. The triad bribery structure also explains how Jack 
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Herbert’s bribery scheme with the police commissioner, as described in the work of Lauchs 
and Staines (2012), was successful. The main purpose of a bribery scheme is to smooth 
collaboration, however when criminal entrepreneurs fail in bribery, they turn to blackmail.      
5.17 Engineering blackmail 
Blackmail is defined as ‘an impermissible coercive threat to disclose harmful information’ 
(Shaw 2012, 1). In this study all four criminal entrepreneurs engaged in blackmail, and 
Saffron mastered the art of blackmail.  
In fact, none of the criminal entrepreneurs in this study were charged with blackmail (Bottom 
1979; Reeves 2007a, 2007b, 2011). Saffron engaged in entrepreneurial blackmail which is 
defined as “information gained by entrapping the victim into committing an embarrassing act, 
for example, the ‘badger game’ where the victim is lured into sex with a confederate of the 
blackmailer.” (Lindgren 1984, 690). Saffron’s modus operandi in applying entrepreneurial 
blackmail was to invite high-profile, influential and authoritarian personnel (in Phase Three 
Saffron’s police capital was 23, political capital was 24 and others was 25 (others could 
include high profile personnel)) to the private and exclusive sex parties he hosted (Reeves 
2007b; McNab 2005; Piper 2010). Saffron never charged a fee for the venue or the prostitutes 
(Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; Piper 2010). The guests engaged voluntarily in sexual 
activities which included men, women and underage girls (Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; 
Piper 2010). In exchange, Saffron apparently only wanted recognition as a good host (Reeves 
2007b; McNab 2005; Piper 2010), but the guests were secretly filmed and photographed as 
they engaged in sexual acts (Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; Piper 2010). The films and 
photographs were later used to blackmail the guests, who were either married, did not wish to 
be known publicly as homosexuals or feared prosecution for performing sexual acts on 
minors (Reeves 2007b; McNab 2005; Piper 2010). If he had reported the sexual acts of the 
guests who held powerful positions in the government and community, Saffron would be 
considered a whistle-blower. Saffron’s entrepreneurial blackmail was successful and made a 
significant contribution to his criminal and business career.  
The data collected also demonstrated that McPherson, Freeman and Askin were involved in 
blackmail operations; however it did not provide any details about their blackmail modus 
operandi (Reeves 2007a, 2011; Morton and Lobez 2011; Hickie 1985). The outcome of the 
analysis of criminal entrepreneur blackmail modus operandi makes a significant contribution 
to the criminal entrepreneurship literature.   
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5.18 Original contribution 
The original contribution of the section on blackmail to the literature on criminal 
entrepreneurship is in the acknowledgment that criminal entrepreneurs who occupy central 
positions in their network, engage in blackmail, which makes a significant contribution to the 
success of their criminal career. The criminal entrepreneurs who engaged in blackmail were 
not interested in extorting payments from the victims, which is the focus of the blackmail 
literature (DeLong 1993; Felli and Hortala-Vallve 2015; Berman 1998; Shaw 2012; Block, 
Stephan Kinsella and Hoppe 2000), but in forcing the collaboration of the victims, who were 
mostly government and police officials.   
5.19 Bringing it all together 
A criminal entrepreneur first modus operandi is locating and filling a gap in their field. Not 
all gaps in the field are promising, but gaps that place an entrepreneur in a brokerage and/or 
central position within their network are shown to pave the way for their success, which is 
consistent with the findings of Lauchs and Staines (2012), Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain 
(2012), Morselli (2001) and Morselli and Roy (2008). Once the entrepreneurs had filled a 
gap, they began to use bribery to smooth their operations. Successful criminal entrepreneurs 
engaged in triad bribery, as noted in the work of Lauchs and Staines (2012), but where 
bribery fails, criminal entrepreneurs resort to blackmail to force the collaboration of non-
collaborative individuals.      
5.20 Modus vivendi 
In this study modus vivendi is the criminal entrepreneur’s ability to extract value from their 
network, and their ability to cooperate and operate in their network coherently with other 
individuals. To understand the criminal entrepreneur modus vivendi and the value of their 
network, this study focuses on the embedded resources within criminal entrepreneur 
networks.  
Due to the limited time and resources of this study, it focuses on two main resources, mentors 
and human capital. The rationale behind focusing on mentors and human capital is their 
significant influence on the success of criminals as described in the literature. Morselli, 
Tremblay and McCarthy (2006) argued that mentors have significant influence on the success 
of criminals, and McCarthy and Hanag (2001, 1995), Bayer, Hjalmarsson and Pozen (2007) 
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and Mocan, Billups and Overland (2015) argued that human capital can enhance the 
commission of crime. 
5.21 Mentorship  
A mentor is an individual who teaches, advices and sponsors a protégé  (Morselli, Tremblay 
and McCarthy 2006, 18). Mentors can have a significant positive influence on criminal 
careers by providing connections, opportunities through weak ties, and personal experiences 
(Morselli, Tremblay and McCarthy 2006, 20). This section describes the role of mentors in 
successful criminal entrepreneur careers. The process of choosing a protégé will be described. 
The changes in a criminal entrepreneur’s modus operandi after being mentored are also 
described. The findings of this section are consistent with the existing literature on 
mentorship and crime (Morselli, Tremblay and McCarthy 2006). The original contribution of 
this section to crime and mentorship literature is in examining those who did not end up 
incarcerated at the peak of their career and outlining the qualities that their mentors looked 
for in a protégé criminal entrepreneur, as previous studies of crime and mentorship were 
conducted in prisons with criminals who had thus been unsuccessful by definition (Morselli, 
Tremblay and McCarthy 2006). 
Mentorship is an important phase in the career of a successful criminal entrepreneur. 
According to the data collected, McPherson, Freeman and Saffron all had clear mentors in the 
second and third phases of their criminal careers. McPherson had two influential mentors: 
Frederick Charles ‘Paddles’ Anderson in Phase Two and Ray Kelly in Phase Three (Reeves 
2007a; Morton and Lobez 2011; Hickie 1985). Both mentors played different roles and 
provided different resources and experiences. Anderson was McPherson’s crime mentor, who 
taught him the art of crime and provided him with the human capital required to operate in 
organised crime (Reeves 2007a; Morton and Lobez 2011; Hickie 1985). Anderson was well-
known and respected in Sydney’s criminal milieu for organising massive international 
shoplifting operations (Reeves 2007a; Morton and Lobez 2011; Hickie 1985). Anderson also 
provided skilled criminal capital for McPherson (Reeves 2007a; Morton and Lobez 2011; 
Hickie 1985). Through Anderson, McPherson moved closer to the centre of Sydney’s 
criminal network (Reeves 2007a; Morton and Lobez 2011; Hickie 1985). Anderson’s human 
and social capital focused on crime, however, and to be a successful criminal entrepreneur, 
McPherson had to learn how to deal with corrupt police and politicians. In Phase Three, 
McPherson was approached by Kelly, a notoriously corrupt detective, who became his 
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mentor in dealing with the upper world of crime (Reeves 2007a; Morton and Lobez 2011; 
Hickie 1985). 
Kelly chose McPherson as his protégé for a number of reasons: 1) he was willing to 
cooperate by providing information on criminal activities in Sydney, 2) McPherson held a 
central position in the criminal milieu, 3) McPherson shared similar values to Kelly, such as 
not killing the innocent or harming children, 4) McPherson agreed to the terms and 
conditions of working with Kelly, which included providing a weekly recorded tape on 
criminal activities in Sydney, and 5) McPherson was a driven, active, competent criminal 
entrepreneur who was eager to learn and showed potential (Reeves 2007a; Morton and Lobez 
2011; Hickie 1985). Mentors choose their protégés for their merits they offer, and the protégé 
must also share some of the values and principles of the mentor. When McPherson joined 
Kelly, he instantly occupied a brokerage position in the criminal network by connecting the 
police to the criminal milieu. McPherson had immunity from prosecution in exchange for 
providing information to Kelly (Reeves 2007a; Morton and Lobez 2011; Hickie 1985). 
McPherson expanded his corrupt police and politician social capital. The merits of being 
associated with and mentored by Kelly, turned McPherson into an opportunity for up-and-
coming criminal entrepreneurs as he could provide immunity from prosecution, the human 
capital of dealing and collaborating with the corrupt police and information on services and 
products required in the criminal market.  
Similar to McPherson, Freeman had two influential mentors who shaped his successful 
criminal career, both in Phases Two and Three. In Phase Two, Freeman was mentored by 
‘The Butcher’ a successful SP bookie (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Deans 2010). In Phase 
Three, Freeman was mentored by McPherson, who taught him how to operate in organised 
crime, including dealing with corrupt police and other criminals in the area (Freeman 1988; 
Reeves 2011; Deans 2010). After a number of failed crimes and incarceration, Freeman 
acknowledged his limitations and allowed himself to be mentored (Freeman 1988; Reeves 
2011; Deans 2010). Freeman first worked as a bodyguard for ‘The Butcher’ (Freeman 1988; 
Reeves 2011; Deans 2010). As a bodyguard, Freeman accompanied the Butcher to collect 
late payments from losing punters (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Deans 2010). Throughout 
his apprenticeship as a bodyguard, Freeman claimed that the Butcher taught him the art of SP 
bookmaking, and how to pick winners (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Deans 2010). The 
Butcher provided Freeman with human capital to operate in the SP bookmaking market, 
teaching him how to deal with punters and how to bet, and exposed him to greater social 
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capital in the SP bookmaking field (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Deans 2010), however the 
Butcher’s mentorship was mostly focused on SP bookmaking (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; 
Deans 2010).  
SP bookmaking and gambling were illegal outside racecourses before 1960 (Pinto and 
Wilson 1992, 197), and Freeman could not secure protection as an SP bookie, as he lacked 
the human capital to deal with corrupt police to arrange immunity. As mentioned earlier 
Freeman rejected a collaboration offer to work with corrupt police (Freeman 1988; Reeves 
2011; Deans 2010). In the third phase, Freeman was approached by McPherson, who was 14 
years his senior, who offered to work with him (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Deans 2010). 
McPherson was aware that SP bookmaking was a great source of cash for financing his 
criminal operations, as the estimated annual turnover of SP bookmaking was $1800 million in 
NSW at the time (Pinto and Wilson 1992, 201). Pinto and Wilson (1992, 201) note: 
“Illegal bookmaking is a multi-million dollar industry run by people who 
can get up to forty or fifty telephones and who, if their telephones are 
closed down, can get them in new premises a week later. Illegal 
bookmakers prosper, making millions of illegal dollars, simply because 
they do not pay income taxes or betting taxes”    
This explains McPherson’s motive for mentoring and recruiting Freeman to take over the 
illegal SP bookmaking market. Freeman was chosen by McPherson as an protégé for a 
number of reasons: 1) Freeman had adopted a collaborative attitude after incarceration, 2) 
Freeman had human capital which included SP bookmaking, which was needed by 
McPherson for money laundering purposes, 3) Freeman had experience in standing-over, 
which was a division in McPherson’s criminal organisation, 4) Freeman had great criminal 
capital that could be used to expand McPherson’s criminal organisation, 5) Freeman had the 
ability to generate cash-flow through SP bookmaking, and 6) Freeman was a driven, 
ambitious, competent criminal entrepreneur who was eager to learn and succeed (Freeman 
1988; Reeves 2011; Coy 2010).  
McPherson’s mentorship of Freeman revolved around dealing with crime in the ‘upper 
world’, rather than the underworld. Freeman had criminal human capital but he lacked the 
human capital for dealing with corrupt police and politicians, as mentioned earlier. 
McPherson passed on Kelly’s values and principles, such as staying away from incarceration 
by not killing innocent people or harming children, and by collaborating with police, 
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providing information, and paying bribes. McPherson also exposed Freeman to greater social 
and criminal capital. McPherson’s social and criminal capital meant new crimes and business 
opportunities for Freeman. Through McPherson, Freeman was able to establish connections 
with high profile US Mafia members, such as Joseph Testa (Deans 2010; Freeman 1988; 
Reeves 2011). Freeman’s network location changed, as he moved to a central position in the 
criminal network and became the biggest SP bookmaker in Sydney, collecting bets from 
different states in Australia, courtesy of McPherson’s protection arrangement. Freeman 
occupied a brokerage position as he represented McPherson in different events (Freeman 
represented McPherson in the US, as he met with the US Mafia) (Deans 2010; Freeman 1988; 
Reeves 2011). Freeman also distanced himself from petty criminals and acted as a broker, 
providing protection for select groups of criminals through his connections with corrupt 
police (Deans 2010; Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011).  
Freeman and McPherson needed the same experience and human capital from their mentors. 
They gained criminal human capital from failed personal experiences and crime mentors, but 
to be successful additional human capital was needed and it was provided by criminals such 
as Anderson and non-criminal mentors such as Kelly. Non-criminal mentors also played a 
significant role in Saffron’s criminal career.  
Saffron had two identified mentors in Phase Two, and although Saffron did not describe a 
mentor in the third phase, the data suggests he had one in the third phase of his modus 
operandi. The first mentor Saffron had was his businessman father, in Phase Two. Saffron 
senior set his son on the path to business. From a young age, Saffron senior taught his son the 
art of arbitrage, and supported him even though he was dealing in the black-market (Saffron 
2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). There is no evidence in the data collected of 
Saffron senior guiding his son into organise crime and corruption. The data shows Sammy 
Lee as the first mentor to teach Saffron how to deal with, and open bribery accounts with 
corrupt police (Reeves 2007b).  
Saffron’s second mentor was his business partner, Sammy Lee (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; 
Piper 2010; McNab 2005). Lee mentored Saffron in how to mix business with corruption by 
opening bribery accounts with corrupt police (Reeves 2007b). Lee’s mentorship was 
successful, and the Roosevelt Club became one of the most successful clubs in Sydney at the 
time (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005), however Lee’s mentorship fell 
short, as the extraordinary success of the Roosevelt Club led to its own failure (Saffron 2009; 
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Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). As the Roosevelt Club started attracting more 
customers and in turn a greater cash flow, corrupt police got greedy and started extorting 
payment from Saffron in exchange for their silence about his illegal activities (Saffron 2009; 
Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; McNab 2005). Like Freeman and McPherson, Saffron 
acknowledged his limitations and agreed to be mentored, as he could not control the corrupt 
police and prevent them from extorting him. Saffron then joined the ‘Crowd’, where he was 
mentored (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b).   
The ‘Crowd’ was a well-connected group of criminals, corrupt police and politicians who 
were able to break the law and avoid incarceration (Reeves 2007b). The data shows that 
Saffron started from the bottom when he joined the group and worked his way to the top 
(Reeves 2007b). This suggests that Saffron must have been mentored by the members of the 
Crowd. Although it is not clear who exactly mentored Saffron in Phase Three, there were 
significant changes in his modus operandi, connections and social status since joining the 
Crowd. He adopted a triad bribery scheme, for instance, and entrepreneurial blackmail. 
Saffron was able to attract high-profile personnel who fell victim to his entrepreneurial 
blackmail scheme.  
Saffron’s businesses expanded rapidly, and despite breaking several laws, Saffron was not 
caught or charged with any crime for a whole decade (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 
2010; McNab 2005). This study suggests that Saffron had a mentor or mentors in Phase 
Three, but that due to the nature of the data collection method, this study was unable to 
identify the mentor(s) and confirm the mentorship of Saffron in Phase Three. Saffron had 
merits and qualities that made him an attractive protégé, however, such as his: 1) willingness 
to cooperate, 2) keen attitude to learning, 3) keen social skills and significant social capital, 
particularly in the Jewish community and among middle-class businessman, 4) significant 
financial capital, 5) sharp business mind, 6) lack of moral compass, and 7) active nature, 
being driven and eager to succeed.          
Askin also did not describe a mentor for his career, and the data collected does not show a 
clear mentor for Askin, however based on Askin’s occupation and position, he did not need 
unique human capital to succeed in his criminal career. In fact, Askin’s criminal career was 
different from those of McPherson, Freeman and Saffron, as most of his crimes did not 
require sophisticated modus operandi. Askin’s crimes were mostly in receiving bribes in 
cash, stocks or favours, or paying bribes in favours and/or cash (Hickie 1985).  
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This thesis argues that Askin’s greatest crime was his philosophy on being soft on organised 
crime. As he once stated ‘I’m a very mixed up fellow, a mixture of good and not so good’ 
(Hickie 1985, 49). The study argues that Askin’s soft attitude towards organise crime was 
driven by the fact organised crime provided: 1) jobs for lower and middle class citizens, 2) 
income for NSW, 3) organisation and control of crime in NSW, and 4) additional income for 
government and police personnel. In fact, on various occasions organised crime members 
murdered other vicious criminals (Coy 2010; Deans 2010; Bottom 1979). As it was vicious 
criminals who were murdered, the public and government considered these murders a public 
service, and little effort was made to identify the murderers (Coy 2010; Deans 2010). This 
thesis suggests that Askin’s philosophy was shared among his associates. For instance, Police 
Commissioner Merv Wood in 1976 spoke once about his philosophy towards casinos and SP 
bookmaking, which was: 
‘A Commissioner can decide whether his philosophy is going to be live-
and-let-live or whether he is going to be a hard man. I think the people of 
Sydney believe in live-and-let-live’ (Hickie 1985, 311). 
The police commissioner’s philosophy and attitude towards crime was crucial as Askin 
received a share of the bribes the police commissioner was paid (Bottom 1979, 1984; Hickie 
1985).  
All mentors of successful criminal entrepreneurs in this study were part of their social capital. 
In fact, Freeman, McPherson and Saffron all had a one-degree relationship with their mentors 
which is consistent with the findings of Morselli, Tremblay and McCarthy (2006), that 
mentors have a direct (strong) tie with their protégé. 
5.22 Original contribution  
This study found that three of the successful criminal entrepreneurs in this study were 
mentored, and their mentorship contributed to their success, which is consistent with the 
findings of Morselli, Tremblay and McCarthy (2006) that mentorship is associated with 
criminal success (in terms of earnings). This study found that the criminal entrepreneurs had a 
direct relationship with their mentors, which is consistent with Morselli, Tremblay and 
McCarthy (2006) findings. This study found that not all the mentors were found in prison 
which is consistent with the findings of Clark and Davis (2011) and Morselli, Tremblay and 
McCarthy (2006). This study also found that mentors can be family members, which is 
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consistent with Morselli, Tremblay and McCarthy (2006) findings. This study also found, 
however, that successful criminal entrepreneurs have more than one mentor, which is 
inconsistent with Morselli, Tremblay and McCarthy (2006) as they found that criminals had 
one mentor. The human capital gained from the mentor also changed the criminal 
entrepreneur’s modus operandi, which is consistent with Coleman (1988, S100) argument that 
human capital brings new skills to the individual, allowing them to act in different ways.  
This study found that criminal entrepreneurs with clear vision and adaptability to change, and 
higher self-control are able to benefit the most from their mentor’s resources. This study 
demonstrated that mentors chose their protégés based on: 1) shared values and principles, 2) 
the merits of the protégés, such as their position in the criminal network and their capital 
(human, social and financial), and 3) the willingness of the protégés to cooperate. These 
findings those of Morselli, Tremblay and McCarthy (2006), that mentors look for protégés 
who are young, less supervised and have a positive attitude towards risk. Trust was not 
described in the data as a compulsory component of the protégés chosen by the mentors, but 
human capital was.                  
5.23 Human capital 
Human capital is the knowledge (such as the know-how of doing crime) embedded in people 
(Becker 1962). The literature on human capital and crime is divided into two sections, human 
capital that would deter people from crime and human capital that would enhance the chance 
of succeeding in crime (Mocan, Billups and Overland 2005; Lochner 2004; Piquero et al. 
2014; Clark and Davis 2011; Coleman 1988). This thesis focuses on human capital that 
would enhance the chance of succeeding in crime. It argues that human capital can influence 
a criminal entrepreneur’s position in a network, and vice versa. It also argues that human 
capital on its own cannot lead to a successful career in crime. Human capital in crime must be 
complemented by social capital and network location to have a significant influence on the 
enhancement of a criminal career.   
For criminal entrepreneurs, human capital is the knowledge of how to carry out a successful 
crime. Human capital in crime can be divided into two main sections, 1) how to commit a 
criminal act, and 2) how to avoid prosecution. To gain human capital in crime, there are three 
main resources, 1) social capital, 2) personal experience and 3) literature.  
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All four criminal entrepreneurs in this study had human capital in crime, but they were 
unsuccessful in Phases One and Two. McPherson had human capital in crime drawn from his 
criminal capital, personal experience which included incarceration, and read literature on 
successful criminal figures. Despite this significant human capital; he was unsuccessful in 
crime until he started collaborating with corrupt detective Kelly. Similar to McPherson, 
Freeman was an active thief, who robbed and stole in different states in Australia (Freeman 
1988; Reeves 2011; Morton and Lobez 2011). Despite having sophisticated human capital in 
crime, particularly in stealing and robberies, Freeman was repeatedly caught and charged 
(Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Morton and Lobez 2011). Like Freeman, Saffron also had the 
human capital of opening bribery accounts with corrupt police and operating in the black-
market, but he was extorted and was unsuccessful in that crime (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; 
Piper 2010; McNab 2005).  
All three criminal entrepreneurs, McPherson, Freeman and Saffron, failed in crime in phases 
one and two despite having the criminal human capital needed to operate successfully in 
crime. Their limitation was the absence of significant social capital and a network location to 
succeed in crime. In other words, criminal human capital cannot be a significant predictor or 
factor in the success of a criminal entrepreneur career, without social capital and a significant 
influential network location such as brokerage and/or centrality.  
5.24 Original contribution 
Criminal human capital has been argued to have significant influence on the success of 
criminal careers (Mocan, Billups and Overland 2005; Lochner 2004; Piquero et al. 2014; 
Clark and Davis 2011; Coleman 1988). Policymakers have argued that new and young 
inmates in prisons should be distanced and isolated from older and experienced prisoners in 
an attempt to prevent the exportation of criminal human capital from veteran criminals to 
young criminals (Cuthbertson 2004).  
In addition to the fact that this approach is not cost efficient, this study finds that separating 
young prisoners from veteran inmates for the sole purpose of preventing the exportation of 
criminal human capital is not necessary, as criminal human capital can be accessed and 
provided by non-inmates and individuals outside prisons. Focusing on criminal human capital 
would also not lead to identifying and predicting successful criminal entrepreneurs. The 
finding of this study is consistent with McCarthy and Hagan (2001), that human and social 
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capital contribute to the success of criminals, however this study argues that human capital on 
its own cannot lead to a successful criminal career. 
5.25 Network location 
Network location is the criminal entrepreneur’s location within networks. This study focuses 
on two main locations, brokerage and centrality. Brokerage is where the criminal 
entrepreneur connects two individuals or groups. Centrality is a central location within a 
network. The criminal entrepreneurs in this study occupied central and brokerage locations 
simultaneously. 
The literature emphasises the significant influence of brokerage in the success of criminal 
entrepreneurs (Morselli and Roy 2008; Lauchs and Staines 2012), however not all the 
criminal entrepreneurs in this study made the most of their brokerage position or relied on 
their brokerage position, although McPherson, Freeman and Askin did so. McPherson 
controlled information and provided protection for prostitution rackets and extortion (Reeves 
2007a; Morton and Lobez 2011). Freeman provided protection mostly to SP bookies through 
his brokerage position (Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Bottom 1979). Askin used his 
brokerage position to provide protection mostly to casino operators (Hickie 1985; Bottom 
1979, 1984). The brokerage positions of the criminal entrepreneurs in this study thus played a 
significant role in the success of their criminal careers. The criminal entrepreneurs in this 
study simultaneously occupied a central position in their criminal network which made a 
significant contribution to the success of their careers.   
McPherson occupied a central position in Sydney’s criminal network. This enabled him to 
provide various criminal services to all members of Sydney’s criminal network. Similarly, 
Freeman occupied a central position in the SP bookmaking network, as he provided services 
for punters both in and outside NSW. Saffron and Askin both occupied central positions in 
their fields. Saffron had a central position within the illegal liquor trade and business 
networks, as he had a monopoly over the liquor market in King’s Cross, controlling suppliers 
and consumption premises. As the leader of the Liberal Party and the Premier of NSW Askin 
occupied a central position in the political network.      
5.26 Original contribution 
It is well known that successful criminal entrepreneurs in a non-hierarchical network occupy 
brokerage positions in the network (Morselli and Roy 2008; Lauchs and Staines 2012; 
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Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain 2012), which is consistent with the findings of this study. 
This study notes that successful criminal entrepreneurs also occupy a central position within 
their network of speciality. While occupying a central position, the criminal entrepreneurs 
connect with other networks which are slightly different to the entrepreneur’s network 
speciality, which creates the brokerage. 
5.27 The theory of successful criminal entrepreneurs 
The theory of criminal entrepreneurs argues that criminal entrepreneurs are a different type of 
criminals who have higher levels of self-control. Criminal entrepreneurs are adaptable to 
change and excel in leadership. As leaders, criminal entrepreneurs have a clear defined 
vision. The vision can be either criminal or non-criminal at first. When it is a non-criminal 
vision, criminal entrepreneurs adopt or add criminal activities to achieve their vision, which 
is reflective of their ability to adapt to change.  
Once the vision is developed, criminal entrepreneurs lead towards their vision with 
charismatic leadership. Charismatic leadership enables criminal entrepreneurs to attract 
followers and associates. The main purpose of criminal entrepreneurs’ leadership is always to 
their own benefit first, which is also known as personal orientation. Criminal entrepreneurs 
also adapt a social orientation to enhance and/or restore their public image. In addition to 
leadership, criminal entrepreneurs have a clearly defined identity at the peak of their career. 
The identity of criminal entrepreneurs is not necessarily criminal. Some criminal 
entrepreneurs may have an identity as a businessman or politician, yet still be criminal 
entrepreneurs. The identity of criminal entrepreneurs changes throughout their careers. It is 
strongly associated with, and linked to their activity and vision. Criminal entrepreneurs may 
also lose their identity due to the loss of their criminal capital. 
There are four main operational approaches associated with successful criminal entrepreneurs 
and achieving their vision. The first approach is identifying a gap in the market. Criminal 
entrepreneurs can identify or create gaps in the market to fulfil. Once criminal entrepreneurs 
fill a gap in the market, two steps are taken. The first step is avoiding conflict. Criminal 
entrepreneurs avoid unnecessary conflicts with law enforcement agencies and criminal 
groups. The rationale behind avoiding conflicts is avoiding unwanted attention that could 
expose hidden criminal activities and operations, which reflects higher levels of self-control. 
The second step is bribery. All criminal entrepreneurs engage in bribery by paying cash for 
information or favours. Criminal entrepreneurs usually engage in triad bribery schemes.  
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In addition to avoiding conflicts and bribery, criminal entrepreneurs engage in brokerage. 
Through their charismatic leadership criminal entrepreneurs are able to attract and connect 
criminals, criminal groups and corrupt police. By becoming brokers, criminal entrepreneurs 
become leaders in the criminal milieu. Where criminal entrepreneurs are unable to persuade 
individuals to collaborate, they turn to blackmail. Through blackmail, criminal entrepreneurs 
do not seek to obtain financial gain, but the collaboration of un-collaborative individuals, 
which shows that criminal entrepreneurs are driven by the accomplishment of their vision. 
Within the criminal entrepreneur social network, criminal entrepreneurs occupy a central and 
brokerage position simultaneously. They occupy a central position in their network of 
speciality. In addition to the central position, criminal entrepreneurs occupy a brokerage 
position with other networks such as a network of corrupt police. Finally, criminal 
entrepreneurs often have more than one mentor in their network. The mentor’s role is to 
provide the human capital of dealing with corrupt police and other criminals and know-how 
about crime. 
Although the theory of successful criminal entrepreneurship has been developed in Australia 
and based on studying successful criminal entrepreneurs in Australia it has a global potential. 
The theory provides the blueprint and elements that have the most significant contribution to 
the success of a criminal entrepreneur. Therefore, these elements are most likely to be found 
in all different parts of the world, where criminal entrepreneurs are found. These elements 
include social capital, mentor, role models, education including literature, occupying 
brokerage position, etc.  
Figure 31 summarises the successful criminal entrepreneur theory by illustrating the three 
modi in the different phases of criminal entrepreneur lives and careers. Figure 31 only 
illustrates the consistent outcomes across the four criminal entrepreneurs. 
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Figure 31 The theory of successful criminal entrepreneurs 
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Figure 30 illustrate the cycle of a successful criminal entrepreneurs based on the consistent 
patterns found among the four criminal entrepreneurs featured in this study. The first column 
reflects the first phase of the criminal entrepreneur career/life. The theory starts first by 
examining the individual modus essendi, which  in this study is the identity. The theory of 
successful criminal entrepreneurship argues that all successful criminal entrepreneurs have a 
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defined identity in terms of the having a clear vision and goals. Then, modus essendi focuses 
in the skills, which in this study is leadership. The theory of successful criminal 
entrepreneurship argues that not all successful criminal entrepreneurs share leadership skills 
in phase of one of their career. The theory of successful criminal entrepreneurs argues that 
successful criminal entrepreneurs in the first phase of their criminal career do not necessarily 
share similar modus operandi or operational approach neither share similar network location. 
However, the first phase successful criminal entrepreneurs do share an access to criminals 
(not necessarily the same criminals) in their network which is the embedded resources in their 
social network. 
In the second phase of their criminal career, successful criminal entrepreneurs all have clear 
defined identity in terms of having a clear vision and goals, in addition to leadership skills. 
Moreover, all successful criminal entrepreneurs’ modus operandi included engaging in 
bribery and blackmail. In their modus vivendi, all successful criminal entrepreneurs occupy 
brokerage positions in their network, and most of them have mentors and criminal capital.  
In the third phase of their criminal career, all successful criminal entrepreneurs have clearly 
defined identity. Their modus operandi also includes bribery and blackmail. With regards to 
their modus vivendi, all criminal entrepreneurs in the third phase occupy a brokerage and 
central position in their network. The embedded resources in the network include criminal, 
police, political and money laundry capital.  
In the last phase of their criminal career, not all criminal entrepreneurs have a clear defined 
identity or skills. Furthermore, their modus operandi is not consistent and their modus vivendi 
is also not consistent as their network location changes and their resources in their network 
also changes.  
Although the theory of successful criminal entrepreneurs aims at providing an understanding 
of how can criminals surpass the law and overcome all the challenges in crime to become 
successful, the author argues that the criminal entrepreneurship in this study falls within the 
productive side of the economy. The author argues that criminal entrepreneurs in this study 
engaged in productive entrepreneurship for a number of reasons: 
1. Due to the living conditions which falls under the category of poverty (Reeves, 2007), 
criminal entrepreneurs facilitated crimes such prostitution which generated income to 
a number of households.  
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2. The criminal entrepreneurs also operated illegal casinos, which provided jobs to the 
locals.  
3. The criminal entrepreneurs also controlled crime (such as murdering the innocent) 
due to agreements with the police and also to smooth and avoiding disrupting criminal 
operations.  
4. Selling liquor after legal trading hours also facilitated jobs for the locals.  
5. Due to the availability of prostitution, gambling and liquor afterhours, Sydney became 
attractive to other visitors, in effect the hotels, restaurants, the city transportation, 
retail stores, etc. started to get more business, thus more people were getting hired and 
the city economy started to recover (Reeves, 2007).  
Yet, the author does not deny the damage criminal entrepreneurs had in terms of spreading 
corruption and damaging the reputation of city. However, the author disagrees with Baumol’s 
(1990) claim that criminal activities and criminal entrepreneurship is mostly an unproductive 
and destructive form of entrepreneurship. In particular, the criminal entrepreneurs of this 
study focused on expanding their illegal businesses and invested in productive business in 
addition to passive income such as rent-seeking which is considered by Baumol (1990) as 
unproductive.      
5.28 Hypothesis tested 
This study tested a number of hypotheses, as described earlier in the methodology chapter. 
The first hypothesis, based on modus essendi, was that criminal entrepreneurs have a clearly 
defined vision, a charismatic leadership style and personal orientation. This study confirms 
that criminal entrepreneurs have a defined vision, charismatic leadership and personal 
orientation (except Saffron and Askin who had personal and social).  
The second hypothesis is that the modus operandi of criminal entrepreneurs includes 
avoiding conflicts, having representatives, delegation, brokerage, bribery, blackmail, forming 
contacts based on trust, creating their own group, establishing protection relationships, having 
the capacity for violence and controlling violence, and joining existing criminal groups. This 
study demonstrates that criminal entrepreneurs avoid conflict and have representatives, such 
as in the case of Freeman who went to the US on behalf of McPherson (Reeves 2007a, 2011; 
Morton and Lobez 2011). This study confirms that criminal entrepreneurs delegate, such as in 
the case of Wally Dena, who collect protection money from clubs on behalf of McPherson 
(Reeves 2007a; Bottom 1979; Morton and Lobez 2011). This study also confirms that 
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criminal entrepreneurs engage in brokerage and blackmail, as discussed earlier. This study 
also confirms that criminal entrepreneurs, such as McPherson and Freeman, have the capacity 
to control and promote violence (Reeves 2007a, 2011; Morton and Lobez 2011). This study 
confirms that criminal entrepreneurs create their own criminal groups, such as McPherson’s, 
and join existing criminal groups, such as Saffron who joined the ‘Crowd’ (Morton and 
Lobez 2011; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010). This study does not confirm, however, that criminal 
entrepreneurs build relationships based on trust.  
The third hypothesis based on the criminal entrepreneur mods vivendi, suggests that they 
operate in multiple networks, that early in their career they have an open network, that their 
network is formed of loosely connected criminal entrepreneurs, that the embedded resources 
in their network include mentors and corrupt police connections who provide immunity, and 
that at the end of their career they have a closed network. This study confirms the modus 
vivendi hypothesis, as it found criminal entrepreneurs are members of multiple networks, 
their network is formed of loosely connected criminal entrepreneurs, early in their career they 
have an open network, and later in their career they have a closed network (with the 
exception of Saffron who had an open network). This study confirms that the embedded 
resources in criminal entrepreneur networks include mentors (except Askin) and corrupt 
police. The next section describes the limitations of this study.  
5.29 The limitations of this study     
This study is not without its limitations. The first limitation involves generalisation, as this 
study is conducted on successful criminal entrepreneurs in Australia, and therefore the 
outcome of this study may not apply to criminal entrepreneurs within environmental settings 
different to Australia. Second this study was conducted based on an environment with high 
levels of corruption and low levels of trust, and it therefore may not apply to criminal 
entrepreneurs operating in environments with lower levels of corruption and higher levels of 
trust.  
This study focused on one characteristic, leadership. Due to time and resource constraints, no 
other characteristics were examined. This study focused on four main operational approaches 
adopted by criminal entrepreneurs, avoiding conflict, brokerage, bribery and blackmail, 
however this study did not describe all the modus operandi of blackmail carried out by 
McPherson, Freeman and Askin due to the nature of the data collection method. Further 
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research is thus needed to gain a better understanding of criminal entrepreneur modus 
operandi. 
5.30 Future research   
Further research is needed to examine the influence of literature on the vision of young 
disadvantaged youth and its ability to deter them from developing a criminal vision. Further 
research is needed to gain a better understanding of successful criminal entrepreneur modus 
operandi, such how criminal entrepreneurs conduct blackmail, as this study only focused on 
entrepreneurial blackmail. What is the modus operandi of successful criminal entrepreneurs 
in laundering their ill-gotten gains and illegal gambling? How are criminal entrepreneurs able 
to open and operate illegal ventures overseas, as in the case of McPherson’s prostitution 
racket in Manila, and ensure their success? Further research is needed to gain a better 
understanding of the triad bribery structure, including its effectiveness in hierarchically 
structured organised crime and networks with higher levels of trust. Further research is also 
needed to develop an approach to eliminate the new potential opportunities created by the 
police when arresting and removing criminals (particularly those occupying brokerage 
positions) from the criminal milieu and/or market. Finally, further research is needed to 
confirm the theory of successful criminal entrepreneurs in hierarchically structured organised 
crime.   
5.31 Conclusion 
In conclusion, criminal entrepreneurs are a different breed of criminal, as they have higher 
levels of self-control. The successful criminal entrepreneurs in this study had a clearly 
defined vision. There were two main primary sources of vision, social capital and literature. 
In addition to social capital and literature, personal experience contributed to the vision 
formation process of criminal entrepreneurs. Once criminal entrepreneurs developed a vision, 
they led with a charismatic leadership style. The charismatic leadership style is usually 
accompanied with personal orientation, and in some cases social orientation. In addition to a 
clearly defined leadership, criminal entrepreneurs had clearly defined identities. This identity 
is strongly influenced by the criminal entrepreneur vision. The loss of a criminal 
entrepreneur’s criminal capital can lead to the loss of identity, such as in the case of 
McPherson.  
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Four main approaches contributing to the success of criminal entrepreneurs featured in this 
study: filling a gap in the market, brokerage, bribery and blackmail. To become a successful 
criminal entrepreneur, an opportunity has to be harvested. This study argues that 
opportunities in the criminal milieu can be created by law enforcement agencies. As law 
enforcement agencies make an arrest, they eliminate an illegal goods and services provider. 
As the supplier is removed from the criminal milieu, a gap is created. A new criminal 
entrepreneur would then provide the needed services and goods. This study argues that not all 
arrests create a promising gap for successful criminal entrepreneurs. If the supplier removed 
creates a significant gap in the criminal network, such as that of a brokerage position, it 
creates a more promising gap and paves a way for a potentially successful criminal 
entrepreneur.  
Brokerage is a power and income approach, a modus operandi, adopted by the criminal 
entrepreneurs featured in this study. Brokerage is connecting unconnected parties and 
individuals, which can lead to controlling information and resources. The most powerful 
brokerage position of criminal entrepreneurs is between corrupt police and criminals, and 
criminal groups. Through their brokerage position with corrupt police, criminal entrepreneurs 
were able to provide protection to select criminals and criminal groups.  
To maintain the brokerage position, criminal entrepreneurs engaged in bribery to reward 
collaborative corrupt police. Bribery was aimed at smoothing criminal operations by 
rewarding cooperative corrupt police for their protection from the law, however successful 
criminal entrepreneurs did not engage in the classic one-degree bribery scheme but a triad 
bribery scheme. The advantage of using a triad bribery scheme lies in reducing the possibility 
of blackmailing and extorting the briber.  
In addition to bribery, criminal entrepreneurs engaged in blackmail. This study only 
described Saffron’s blackmail scheme in detail, due to the nature of the data collection 
method as no details were provided on the other criminal entrepreneurs featured in this study 
blackmail modus operandi. Saffron engaged in entrepreneurial blackmail, where he lured his 
victims into having voluntary sex, then filmed and photographed them secretly; however 
Saffron did not carry blackmail to extort payments from the victims but to ensure and force 
their collaboration.  
The embedded resources in the criminal entrepreneur network included mentors, with the 
exception of Askin. Criminal entrepreneurs have more than one mentor. Not all the mentors 
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of the criminal entrepreneurs were criminals. The mentors provided criminal human capital, 
however this study found that criminal human capital alone cannot lead to a successful 
criminal career. Criminal human capital in addition to a significant network location, such as 
a brokerage position and connection with corrupt police, can lead to a successful criminal 
career. In addition to mentors, all four criminal entrepreneurs had connections with criminals, 
corrupt police, politicians and money launderers. 
This study confirms the hypothesis that criminal entrepreneurs have clear vision, and are 
charismatic leaders with personal orientation. This study also confirms the hypotheses that 
criminal entrepreneurs avoid conflict, have representatives, delegate, engage in brokerage, 
bribe, blackmail, create their own criminal groups, establish protection relations with corrupt 
police, have the capacity for violence and controlling violence and join existing criminal 
groups. The hypotheses that criminal entrepreneurs operate in multiple networks, that early in 
their career they have an open network, that their network is formed of loosely connected 
criminal entrepreneurs and that at the end of their career they have a closed network, are also 
confirmed.      
The study is not with its limitations. The findings of this study are applied to criminal 
entrepreneurs in corrupt environments with lower trust levels. This study focused on one 
characteristic of criminal entrepreneurs, which is leadership. Only four operational 
approaches were examined in detail in this study: filling a gap in the criminal market/milieu, 
brokerage, bribery and blackmail. Further research is needed to examine the additional 
operational approaches adopted by criminal entrepreneurs. Finally, further research is needed 
to confirm the theory of successful criminal entrepreneurs in different settings. 
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6 Chapter Six: Conclusion 
Criminal entrepreneurs are a different type of criminal. This study argued that successful 
criminal entrepreneurs are a different breed of criminal, compared to the classic criminals 
described in low self-control theory. The purpose of this study was to develop a theory of 
successful criminal entrepreneurs. The aim of the theory was to gain a better understanding of 
how criminal entrepreneurs succeed in founding and/or operating criminal organisations. 
Understanding how successful criminal entrepreneurs succeed in crime enables law 
enforcement agencies and policymakers to develop more precise and efficient crime 
prevention and early intervention programmes and policies to prevent and prosecute criminal 
entrepreneurs. The importance of addressing successful criminal entrepreneurship in 
organised crime is reflected in the cost and damage to the Australian economy and 
communities. 
In 2013-2014 organised crime cost the Australian government $36 billion, which the 
equivalent of 24% of Australia’s 2015 social security and welfare budget (Dawson, 2015). 
Organised crime in Australia adds 6.3% to the average cost of living, as a result of prevention 
and intervention programmes implemented against organised crime (Dawson, 2015). Various 
scholars and researchers, including Bright et al. (2015), Lauchs and Staines (2012) and 
Morselli (2001) have therefore studied organised crime and criminal entrepreneurship in 
order to break down criminal organisations.    
Studying and understanding organised crime proved to be a challenge, starting with its 
definition. There are various definitions of organised crime and they lack consistency 
(Bersten 1990; Maltz 1976; Paoli 2002; Finckenauer 2005). The inconsistencies in the 
definitions of organised crime are mainly in defining the words ‘crime’ and ‘organised’. 
Some defined organised crime based on the crimes carried out by criminal organisations, 
which it has been argued can also be carried out by individuals or non-organised criminal 
groups. The structure of organised crime in the definition of organised is also controversial. 
Some definitions of organised crime argue that organised crime has a hierarchical structure, 
such as the US Mafia (Paoli 2002), however recent studies have shown that organised crime 
groups can also have a non-hierarchical structure, as is the case with organised crime in 
Australia (Lauchs and Staines 2012; Lauchs, Keast and Chamberlain 2012), the focus of this 
study. This inconsistency challenges policymakers in developing efficient policies to tackle 
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and prosecute organised crime members and leaders, including criminal entrepreneurs. As 
this study addresses organised crime in Australia, it focuses on non-hierarchical structure.  
Due to the nature of non-hierarchical organised crime, researchers have either focused on a 
specific crime network, a location of criminal activities or the criminal entrepreneurs who are 
members of the criminal organisation (Lauchs and Staines 2012; Lauchs, Keast and 
Chamberlain 2012; Morselli 2003; Morselli and Tremblay 2004; Morselli 2009, 2001; Bright 
and Delaney 2013; Bright, Hughes and Chalmers 2012; Bright et al. 2015). This study 
connects the three approaches by focusing on criminal entrepreneurs, and their networks in a 
specific location, which is Sydney, Australia. The criminal entrepreneurs featured in this 
study were Leonard McPherson, George Freeman, Abraham Saffron and Sir Robert Askin. 
The rationale behind choosing McPherson, Freeman, Saffron and Askin is their success and 
documented involvement in organised crime in Australia. McPherson was well-known for 
murder and providing protection for the operators of other illegal activities (Reeves 2007a; 
Morton and Lobez 2011; Coy 2010). Freeman was well-known as an illegal SP bookie 
(Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011; Morton and Lobez 2011). Saffron was well-known for his 
illegal liquor trade operations and blackmail (Saffron 2009; Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010; 
McNab 2005). Askin was well-known as a facilitator and supporter of organised crime, as he 
provided protection to corrupt police who protected active criminals in Sydney, Australia and 
illegal casino operators (Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989; Hickie 1985).     
Research into successful criminal entrepreneurship and organised crime is still in its infancy 
stage, as only three studies have been carried out by Morselli (2001, 2003), and more recently 
by Lauchs and Staines (2012), focusing solely on successful criminal entrepreneurs in 
organised crime. The work of Morselli (2001, 2003), Lauchs and Staines (2012) focused 
mostly on the social network aspect of criminal entrepreneurship. The outcome studies by 
Morselli (2001, 2003), and Lauch and Staines (2012) suggests criminal entrepreneurs owe 
their success to their network location and connections. Criminal entrepreneurs occupy 
brokerage positions. Brokerage, in its simplest form, involves connecting unconnected parties 
and individuals. In this way the criminal entrepreneurs are able to control and access 
information. By controlling information, the criminal entrepreneur becomes aware of the 
needs of other criminal groups and individuals, and therefore the criminal milieu. The 
criminal entrepreneur can thus sell information to the police to make arrests, or to rival 
criminal groups to overpower other criminal groups. By knowing the needs of the criminal 
milieu, criminal entrepreneurs can also found their own criminal organisations and provide 
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the required products and services to other criminal groups and individuals. One of the most 
common services provided by criminal entrepreneurs who hold a brokerage position with 
corrupt police is immunity from prosecution (Lauchs and Staines 2012). Through their 
connections with corrupt police, criminal entrepreneurs can gain immunity from prosecution 
by either paying bribes or providing information on criminal activities in the area. In 
exchange, criminal entrepreneurs are granted immunity from prosecution, which they extend 
to select criminal groups and individuals for a fee or favours.    
This study extends the effort of Morselli (2001, 2003) and Lauch and Staines (2012) by 
confirming their findings in Australia. It also describes the internal factor that contributes to 
the success of the criminal entrepreneurs, which is leadership. External factors that also 
contribute to the success of criminal entrepreneurs, including the embedded resources in their 
social networks, such as mentors and human capital and their network location such as in 
brokerage and centrality, are also described. 
In order to describe the changes and developments in criminal entrepreneur leadership, 
operational approaches and social networks throughout their life-cycle; this study divided the 
criminal entrepreneur’s lives and careers into four phases. Phases One and Two are prior to 
success in crime; Phase Three is the peak of the criminal entrepreneur’s criminal career 
success, Phase Four is the end of the peak or the decline of the criminal career. The phases 
were determined based on catalysts such as a connection to a powerful corrupt police officer, 
occupying a brokerage position in a network, or an event such as being incarcerated which 
led to or caused a significant change in the criminal entrepreneur’s life or career. The 
rationale behind dividing the criminal entrepreneur’s life and career into four phases was to 
describe the changes in their leadership, identity, operational approach and social network 
throughout their life. By dividing the criminal entrepreneur lives and careers, the researcher is 
able to describe how the changes occurred and the forces, reasons or causes behind them. 
Understanding and outlining the forces behind the changes that led to the success or failure of 
criminal entrepreneurs is of significant importance to law enforcement agencies, as they can 
focus their efforts on disabling the contributors to the success of criminal entrepreneurs.        
In order to describe the internal and external contributors to criminal entrepreneur success, 
this study adapted Smith’s (2009) framework of modus essendi, modus operandi and modus 
vivendi. Modus essendi, in this study, enabled the researcher to understand the behaviour of 
the criminal entrepreneurs, in particular leadership and identity. Leadership is composed of 
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vision, leadership style, and orientation, while identity is composed of the entrepreneur’s 
identity, including self-conception and identity status. The rationale behind focusing on 
criminal entrepreneur leadership and identity is their significant role in the success of a 
criminal entrepreneur career. This study also describes the roots of criminal entrepreneur 
vision, and how they perceive themselves, which has implications for early intervention 
programmes.  
The second element in Smith’s (2009) framework involves illustrating the criminal 
entrepreneur’s operational approach, through modus operandi. Five elements make up the 
modus operandi of criminal entrepreneurs, and includes any occurrences that had a 
significant influence on the criminal entrepreneur’s life or career, the motives behind the 
occurrence/event, the individuals involved in the event, the location of the event, and 
outcome of the event, whether it served its motive or not. The rationale behind outlining the 
modus operandi of the criminal entrepreneur is to understand any external factors that 
contributed to their success and choice of career. Modus operandi also enables the researcher 
to understand how the criminal entrepreneurs conducted their crimes successfully. Modus 
operandi also illustrates changes in a criminal entrepreneur’s operational approach to 
overcoming any challenges and responding to changes in the environment. The third element 
in Smith’s (2009) framework is modus vivendi. Modus vivendi is the value extracted from the 
criminal entrepreneur’s network and their ability to co-exist with other criminals and criminal 
groups in the same area. The embedded resources and their network location within the 
criminal entrepreneur’s social network were described. In this study, the embedded resources 
focused on criminal, police, political, money laundering and gang capital, in addition to 
mentors and human capital. Mentors are those who provide guidance to the criminal 
entrepreneurs in their career. The rationale behind focusing on mentors is their ability to 
provide connections that would enhance the criminal entrepreneur’s chances to access 
opportunities in the market and in human capital. Human capital is the knowledge, or ‘know-
how’, of being successful at crime. The rationale behind focusing on mentorship and human 
capital involves their significant role in the success of the criminal entrepreneur careers, as 
described in the literature (Morselli, Tremblay and McCarthy 2006).  
Modus vivendi also describes the criminal entrepreneur network location. The network 
location focuses on the criminal entrepreneur’s location within their network, such as 
occupying brokerage and central positions. The importance of understanding the criminal 
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entrepreneur network location involves its significant contribution to their success, as 
documented in the work of Morselli (2001) and Lauchs and Staines (2012). 
This study found that all four criminal entrepreneurs featured in the study had a clearly 
defined vision. Not all had an original criminal vision, but they adopted a criminal vision to 
overcome corruption and challenges in the environment. Two main external factors had a 
significant influence on the formation of the criminal entrepreneur vision: social capital and 
literature such as provided by the mass media. Social capital, literature, role models and 
personal experience contributed to the formation of criminal entrepreneur vision. Once the 
vision was defined, all four criminal entrepreneurs led, at the peak of their careers, with a 
charismatic leadership style toward their vision. The four criminal entrepreneurs in this study 
had a clearly defined identity at the peak of their career. Although the identities differed, not 
all criminal entrepreneurs identified themselves as criminals. This study revealed that social 
capital has a significant influence on criminal entrepreneur identity and identity status, as loss 
of criminal capital can lead to the loss of identity.  
The four criminal entrepreneurs started their careers by identifying a gap in market. This 
study argues that the gaps in the criminal market can be created by law enforcement agencies 
and personnel, in addition to criminals and criminal groups. Law enforcement agencies create 
gaps in the criminal market by making arrests. In other words, by arresting criminals in non-
hierarchically structured organised crime, law enforcement agencies remove criminal services 
and/or product providers and suppliers. In effect, a criminal entrepreneur will provide the 
service and/or products needed in the criminal milieu, and fill the gap in the market.  
Once criminal entrepreneurs fill a gap in the market, they engage in bribery to ensure the 
collaboration of corrupt police and avoid interruption to their illegal activities. Bribery is also 
used by criminal entrepreneurs to access information from corrupt police, such as about 
ongoing investigation into their criminal activities, however the criminal entrepreneurs of this 
study did not adapt the classic one-degree structure of bribery where A bribes B. The criminal 
entrepreneurs engaged in a triad structure where A bribes B, and B bribes C. The triad 
structure reduces the possibility of extortion and being blackmailed, as A is aware of B and 
C’s arrangements, where if A was to be extorted for the bribes they paid, A can expose B and 
C’s bribery arrangement.  
The entrepreneurs in this study also engaged in what is known as entrepreneurial blackmail, 
where the victims were voluntarily lured into having sex. The victims had sex with men, 
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women and minors, and all were filmed and photographed without their permission or 
knowledge. Later, the victims, who were high-profile personnel working in the government 
and law enforcement agencies were blackmailed with the films and photographs in the case 
they interfered with the criminal entrepreneur’s criminal operations. Blackmail and bribery 
made a significant contribution to the success of the criminal entrepreneurs in this study.  
Modus vivendi also made a significant contribution to the careers of criminal entrepreneurs. 
Modus vivendi focused on the criminal entrepreneur’s network location, which includes 
brokerage and centrality. The four criminal entrepreneurs in this study all occupied brokerage 
positions and central positions in their network of speciality. For instance, McPherson 
occupied a central position in the criminal milieu as a protection provider, and a brokerage 
position with a corrupt police network (Reeves 2007a; Morton and Lobez 2011; Coy 2010). 
Freeman had a central position in the illegal gambling network, and a brokerage position with 
a corrupt police network (Coy 2010; Freeman 1988; Reeves 2011). Saffron had a central 
position in the illegal liquor trade and a brokerage position with corrupt police (Saffron 2009; 
Reeves 2007b; Piper 2010). Askin had a central position in politics and a brokerage position 
with corrupt police and illegal casino operators (Hancock 2006; Goot 2007; Reading 1989; 
Hickie 1985). Modus vivendi also describes the embedded resources in networks, which 
includes criminal, police, political, money laundering and gang capital in addition to mentors 
and human capital. 
With the exception of Askin, all criminal entrepreneurs in the study had more than one 
mentor. Mentors provided human, criminal and social capital. Mentors also provided the 
human capital of dealing with corrupt police and politicians, and placing criminal 
entrepreneurs in a brokerage position. Mentors choose their protégés based on their merits, 
such as willingness to learn and a collaborative attitude, and the privileges they provide, such 
as criminal capital. Finally this study argues that criminal human capital alone cannot lead 
criminal entrepreneurs to success as social capital and network locations are needed in order 
for criminal human capital to be effective. 
The findings of this study confirm the hypotheses that criminal entrepreneurs have a clear 
vision, lead with a charismatic leadership style with personal orientation. This study confirms 
the hypotheses that criminal entrepreneurs avoid conflict, bribe, blackmail and broker, in 
addition to having the capacity for violence and controlling violence. The hypotheses that 
criminal entrepreneurs have mentors, are connected to protection providers such as police, 
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operate in multiple networks, join existing criminal groups, create their own criminal groups, 
and have an open network early in their career and a close network later are confirmed.   
Finally the theory of successful criminal entrepreneurs argues that criminal entrepreneurs 
have high levels of self-control. Criminal entrepreneurs have clear vision, charismatic 
leadership styles and personal orientation. The operational approach of criminal 
entrepreneurs includes filling a gap in the criminal milieu, brokerage, bribery and blackmail. 
Criminal entrepreneur social networks include mentor, criminal, police, political and money 
launderer capital. Finally criminal entrepreneurs occupy brokerage and central positions in 
their network, which is of significant importance to policing organised crime.    
The significant contribution of this study to policing organised crime is, first, that it enables 
law enforcement agencies to identify potentially successful entrepreneurs by targeting 
charismatic individuals who are able to connect and attract followers in criminal milieus. 
Those individuals are more likely to hold central positions in their field of expertise 
(including the specific network of the field) and a brokerage position with corrupt police. 
These individuals are more likely to be connected to mentors who could be organised crime 
leaders and/or corrupt police. Policing organised crime can also start from within the police 
force, by identifying corrupt police who are providing protection to organised criminal 
groups and leaders. Last, as the police make arrests in the criminal milieu, further research is 
needed to develop an approach to fill the gaps in the milieu/market created by the arrest and 
removal of criminals, which creates new opportunity in the criminal market for potentially 
successful criminal entrepreneurs.   
This study is not without its limitations. The first limitation of this study is generalisation, as 
this study is conducted in Australia which has higher levels of corruption and lower levels of 
trust among criminals during the lives of the four criminal entrepreneurs featured in this 
study. Second this study focused on leadership only, and did not include other skills and 
qualities that criminal entrepreneurs could have. Finally this study only focused on four 
operational approaches, filling a gap in the market, brokerage, bribery and blackmail, 
although this study did not describe all the modus operandi of blackmail carried out by 
McPherson, Freeman and Askin. Further research is needed to describe and understand other 
criminal entrepreneur modus operandi, such as operating successful criminal operations 
overseas. The theory of successful criminal entrepreneurs is yet to be tested and confirmed on 
criminal entrepreneurs in hierarchically structured organised crime. 
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